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Abstract 
This thesis examines the continually developing Iranian-Chinese relationship in the Contemporary Era 
and if it can be classified as a Tacit alliance. Under analysis is the affect that domestic, regional and 
international developments have had upon the evolution of their political-economic relations and 
what this reveals about the nature of the relationship itself. This dissertation shows that relations and 
decisions between the two states are not always based on tangible decrees or treaties but within a 
framework of unspoken understanding and co-operation. The relationship is influenced by existing 
historical and cognitive frameworks with regard to foreign policy and economic security. As such the 
orientation towards this informal alliance is constructed and reinforced by the identities, interests, 
norms and values of the two societies and perceptions of distance (politically) between one another 
from the silk road era to the present day, as supported by holistic constructivist theory and cognitive 
approaches to foreign policy. Iranian-Chinese relations are the creation of myriad factors at many 
levels of interaction, be they regional, international or historical. However, this thesis focuses on the 
nature and drivers of their relationship.  
 
 
 
Please Note: Parts of this thesis have been included in papers that have already been published or 
submitted on-line for conferences, as follows (and submitted with the thesis): 
Joharchi. S., 2013. A Tacit Alliance: An Analysis of Chinese-Iranian Relations. The Maghreb Review. 
Joharchi. S., 2012. Post-Colonial, Hermeneutic…or Both? The Problem of Interpreting Iranian 
Foreign Policy. Paper submitted on line for the BISA-ISA international Conference, 2012: Edinburgh.   
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Introduction 
Iranian-Chinese relations are not a modern phenomenon. Historic relations between the two powers 
can be traced as far back as the Parthian and Sassanid Empires of greater Iran (141 BCE to 208 CE) 
which were in regular economic and political contact with the Han and Tang Dynasties of China Proper 
(206 BCE to 907 CE) (Fischel, 1951). Each boasted grand and advanced, historically rooted civilisations 
of great regional power and influence. Such relations appeared to have endured into the 20th century 
with the respective formations of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the People’s Republic of China 
(Fischel, 1951). This historical association was born out of mutual gain and the common interest of 
trade preservation and protection along the Silk Road through co-opted guardianship.  
In the contemporary era the relationship between these two states is as complex as it is 
dynamic, as well as being of international interest. Iran and China are both significant actors in two 
highly important regions of the contemporary world: China, a rising global power and Iran the 
strongest state in the energy abundant Persian Gulf. On such a statement of the positions of the two 
states it would seem unproblematic that they maintain positive and enhanced diplomatic and trade 
relations with one another. Indeed, the US and the EU are important actors in two important regions 
of the world and it naturally makes sense that they would foster, where possible, amicable, if not 
friendly, relations. The case is far from clear cut, however. Iran has been at odds with western powers 
since the spectacular revolution of 1979 in which it turned its back on the special relationship it had 
with the US as a key ally, in preference for a return to non-secular, foundational values.  
In the wake of 9/11 and 7/7 Iran was denounced as a member of the Axis of Evil (Chomsky 
and Achcar, 2007:155). Recent aims, objectives and actions with regard to the development of its 
nuclear energy programme have also exacerbated international concerns that Iran is intent on 
developing nuclear weapons capabilities. As a result, it has been the recipient of numerous and 
extensive economic and trade sanctions, requested by the United States and supported by United 
Nations members (Afrasiabi and Maleki, 2003:255). China, on the other hand, is very much a member 
of the global economy with the restructuring of its economy after Mao Zedong (1949-1976) into a 
liberal free market, despite retaining a socialist political system (Wu and Lansdowne, 2009). It is highly 
interdependent with the US and boasts trade relations and ties with an extensive array of Western, 
Asian and other international peers. It is highly economically successful, with year on year GDP 
increases and has seen a significant improvement in its diplomatic relations (Chinability, 05.11.11). 
Such information poses the question, why then is China (or does China appear to be) so intent on 
fostering and maintaining positive relations with an international pariah? China may have voted in 
favour of NATO sanctions against Iran but the government is also consistently on record expressing 
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the desire that alternative measures be explored instead. China is an advocate of the opening of 
discursive relations between NATO powers and Iran, believing that sanctions are not the most 
appropriate plan of action (Farrar-Wellman and Frasco, 2010) with President Hu Jintao stating that 
they are - ‘quite confident that friendly and profound economic relations between the two countries 
should continue forever’ (Farrar-Wellman and Frasco, 2010). Indeed, China has gone so far as to 
employ third parties, such as Taiwan, to facilitate trade in order to bypass sanctions. China and Iran 
are heavily involved in mutually profitable billion dollar deals with regard to industry, construction 
and energy. China is aiding Iranian development of its oil fields, both inland and offshore, as well as 
its railway system, dams and shipyards. Iran in return buys up to 30-40, 000 barrels of refined 
petroleum daily from China (Leyne, 16.04.2010). China has also shown interest in joining the Iran-
Pakistan gas pipeline venture in the wake of India’s exit from the commitment (Farrar-Wellman and 
Frasco 2010). 
Iran, in the contemporary arena, is very much at the mercy of the processes of globalisation. 
A growing population must be supported, economically, politically and socially. Iran has difficulty due 
to inherent mismanagement, both as a result of the first Gulf War which put longer term structural 
developments on hold, and as a result of stalemates amongst the ruling elites (Minmansour, M., 2007). 
Economic sanctions and limited trading and investment opportunities with the external world have 
also led to the retardation of economic growth. A direct result of this is the rapid urbanisation of the 
Iranian population in a climate of economic stagnation internationally which has a direct domestic 
domino effect. The status of Iran can be separated into two camps, those that urbanise with 
development and those that urbanize without it. The result is the lack of a clear middle level urban 
centre to bridge the gap between underdeveloped cities such as Hormozgan and Kerman, with major 
cities such as Tabriz, and Tehran (Minmansour, M., 2007). Through continued interaction, the 
relationship with China mediates the risks that globalisation presents to Iran, inviting Chinese firms, 
information and investment with aid, trade, knowledge production and development. This is Iran’s 
back door into the international economy and it has substantive possible effects on regional 
transformation. Iranian advancement and development is an area of concern not just regionally with 
regard to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) but also internationally, especially with its 
development of nuclear capabilities.  
Economic security is a key foreign policy consideration of any state, regardless of its level of 
development. Also important in foreign policy formation and implementation are the roles of norms, 
values, history and experience. Iranian-Chinese relations have their roots in historical and civilisational 
narratives. The two states have at times been aloof or distant with one another, tensions rising over 
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disagreements or ideological divergences. Regardless of this, or more to the point, in spite of this, 
there exists no historical occurrence which is set in the national or civilisational narrative to foster 
resentments between them. In the context of psychological factors of foreign policy analysis (FPA), it 
could be said then, when considering the actions or motivations of one another, the existing schema’s 
or knowledge frameworks for assimilation, are not based on negative past experiences or enemy 
images. Despite both suffering long periods of humiliating interference, intervention and/or control 
from external actors, be it Japanese expansion or European colonialism, neither in their nation state 
or civilisational guises has ever made a victim of the other.  
It is no secret that Iran’s relationship with many ‘Western’ powers, especially the US, is 
contentious at best. Indeed, Iran has been the recipient of numerous sanctions in the aftermath of the 
1979 Iranian revolution and more contemporarily with regard to its nuclear energy programme (Vakil, 
2006:52). Iran is also out of favour with significant actors in the international community over fears of 
its nuclear development programmes. These fears are born out of, or exasperated by, psychological 
dispositions with regard to cognitive processes and the assimilation of information into existing 
schemas (Clarke, and White, 1989:143). This is to say that in the eyes of the US for instance, Iran has 
acted in a negative manner previously. The 1979 revolution and a turn against western values, 
followed by the 1981 Iranian hostage crisis was seen as a betrayal to the US. This results in the use of 
theories such as mirror image, image of the enemy theories and Fundamental Attribution Error 
theories to assess actions and perceived or assumed motives of other states (Clarke and White, 
1989:145). China and Iran have a long history of diplomacy and interaction which has specific effects 
on their inherent images and assumptions of one another which, as a result, are important to consider 
in any assessment of their relationship. 
In contrast, it can be argued that Russian-Iranian or even Russian-Chinese relations would be 
a much more timely subject of research in light of current events in the MENA surrounding the fall out 
of the Arab spring and the conflicts raging, specifically in Syria. Such an analysis however would add 
little additional dimension to the study of the role of identity and historical narrative in the formation 
and execution of foreign policy. To take Russian dynamic in particular, with regard to either state is 
certainly an interesting endeavour however, it is also vacillatory at best. In the case of China, it began 
as Russia’s protégé, before throwing those shackles off under the leadership of Mao Zedong from 
1949-1959 (Xia, 2000:11). Tensions rose during this time as Mao felt subverted and adopted a level of 
distain for his former mentor. Following the collapse of the USSR, rapprochement with Russia began 
in 1996, with commitments to a constructive partnership in 1996 and a treaty of co-operation in 2001 
(Nye, 2015:6).  The two neighbours also share a long land border which puts them within one another’s 
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security sphere in a way that distance between states does not and they are both founding members 
of the SCO, with smaller states which is a security organization constructed in part in reaction to 
growing US presence in the Asian region (Huasheng, 2006: 118). As their relationship develops it 
breeds greater co-operation and diplomatic ties, however there is a specific history of tension – from 
China’s experience of colonial imperialism to the swords at dawn period of the 1960’s which points to 
a relationship which, over the long duree represents a series of peaks and troughs.  
Iranian-Russian relations, in contrast, are also plagued by historical experience. The 
codification of an anti-hegemonic policy in the re-drafting of its constitution following the 1979 
revolution immediately puts Russia, along with the USA and  many European states, at a distance. In 
the run up to Khomeini’s rise to power the communist influence in Iran was strong, represented and 
endorsed by the communist Tudeh party until it was crushed by the Ayatollah’s victory and 
subsequent consolidation of power. Though relations with Russia can be traced back to 1521 (Logan, 
2002:91), this relationship has, and arguably still does, fluctuate between co-operation, or 
collaboration, and rivalry. Since the fall of the USSR relations have steadily improved, benefiting from 
the UN imposed economic sanctions placed on Iran which, despite Russia predominantly vetoing, have 
resulted in the later becoming one of the former’s top trading partners (MacFarquhar, 2016:1). In the 
contemporary era they also join forces with Iraq and Syria to form the RSII coalition, a joint intelligence 
sharing operation between the four opponents of ISIS as both Russia and Iran come out in support of 
the Assad regime – a long standing ally for both (Jethro, 2015:1). Again, as with China, Iranian-Chinese 
relations, though they may be cooperative and collaborative at present, have not always been so and 
hold within them a history as much of enmity as of amity.  
In analysis of Iranian-Chinese relations and the formation of a tacit alliance between the two 
provides a specific reading of the identity narrative that is present in cognitive foreign policy making 
and the ways in which the historical narrative influences decisions yes, but more importantly the 
perceptions upon which such decisions are made. Unlike Relations with Russia, Iranian-Chinese 
relations do not have, in the modern era, the memory of previous tensions or conflicts to act as checks 
and balances on greater integration or to colour concepts of trust and risk in decision making. As such 
the narrative that is constructed is subtly but significantly different and so offers a more original lens 
through which to asses decision making and alliance creation in the absence of a formal treaty.  
This is a highly contemporary area to research, discussing a relationship which is still in the 
process of development and transformation. As such it has huge potential to transform existing 
relations and situations. The Middle East is an important region for the international community, due 
to the global dependency on hydrocarbon reserves. Indeed, the US has long been aware that the 
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maintenance of hegemonic power is reliant on the control of the economic levers of such power – 
specifically control and influence over energy resources (Chomsky and Achcar, 2007:135). This is not 
to say that the South Central Asian region is not also of significant importance to the US. Since the end 
of the Cold War, the states of these regions have been embracing various opportunities presented to 
them to liberalise their trade structures and integrate as fully as possible into the world economy. This 
can be seen through the development of regional initiatives such as the SCO, ASEAN, APEC and AFTA 
(Ellings and Simon, 1996:18). Also pursued have been bi- and multi-lateral agreements at the 
international level with trading blocs such as the EU and NATO (ibid, p89). Such efforts have resulted 
in significant annual GDP increases at the regional level (though of course national differences in rates 
of growth are naturally present). It is also of considerable strategic importance for the transit of Middle 
Eastern oil to external markets. It also offers extensive trade markets and low cost labour for Western 
firms and states. US presence in the region has diminished somewhat since the early 1990s, 
particularly in military terms. Following the end of the Cold War numerous US bases were withdrawn 
and, as tensions in the MENA heightened, the US became pre-occupied; it is still an area of wealth and 
potential for the western powers, however. In short both regions are of significant importance to the 
US, though for rather different reasons and so they cannot truly be compared (Ellings and Simon, 
1996:98-100).  
Indeed, any such attempt at a comparison is far beyond the scope of this thesis. What is under 
scrutiny is the nature of Iranian-Chinese relations. The central interest of this thesis is to analyse 
Iranian-Chinese politico-economic relations and how they are conducted in the absence of a formal 
alliance, as well as their impact both regionally and internationally. This relationship has many external 
implications. Not just with regard to regional transformation but also the international community. In 
exploring, analysing and evaluating this relationship in economic security terms this dissertation builds 
on ‘Tacit Alliance Theory’. This will naturally involve an analysis, or consideration, of regional and 
international dynamics but only in so far as they support the cause. The proposal of the existence of 
an intangible relationship between states was first formalised in the work of Sylvia Crosbie (1974) in 
her influential book A Tacit Alliance: France and Israel from Suez to the Six Day War. This work 
describes and analyses the informal alliance which developed between the two states in the 1950s 
and 1960s, though it actually has its roots in earlier interactions (Crowe, 1974: p660). This concept of 
a Tacit Alliance is one that has received very little scholarly attention generally. In analysing the 
applicability of Tacit Alliance theory to Iranian-Chinese relations this thesis departs from the more 
traditionally empirical discussions of security co-operation and theories of the ‘end of alliances’ that 
have tended to dominant the post-Cold War era (Oest, 2007: 3). As such the underpinning assumption 
here is that though the nature and structure of alliances have changed, alliance theories still hold 
10 
 
relevance in the contemporary era – specifically tacit alliance theory. Since the original application of 
TAT to an analysis of French-Israeli relations in the 1960’s there has been little further research, 
though it has been applied to understandings of the dynamics of Sino-American relations in the post-
Cold War era (Moore, 2014) and to Israeli-African relations (Polakow-Suransky in 2010).  The alliance 
discussed in the first of these two cases was concluded to have come to an end, though the Israeli-
South African case appears to be ongoing. TAT moves away from the traditional security centred 
alliances in that it develops an understanding of bilateral state relations which allows for the evolution 
of more complex, less territorially based interests that have evolved in line with the ever more 
globalized and economically interdependent world of the contemporary era. Whilst alliances have not 
ceased, they have arguably changed in size and shape to represent more politico-economic entities 
that recognize the importance of non-traditional security concepts and the dynamics of national-
international two-way influences. A Tacit Alliance is one such representation of the interplay between 
such dynamics, which can be witnessed in an analysis of Iranian-Chinese relations.    
An assessment of the relationship between Iran and China would be a daunting task, created as 
it is of myriad factors and considerations at the domestic, regional, international and historical levels. 
This thesis will take a considerably narrower form, since what is under scrutiny relates directly to the 
nature and drivers of their relationship and the extent to which it is underpinned by a tacit 
commitment to one another, within a framework of historical civilisational lineage and psychological 
effects of victimisation and exploitation (again, by many but never each other). As such there will be 
instances when it will be necessary to discuss them separately, but always in relation to one other vis-
a-vis greater trends and commitments. With this endeavour in mind the aims of the investigation will 
be threefold:  
1) To explore the nature of Iranian and Chinese foreign policy decision-making and the impact of 
identity and cognitive factors in this process. 
2) To investigate the political and economic dimensions of the Iranian-Chinese relationship in the 
contemporary era with particular reference to domestic and international economic security. 
3) To evaluate the extent to which the Iranian-Chinese relationship represents a Tacit Alliance and 
what this could mean for international relations.  
These aims will be pursued in the form of the analysis of the following three research questions  
1) What are the key features of Iranian and Chinese foreign policy decision-making and what are 
the psychological and cognitive factors that influence these processes? 
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2) What impact do the political and economic dimensions of Iranian-Chinese relations have upon 
domestic and international economic security interests and concerns and how are they impacted 
by them in turn? 
3) Are there sufficient grounds to classify the Iranian-Chinese relationship as a Tacit Alliance? If so 
what does this relationship suggest with regard to the evolving dynamics of the south central 
Asian region? 
An exploration and analysis of the Chinese-Iranian bilateral relationship can give rise to 
numerous hypotheses with regards to power politics, liberal institutionalism, foreign policy 
frameworks and so on. The hypothesis to be tested in this project is as follows: 
‘The relationship between China and Iran is indeed a tacit one, that is to say that it is informal and 
intangible in nature. This relationship is influenced by existing historical and cognitive frameworks 
with regard to foreign policy and economic security but is also affected by external powers and factors’.  
The thesis will begin with a literature review which will set the political economic relationship 
between the two states within the wider theoretical and analytical arena. Divergence and 
convergence in policies, norms, values and commitments between the two states will be analysed. 
Also considered will be general trends in interpretation – by one another and external powers. China, 
at the end of the Cold War was viewed with great suspicion by its regional neighbours and the US, 
indeed many of the fears expressed with regard to Iran’s lack of transparency and unwillingness to act 
‘responsibly’ were mirrored in similar views expressed towards China at the fall of the Cold War in the 
Early 1990’s (see Ellings, R.J., and Simon. S.W., 1996). The majority of the literature to be reviewed 
will be no more than 15 years old, to maintain a contemporary analysis. Older sources will be used 
where necessary. One such example of this is the work of R.J Ellings and S.W. Simon on ‘Southeast 
Asian Security in the New Millennium’. Though published in 1996 it is an excellent example of 
interpretation and assumption with regard to the nature of China’s rise to power and external 
interpretations of its intensions and aspirations.  
Also of importance in this section will be a discussion of classical paradigms within IR. Iranian-
Chinese relations can clearly be analysed using Balance of Power theory, the two states using one 
another to boost their own positions and development, as well as checking the hegemonic 
interventionist nature of the United States and its regional aspirations in the interests of maintaining 
controls of the dominant levels of the global economy – namely energy resources and trade relations. 
Liberal Complex interdependence theory can also be used to analyse the relationship at hand. Each 
state has something that the other wants and so cooperate in numerous ways, resulting in a complex 
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web of interdependence which makes extraction difficult. Each state gradually has more to lose from 
distancing itself from the other over time, making it more and more difficult. This can be seen equally 
as clearly in China-US economic relations. China leases a significant degree of US treasury bonds to 
the extent that, if it did not renew its leases the US economy would be delivered a potentially fatal 
blow. Such an act though would also result in devastating China’s economy: the economies of the two 
have become intricately intertwined. Such alternate theories will be discussed, alongside the reasons 
why they are being rejected for this thesis. This is not to say that Iranian-Chinese relations cannot be 
explained in traditional power politics or interdependency terms, but rather that they omit too much 
which is necessary whilst including too much which is not.  
Following on from this will be a discussion and defence of the theoretical and methodological 
framework of this thesis. Tacit Alliance Theory, developed by Sylvia Crosbie, analyses the informal 
alliance between states. Due to its normative nature Tacit Alliance Theory will be analysed using 
Holistic Constructivism. Holistic Constructivism posits the international and the domestic as two sides 
of the same coin; both affected by and effective of one another. This branch of Constructivism allows 
the most comprehensive analysis of all factors of effect within the informal Iranian-Chinese alliance. 
Holistic Constructivism as advanced by John Ruggie (Burchil and Linklater, 2007: 195) will allow the 
development of analysis with regard to the evolving relationship between China and Iran as well as 
allowing for domestic considerations and influences within that relationship.  
Cognitive foreign policy concepts such as schema theory, though supported by scholars such 
as Benjamine Goldsmith (cited by Sridharan, 2005), Jerel Rosati and Scott (Rosati and Scott, 2004), and 
David Houghton (2009), have their roots in the writings of sixteenth century Montaigne (Sridharan, 
2005:663). Schema theory aids analyses of the greater securitisation or de-securitisation of existing 
perceptions. The Iranian-Chinese relationship is shaped by economic security concerns and interests. 
It is also heavily influenced by pre-existing norms and values and historical experiences, by 
psychological factors, and as such cognitive FPA will also be employed in the interests of the most 
comprehensive analysis of all significant factors of influence. The use of a mixed methodological 
approach will be discussed in the second part of this chapter. It will be shown that such an approach 
is necessary to permit a greater array of methodological tools to be utilised (Creswell, 2011:35). In 
keeping with this anti-foundationalist approach, the epistemology will be normative. It will assess the 
extent to which the patterns of interactions are uniquely fuelled by individual foreign policy aims with 
regard to political and economic interests and the maintenance of the tacit alliance, so long as this 
alliance is beneficial to either side.  
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Though both qualitative and quantitative methods will be utilised for this research endeavour 
which will, occasionally, be empirical it does not aim to be empiricist. With regard to ontology and 
epistemology, this research will be conducted and consolidated within an anti-foundational and 
interpretivist framework. It shall be shown that international relations and alliances and the 
construction of foreign policies are effected by inherent cognitive factors (Clarke and White, 1989:145). 
Since the regional and international arena in which relations are conducted will be shown to be a social 
construct, interpretation will also need to be utilised and considered (Jervis, 1970:19). Data used will 
involve the analysis of existing research and trade data such as desk research, current documentation, 
trade reports and flows. Also included will be a critical discourse analysis of government 
representations of, and statements towards, one another which will reveal the construction, or lack 
thereof, of an informal alliance and the ways in which rhetorical devises are used to offset risk and 
increase trust between one another.  
Tacit Alliance Theory (TAT) offers interesting considerations regarding why and how states 
engage. China and Iran’s long history of diplomacy affects their inherent images and assumptions of 
one another which are important to consider in any assessment of their relationship. This will be built 
upon further in Chapters four and five, which seeks to analyse the specific foreign policy-making 
processes and the extent to which they are influence by cognitive factors. Both China and Iran have a 
commonality in their inclination to overtly incorporate their foreign policy experiences into their 
national and (especially important) historical narratives. Each is seen as an extension of the other and 
so mutually influential. History will play an important role in these chapters as they will be shown that 
decisions taken and interpretations made with regard to external actors are heavily influenced by past 
experiences. Both states for instance, have been at the mercy of colonialism, though to different 
degrees and in different manners. This ultimately affects their interpretations of the Western (and 
Japanese in the case of China) intentions and capacities to manipulate and humiliate. This is naturally 
a vast amount of ground to cover and so will be split into two chapters accordingly: chapter three 
concentrating on Iran and chapter four on China.  
Chapter five will bring the information from the two previous chapters together to analyse 
the ways in which the political and economic dimensions of Iranian-Chinese relations have shaped, 
and are shaped, by domestic and international economic security concerns and interests. Within this 
analysis will be a consideration of the nature of securitisation and the factors which result in the 
securitisation of benchmarks, specifically the greater securitisation of the overall economy, but in 
particular hydrocarbons and trade. A key rising concern with regard to this area, following the western 
financial crisis in 2008, is the state control of the Yuan (RMB) and the extent to which it is undervalued 
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(Morrison and Labonte, 2011). The two states are also moving closer together regionally. Each sees 
themselves as a natural superpower in their respective regions and so appear to be committed to 
regional stability and peace (though the two are not mutually exclusive). As such they have been highly 
visible in a number of regional organisations such as ASEAN and the SCO and the ECO (Vakil, 2006:61).  
 It will not be possible to exclude from this chapter a discussion of the ‘nuclear issue’ though 
it must be stressed that the aim is not to discover Iranian nuclear intentions. The nuclear issue is an 
important factor in the Iranian-Chinese relationship with regard to the transfer of technology and 
materials, be they ‘dual-use’ or otherwise. It is also important with regard to the 
securitisation/politicization of an ‘Iranian threat’. How China responds to the Iranian nuclear 
programme, its official discourse and external reactions has the potential to reveal much about how 
they see and interact with one another.  Connected to this will be a discussion on third party profit-
driven ‘front companies’ and politically driven ‘black knights’ which are used to ensure the delivery of 
trade commitments despite the extensive economic sanctions applied to Iran and firm wishing to 
conduct significant trade with it (Early, 2011:383).  
Chapter six applies Tacit Alliance Theory to Iranian-Chinese relations, in light of the previous 
chapters. Relations will be assessed with regard to the extent to which they are underpinned by a tacit 
commitment to support their status quo. If a Tacit Alliance does constitute the theory of best fit the 
facets which make up the whole will be addressed specifically to further cement the argument. That 
is to say that all factors pertaining to shared norms and values, economic and developmental interests, 
civilisational grandeur, historical humiliation at the hands of external interlopers, and regional 
ambitions, will need to be considered in an analysis of how, why and to what extent the relationship 
under scrutiny can be considered a Tacit Alliance. The final chapter will necessarily conclude on the 
overall ambitions of this project. The points made and areas addressed will be summarised and the 
relationship formally codified. Possible developments in the relationship may also be projected, such 
as the likelihood of the relationship surviving the return of Taiwan to China or a military strike on Iran 
by the US, or far less dramatic, the natural evolution of the South Central Asian region, in relation to 
the MENA and the various issues for consideration that may be raised which could influence or alter 
the dynamics of the relationship, if not the very relationship, or alliance, itself.  
Iranian-Chinese relations are important to understand. Both are significant states in their own 
regions. They are also high profile actors in the international arena. If either state speaks then they 
illicit a reaction from the dominant global powers. However, it is important to note here that this 
thesis does not state that they are necessarily heard, or responded to. And herein lies an issue of 
interest. China is ever more furnishing its image as a responsible international actor. It has chosen its 
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path of development and embraced capitalist economic tools in a way that it seems unable, or 
unwilling, to grasp politically. It is highly interdependent with the United States and growing more so 
with its regional neighbours, Latin America and the EU. 
Iran is on a similar path, it has committed its foreign policy actions to fostering greater trust 
and respect amongst regional neighbours and international peers such as the EU and states of Latin 
America, such as Brazil. Expansionist and interfering intent were absent from its negotiations with the 
West, and specifically the US, over Afghanistan and Iraq in the post 9/11 bubble of the war on terror. 
It also has set upon a course of development, though with a much greater start up challenge than 
China due to economic stagnation caused by years of economic sanctions and trade embargos. Why 
then are Iran and China committed to growing interdependence? Indeed, if the driving force behind 
China’s actions was the ability to hold the Iran card in the face of Washington’s Taiwan card then this 
makes little sense. If the Taiwan issue were to end, some form of resolution to be found, China would 
still be stuck with the Iran pariah at its heels – there seems little benefit. Indeed, parallel to greater 
Iranian-Chinese integrations, there has also been a thawing in relations between China and Taiwan 
and noises of a desire to put the issue of ownership on the back burner in favour of greater integration 
in terms of trade and economics.  
There is much media coverage of Iranian-Chinese cooperation, deals, support and interaction. 
In terms of the media, the relationship between the two can be well-chronicled with just a few strokes 
of a keyboard and a Google search engine. This interest has not yet saturated academic fields, however. 
There is such discussion to be found on Iran-US and China-US relations, but little on relations between 
the two states. This is surprising for several reasons, but above all because the relationship matters 
on many levels. It is arrogant to pass their cooperation off as an anti-hegemonic stance against the 
might and glory of the advanced and powerful West. It is still more arrogant to suggest that each is 
important only in relation to the West. The International system is changing, it may be slow and, at 
times unapparent, but it is changing nonetheless, and its forms can be seen in regional trends. Martin 
Jacques recently wrote a well-received book: When China Rules the World (2009). In it he discusses 
the evolution of a new world order with China at the helm. The book is not pro-Asia or anti-US. It 
states merely that the US and Western ideology are in a natural decline and China is the only fitting 
driver of a new system. Interestingly what is discussed is the importance of a new level of democracy: 
democracy not within a state but between states being the most important aspect of interaction and 
interdependence.  
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Relevance and originality 
Iran and China are heirs to two of the world’s most ancient civilisations. They are also in 
possession of two very different and unique social, economic and political systems in two regions 
growing ever closer in geo-strategic terms. Relations between the two nations, despite periods of 
cooling (1940's-1960s and 1979-1982) have remained fairly constant and amicable from the days of 
the silk route to the present, where they have flourished in economic and diplomatic terms. Despite 
this there has been very little study of the relationship between the two states. There are to be found 
various studies, commentaries and media reports that reference Iranian-Chinese relations or discuss 
issues or aspects of engagement, such as China's response to the Iranian nuclear issue – or more 
specifically the proposal of punitive sanctions in relation to Iranian intensions; also details of trade and 
economic transactions and their impact on each or either state’s development, though generally in 
relation to the wider international community. Lacking from such literature is an in-depth discussion 
or analysis of the relationship itself, its drivers and agents, impact, or potential impact, at the regional 
and international levels – both now and in the future – and above all its very nature and implications.  
In brief Iran and China have enjoyed amicable relations, as joint guardians of the silk routes, 
as far back as the Parthian and Han empires and dynasties (circa 139BCE), until they ceased in the 
fifteenth century. Formal relations, though tepid, resumed in the 1920's with limited trade relations, 
only to cease again in the 1940's. China's conversion to a people’s republic in 1949, further 
exacerbated relations with Iran's unwillingness to recognise its legitimacy. The reasons for this are 
numerous, based on national interest, ideological difference and geographic distance to name just a 
few as well as experiences of, and relations with, external powers. Whilst it would be interesting to 
expand on these issues, they are not, in detail, the aim of this study and are mentioned in the interest 
of supplying a background to the history of the inter-state relations.  
In the 1950s China expressed an interest in renewing ties with Iran, as a result of anti-
imperialist uprisings in the latter how, due to its monarchical nature and heavy policy dependence on 
western, colonial powers, Iran declined. This attitude was revised in the 1960's as a result of domestic 
and international shifts, as Iran reconsidered its approach to China. The latter’s statement of support 
for the Shah on the eve of the 1979 revolution again resulted in retardation, though relatively short 
lived, in relations. China's appeasement and recognition of the Islamic Republic, combined with the 
breakout of the Gulf War, however, gave China its foot in the door as it became a major arms supplier 
of Iran (and also Iraq). Relations between the two powers since this time, though slow in taking off, 
have gone from strength to strength in economic, political and diplomatic terms. Despite this, the 
relationship has never been formalised into an official, and binding alliance – and thus is the rationale 
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for this investigation. 
The Middle East is an important region and will continue to be so until viable alternative 
energy sources are found. Even after this it is still an ancient region of civilisations, cultures, and the 
world’s fastest growing religion – Islam. Iran is on the rise regionally, attempting to combat patterns 
of regional distrust from neighbouring states and secure multi-lateral trade endeavours through 
systems such as the SCO. It recognises itself as the most suited nation to take pride of place as regional 
superpower. Being, in this regard, China’s regional peer. A new world order, be it still based on 
traditional capitalist principles, will be ever more shaped by the growing dominance of the more 
powerful, the agenda setters – already Chinese Mandarin is seeping into language schools as a highly 
relevant business language and is attracting more foreign students than the most important 
traditional European languages, including French and German. Chinese art and fashion are ever more 
popular at the galleries and fashion shows of New York and Milan. For too long the study of 
international relations has been western in focus, be it euro-centric or US-led. This overlooks 
important developments in other regions which can have profound effects on the international. For a 
point in turn see the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. One reason for the lack of 
appropriate prediction was an inability, or unwillingness, to assess the USSR within itself, outside of 
its relations with the US. The result was half a story and lack of preparation for an unexpected outcome.  
Iranian-Chinese relations are an important, yet overlooked, area of study that are necessary 
to understand and adequately interpret the international system and its developing trends. The 
evolution between the two states has important implications with regard to regional dynamics in 
central Asia as well and the MENA, not to mention the rest of the world. Many of the issues which 
surround Iran and its nuclear development programme concern lack of transparency. Yet to what 
extent has Iran been given the opportunities, within a favourable environment, to be transparent and 
accepted? It should also be noted that both states have experience of colonialism in all of its various 
forms of interference and manipulation. This naturally colours their perceptions. Being old colonies 
also affects the perceptions of their old colonial rulers, however. Will previous colonies not always, to 
an extent, be those that the west had to civilise? Barbarians that had to be taught to be correct and 
good and acceptable? Such may be the dominant view in western capitals, albeit unstated.  
There are numerous side issues that come from this thesis, opening myriad avenues of 
investigation with regard to the study of norms and values and critical approaches to IR. They are for 
now, however, beyond the pale. There is a significant gap in the research available on Iranian-Chinese 
relations at the national, regional and international levels. Indeed, the word gaps seems to be an 
understatement as there have been just three book published on the subject, one a history of the two 
18 
 
civilisations, one an assessment of their parallel histories (Burman, 2009: 5), and the third, a recent 
endeavour, by John Garver (2004), to discuss the Realist nature of the relationship – in light of the US 
position. This thesis is unique – for now – and through the development and application of Tacit 
Alliance Theory offers a new way of looking at states and state relations. In this respect it contributes 
to knowledge, and theory. Beyond this, it is a contribution that is of value to foreign policy-makers 
and analysis as well as IR scholars generally. It matters, it is useful, and above all, it has practical policy 
implications.  
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Chapter One: 
Literature Review 
Introduction  
On approaching the task of analysing Iranian-Chinese relations, it is quickly apparent that there are a 
wealth of both direct and indirect references to the mutual rhetoric between the two states, of shared 
historical experiences, civilisational lineage and amicable, if not friendly, interactions. In 1971, Zhou 
Enlai’s welcome of Princess Ashraf to China was framed with a rhetoric which stressed Chinese-Iranian 
relations dating back ‘more than two thousand years’ (cited in Graver, 2006:9). This was supported by 
a subsequent newspaper editorial linking positive relations back to the silk road (Gentry, 2005:124). 
In response to a similar speech delivered a year later to Farah, the lady replied in kind. This is worth 
mentioning at the beginning of this literature review because this rhetoric appears, at least, to run 
parallel to the motivations of concrete interests and ambitions, and at most, to be intricately 
intertwined with, or to underpin, them. Despite China voting in favour of NATO sanctions against Iran, 
President Hu Jintao (2002-2012) insisted that China was ‘quite confident that friendly and profound 
economic relations between the two countries should continue forever’ (Farrar-Wellman and Frasco, 
2010:1). 
 The role and use of rhetoric in this instance is far more complex, however, and one that needs 
to be clarified in the first instance. China and Iran continually fall back on a discourse of shared norms 
and values based on their long histories and relations as guardians of the Silk Road, allies against Soviet 
expansionism, and standard bearers of ancient civilisations and original great powers. President 
Ahmadinejad, in a speech given at Peking university (09.06.2012), referred to both China and Iran as 
‘ancient cultures which had both liberated themselves from colonialism’ (Press TV: 06.06.2012). Hu 
Guoqiang, in a similar vein gave recognition to both countries as ‘ancient civilisations […] enjoy[ing] 
historic relations […] since 2,000 years ago, the ancient Silk Road has connected [the] two countries 
together, and the friendship between [the] two countries has withstood the hardship of time and 
history’ (Chineseembassy.org; 18.07.2011). Official address of one to another concerning economic, 
cultural or political exchange are littered with such references and allusions to trust, friendship and 
respect. For example, Hua Guofeng, during a 1978 visit to Iran, stated that ‘[t]wenty years of 
Friendship between Chinese and Iranian peoples, provided a solid base for continuing cooperation’ 
(cited in Garver, 2006:10). Though this statement was offered before the 1979 revolution and so 
regime change in Iran, it suggests a continuation of attitudes, its roots being visible in Hu Jintao’s 
above allusion to a ‘profound’ friendship which ‘should continue forever’.  
20 
 
This is of course no secret and can be confirmed by the most sweeping glance of the internet, 
journal articles or newspapers. What is less clear, or rather less clearly defined, are the motivations 
for such behaviour. Iranian and Chinese interests are heavily intertwined as major energy suppliers 
and consumers. They are also highly invested in one another’s economies and in areas of research and 
development, trade and culture (to be discussed at length in chapter six). They also have a shared 
interest in a stable and secure MENA region and limited US interference. These interests are the 
drivers of Iranian-Chinese relations and dictate much that transpires between the two, wider global 
constraints permitting. What is interesting is that these policy goals would be no less important, or 
pursued, if stripped of their rhetorical garb of a millennia of friendship, deep trust and admiration. As 
such the literature review to follow will begin with an assessment of the presence and role of rhetoric 
generally. The following section will take this rhetoric further to discuss how the previous 
understanding fits with concepts of trust and risk in international relations. Trust and risk are 
important considerations in relations, or potential relations, between states and underpin the 
inclinations or reluctances of one state to approach or interact with another. An understanding of this 
is highly important in the contemporary era which is based on a global political economy of free 
markets and economic interdependence. The role of economic concerns with regard to security 
policies will then be discussed in the proceeding section, followed by an exploration of the concept of 
economic security as a specific aspect of foreign policy. This will naturally, and necessarily, result in 
the final section which will discuss spheres of influence. This is not a significant jump in subject matter. 
After discussing the roles of rhetoric, security, economics and foreign policy it is necessary to frame 
these with regard to discussions on where, or in which direction, such foreign policies are aimed - the 
framework within which the relations and interests of each state can be understood vis-à-vis their 
foreign and domestic policy aims and ambitions.  
Rhetoric 
Iran, China and the Persian Gulf, written by A.H.H. Abadi in 1982, published in the wake of the 1979 
Iranian revolution and Deng Xiaoping’s consolidation of power in China, is well written and informative, 
albeit slightly dated, with little to offer as a result of the myriad changes that have taken place 
internationally and domestically in each state since. The opening chapter begins with a description of 
the long standing, positive, relationship between Iran and China and their shared experiences as great 
powers, ancient civilisations and victims of European expansionism. Zhou Enlai, addressing Princess 
Ashraf on the 14th of April 1971, states: ‘friendly contact between [the] countries date back more than 
2000 years’ and he adds that: ‘[i]n modern times […] there have been fewer contacts as a result of 
imperialist obstruction and sabotage’ (cited in Abidi, 1982:57). As such, though it recognises the 
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significance of such discourse it has little to offer in the contemporary era. Martin Jacques in contrast 
(2011), dedicates only a brief section to Iran, which is seen to be at the heart of Chinese strategy in 
the Middle East. Despite this Jacques, whilst giving no direct examples of speeches of confidence or 
amenity between the two powers, highlights the use of rhetoric to ‘create a shared affinity between 
the two countries’ (p434). Though he consigns this fact to the margins, positing that core power and 
developmental interests alone are what underpin and influence the relationship. This raises the 
question, if they are as irrelevant as Jacques posits then why were they not omitted entirely from the 
reading. To mention the existence of such rhetoric is to denote that it has influence in some form, 
regardless of the extent to which it is considered effective. It should also be noted that despite Jacques’ 
writing about the rise and future of China, the section on its relationship with Iran is the smallest in 
the book. This theme of the use, or acknowledgement, of rhetoric is developed more broadly by John 
Garver in China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World (2006).  
Garver carries out a much needed discussion on Chinese-Iranian relations in the contemporary 
era. He considers how China and Iran consistently try to resist perceived US hegemony and invoke 
their ancient relations to legitimize the convergence of their national interests. The relationship 
between the two states is framed within the regional and international context and discusses the 
economic agreements between the two states as well as knowledge and technological transfers. The 
impact of this relationship on China-US relations is also addressed and China is shown, when pushed, 
to bend to US wishes, cancelling contracts already made with Iran. Despite this, China is acknowledged 
to consistently assist Iranian development and modernisation efforts as well as seeking their common 
interest of a Soviet- and United States-free Asia. Garver looks at the relationship between the two 
states from the time of the Shah, through the 1980-88 Gulf War, to the present day. He approaches 
this subject from a Realist power projection lens in which the rhetoric of trust and respect is a 
lubrication tool for the execution of pragmatic and independent interests and ambitions. Garver 
makes a significant contribution to the issue of the rhetoric of friendship between the two states. He 
readily acknowledges that despite concrete interests being the core drivers of interactions, this 
rhetoric has a deeper role to play as a reinforcement of ‘civilisational solidarity’ which ‘seem[s] to 
lubricate the process of Sino-Iranian co-operation’ (Gentry, 2005:123). In this respect it creates and 
reinforces the shared modern histories and the resultant norms and value systems of the two states. 
Importantly however, Garver sees the application of this rhetorical tool as secondary to the Pragmatic 
interests, rather than being crucial to their maintenance and so intertwined with the overall 
construction of their relations. This is a result of the realist framework utilized which subverts the roles 
of norms and values and diplomacy in favour of the objective agency of interests. This objectivity 
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however is little more than an illusion as it is the very narratives of experiences and beliefs that dictate 
interests and, more significantly, the behaviours and actions utilized to fulfil them.  
Lounnas Djallil (2011), in contrast, attempts to assess the China/US/Iran triangle in light of the 
Iranian nuclear crisis in purely factual terms. Great attention is given to the nature of trade, energy 
and technology transfers between the two powers and the wider influence of the United States. Iran 
is portrayed as an asset in more practical terms both in reference to its geo-political position and also 
as a deterrent to US hegemony over China or as a useful bargaining chip for China in reaction to the 
Taiwan card which could potentially be played by the United States. Whilst the article is useful and 
undeniably factually accurate it is very much focused on Iranian-Chinese dynamics in relation to US 
interest. It also prompts certain questions. In recent years China-Taiwan relations have been thawing 
and the urgency to have Taiwan return to Chinese control has wavered, or rather been put on the 
back burner in favour of opening greater diplomatic channels in light of China’s various good 
neighbour, harmonious rise policies (Wu and Lansdowne, 2009).  China is, and has always been, loyal 
to its perceived borders which continue to be of top priority, as can be seen by its refusal to negotiate 
ownership of contested South China Sea islands (Buzan, 2012). The government has been eager to 
adopt a stance of shared, regional responsibility and joint projects for development which appear to 
be taking priority over ancient boundary issues in China’s rise.  
Within this framework, the Taiwan card is of far less importance in security terms than is 
suggested by Djallil. This argument is supported by a recent item in The Economist (29.09.12: 9) which 
reports on reactions to a Taiwanese fishing fleet and patrol ships entering the disputed waters around 
Senkakus/Diaoyus. The skirmish that ensued and resulted in Taiwan’s withdrawal was notably with 
Japanese vessels rather than Chinese.  Dorraj and Currier (2008) also discuss Iran-China relations in 
the contemporary era and the extent to which they interact in economic terms. The authors in this 
instance begin with an historical overview of the psychological identification with one another of the 
two states to frame the instances of co-operation and interaction under assessment. Though they do 
not provide an in-depth analysis of the use of rhetoric, their article is a significant improvement on 
that of Djallil because it does include the rhetorical facet of the relationship. This rhetoric is important 
in framing and legitimizing relations between two states. It constructs a common sense view of why 
interactions and support for one another are offered and accepted: of course they will assist and 
defend one another (non-militarily), they are peers, who’s civilisational and historical experience gives 
rise to no period of previous conflicts and so creates the grounds for trust and amity. 
This more comprehensive assessment is needed to understand the full complexities of the 
Iranian-Chinese relationship, for it is these allusions to trust and friendship, to confidence, which 
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enable China, for instance, to back down and accept proposed sanctions against Iran in the UN, 
without being labelled as betrayers by the Iranians, and putting the economic interdependencies 
between them into crisis (UNSC press release). Notably, China is far more intertwined and dependant 
on the maintenance of close ties with the USA than with Iran and yet does not show the same pattern 
of reinforcing interactions with such rhetoric. Nor does it apply such a strategy with the EU or South 
Africa. In this respect it is possible to take the lead from what is not said, or documented. Inference to 
this rhetoric forms an almost constant backdrop to relations between the two powers for specific 
reasons which must be examined in closer detail for a better understanding of the starting point of an 
analysis of Iranian-Chinese relations. To clarify, it is not enough to simply state sources that include or 
exclude such rhetoric but rather to suggest, based on existing research, what the strength of patterns 
of interactions suggest in terms of both diplomacy and security, particularly between two states which 
have no formal, binding alliance with one another.  
Ben D. Mor in Credibility Talk in Public Diplomacy (2011) explores the wider implications and 
uses of rhetoric as a political tool in the accumulation and maintenance of soft diplomatic power. 
Though the article is predominantly written with reference to the use of rhetoric by one party against 
another, and specifically in relation to Israel and the Qana bombing, it is highly relevant in its general 
assessments. Mor assesses rhetoric in relation to the politics of credibility and ‘credibility talk’ as an 
act of power which has deep psychological roots intimately intertwined with emergent social orders 
and identity stability. This is reflected in the work of Morin and Gold (2010) which recognises rhetorical 
action as the strategic use of a set of claims to convince a given audience for gain maximisation (ibid, 
p566). In this light credibility is not a ‘real world’ tangible entity but rather it is created, reproduced 
and reinforced through interaction. Credibility construction is the product of the emergence of a 
normative structure produced itself out of identification with the credible and accepted rhetoric of 
actors regarding the decisions made and more importantly the social, cultural, political, economic and 
historical drivers of those decisions.  
China and Iran are both ancient civilisations which were once great powers and joint guardians 
of the Silk Road (Fischel, 1951). They have also been at the mercy of European expansionism and of 
colonialism. In identity terms they are both societies structured around a sense of shame, over guilt 
favoured in more western societies. Unlike guilt, which is tied to the individual, shame is a social 
concept concerning the wider implications of actions on reputations not just of the actors but their 
wider familial and social network. Here the similarities between the two societies end. Iran is a 
theocracy, ruled by the tenants and laws of Islam above all else. China in turn is truly secular, a society 
constructed around a system of filial piety (Jacques, 2011: 344). Their customs, practices and 
24 
 
languages are different.  Even their regions of interest do not converge as much as one would expect. 
China is of Asia and its primary, regional interests are of Asia. Whilst Iran could technically be classified 
as being of Asia it is classified as belonging to the MENA and its interests highlight its support of this 
classification despite it being a non-Arab state with more cultural and linguistic commonalities with 
Asian states such as Afghanistan and Turkmenistan (Kurtaran, 2011; Page). They are not Kin countries 
in the sense posited by Samuel Huntington (2002) nor do they constitute the type of imagined 
community supported by benedict Anderson (2006). Nor have they committed to any formal binding, 
internationally recognised alliances. In addition, in the contemporary era there is also, a distinct lack 
of similarity in the way in which each is viewed by the wider international community. Whilst 
commentators and scholars alike allude to China’s potential and increasing dominance in the coming 
century, Iran is often viewed (or dismissed) as a pariah state of little influence (Burman, 2009:187). 
Regardless, they do have mutual interests which need to be catered for, and defended against outside 
interference due to Iran’s international pariah status as an enemy to Western interests. In this respect 
rhetoric of shared experiences and mutual trust and respect are legitimizing, they construct credibility 
and serve as a ‘validating tactic’ (ibid, 418). Mor highlights that ‘actors rarely make assertions without 
simultaneously trying to back them up’ (Mor, 2011: 418). China is heavily involved with Iran’s energy 
industry and dependant on its exports of hydrocarbons. As such it is eager to pursue joint explorations 
of Iranian energy fields and reluctant to support UN trade sanctions against Iran which could harm 
such interests (Swaine, 2010: 3). In contrast, China is also eager to maintain its international presence 
and be accepted as a ‘responsible power’ (ibid). The latter of these aims are at odds, to an extent, with 
the former.  
Such interests then appear to be lubricated by rhetoric of underlying moral and value-laden 
influences of friendship and goodwill which are legitimating, and far easier to sell to the populace and 
harder for international peers to argue against since it is a tactic that all use (the most obvious of 
which being the US and the UK and their ‘special relationship’). China and Iran are constructing a 
friendship and confidence in one another based on shared norms, values, and historical experiences 
which, being accepted by the domestic and international communities either grudgingly or 
enthusiastically, supersedes individual actions or decisions. Specifically, China is able, when necessary 
and under pressure from the United States, to accept sanctions against Iran without incurring the 
latter’s wrath or losing its ‘friendship’. Iran in turn can commit to uranium enrichment or pursue 
economic and cultural foreign policy interests in the NIS states of Central Asia without incurring 
significant suspicion from China. They are friends, they share trust, and when required, a degree of 
transparency, or so the rhetoric is constructed to suggest. In this respect then, rhetoric acts as a 
security blanket. Constructed frameworks, it should be noted, reinforce as much as they are reinforced. 
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The rhetoric of friendship can also been seen as a commitment, either to the status quo of trust and 
goodwill or to its development. In 2011, the 40th anniversary of the establishment of modern 
diplomatic Iranian-Chinese relations, Chen Zilli, during a visit to Iran, assured his audience that ‘China 
is willing to seize this opportunity (the anniversary) to further consolidate political mutual trust, [and] 
enhance co-operation’ between the two states (Chansoria 02.05.2011) Underpinning this, or rather 
being underpinned by this, is the concept of trust. Trust in this context has specific connotations and 
is related to risk and safety in security terms.  
Trust and Risk 
Internationalisation and globalisation, have transformed the nature of conflict and contention, and 
how they are interpreted. Traditional politics tended to be synonymous with territory and its defence 
or expansion (Nasu, 2011:2). Threats and confrontations were tangible, the enemies could meet on a 
battlefield, they could fight and the loser would be beaten, and generally stripped of some form of 
possession, usually land. States that were able to, built up their stores in preparation and to deter 
interlopers or invaders. Coker (2002) posits that the contemporary globalised world of high 
international economic and political interdependence has seen a shift from deterrence to reassurance, 
from ‘active confrontation to co-operative agreements’ (p54). This is particularly relevant to the field 
of security and definitions of risk which are no longer territorially bound but interlinked with both the 
promotion and defence of legal norms. In this respect risk is no longer a variable but a way of thinking, 
a result of an impervious vulnerability which is an inherent condition of the international system. This 
can be best seen in the new wars that have been waged in recent years – the War on Terror being a 
prime example. Terror, once a tool of the state is now borderless. It is, as Coker (2002) states, not an 
entity that can be secured against but rather a risk that must be managed, through surveillance and 
the control of panic or fear escalation (p61). Threats now are more permeable and invasive. They 
cannot be defeated by the construction of a new international or security system but rather their 
effect must be safeguarded against. In this respect the new security agenda is one that manages not 
security but rather insecurity. To manage these challenges states cannot work alone, coalitions, 
alliances, agreement and treaties are essential for any attempt at harmony and stability, in both 
political and economic terms, as is trust. 
Despite the existence of an expanding body of work on the concept of trust, it is a normative 
term and so value laden. Though its definition has been highly debated across the social sciences in 
the previous decade, no single definition of exact fit has been achieved. It is, as with many concepts, 
far easier to pin down what it is not, to identify it in relation to its other if you like. Despite this, a 
degree of convergence has developed with regard to the constitutive elements of trust. A Kydd (2007), 
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holds with the rational choice school of thought that, in the discipline of International Relations, trust 
has tended to be equated with the willingness to take risks on the behaviour of others, being the sum 
total of risk assessment and self-interest. This rationalist approach has limitations in its applicability 
as it omits consideration of the role played by information and information flows. Game theory, as 
Abbott points out in his 1993 article: ‘Trust but Verify’ specifically highlights the strategic structure of 
interdependent relationships. Abbott goes further to outline the two strategies used to produce 
information: verification and assurance. Information here is of particular importance in the 
construction of trust with regard to the absence of formal alliances. Indeed, to talk of levels of trust 
between states that are highly interdependent and signatories of legally binding treaties or 
agreements is a rather moot point. Trust is of limited concern in this respect because the level of risk 
concerned is also limited by binding agreements. This not to say, of course, that the agreements 
themselves have any physical power. They are, after all, only binding if the relevant parties recognise 
them as such, and so legitimize them.  
It could be argued, and Abbott appears to tacitly assume, that this is where trust becomes an 
issue or plays a role. The interdependent nature of treaties and agreements, generally amongst like-
minded states makes backing out of an agreement highly problematic. The old adage that liberal 
democracies do not go to war with one another is not based on a deep trust and brotherhood between 
them but rather the result of high interdependence with one another and dependence on the status 
quo and the world system which offsets the risks of betrayal. Indeed, a cruder example would be that 
of China, which buys significant US bonds, the cashing in of which would undoubtedly be disastrous 
for the economy of the latter, but of course not until after it has first crippled the former’s economy. 
A better understanding of Trust and the ways in which it is constructed is considerably more 
informative, and arguably more important when applied to relations between states which lack the 
formal and legal articulations of cooperation.  As stated above, China and Iran are not kin countries, 
in Huntington’s use of the term (2002), nor have they committed to a formal alliance with one another. 
But, as previously stated, there is recorded evidence of continual rhetoric of trust and acts of 
confidence: China may have voted in favour of UN sanctions against Iran but the government is also 
consistently on record as advocating the opening of discursive relations between NATO powers and 
Iran (Farrar-Wellman and Frasco, 2010). China, controversially, has also gone so far as to employ third 
party ‘Black Knights’ (to be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter) to facilitate trade in order 
to bypass such sanctions (Kozhanov, 2001). 
Hoffman (2002) highlights the use of the rhetoric of trust by individuals as diverse as Karl 
Deutsch (1957) and Kofi Annan (2000) to promote peace and security, in which trust is seen as the tie 
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that enables and binds such commitments. Hoffman raises the important point that cooperation is 
not dependant on trust but rather can be coerced. The aim of international sanctions, as posited by 
the US government, is to pressure Iran into abandoning uranium enrichment, or rather to enter into 
a binding agreement to do so. If Iran were to comply, to effectively ‘cooperate’, with the international 
community it would be the result of coercion – cooperation without trust. Hoffman identified the 
need to be aware of the alternate structures of relations and degrees of risk and obligation involved 
in order to better assess the nature of trust, risk and security (p376). This offers important 
considerations, and contrasts with Abbott who recognises trust as being of lower importance in formal, 
binding agreements and alliances. Formal agreements then are more stable and less inclined to fail or 
be aborted by either party, unless of course one member has been coerced into compliance in which 
case trust may not be lost for it was never present in the first place, which can be highly destabilising 
for security.  Under examples of coercion, hoodwinking should also be included: during the Khatami 
presidency, Iran suspended nuclear development as a goodwill gesture to the EU which requested six 
months to present a ‘safer’ alternative. Three years later Iran called of the suspension as it became 
clear that no such alternative would be offered, other than Iran’s total abandonment of the endeavour.  
With regard to the perception of formal alliances being more stable there is a challenge that 
can be offered, and indeed is, implicitly, within this thesis. If formal alliances are legal entities – 
contracts if you will, then they may be difficult to withdraw from. Difficult is not the same as impossible 
and requires the formal acknowledgement of a breaking of a term or pledge or of the agreement no 
longer being applicable or valid. In short, this process, being legal and contractual would take very 
little time to execute in relative terms. The dissolution of a normative, or tacit alliance however, is a 
much more laborious task. As this latter form of alliance is dependent on the construction of a 
narrative of alignment and support over time then its disavowal and so an alternative narrative would 
be equally laborious. If US-Iraqi relations are taken as an example, then you can see that the support 
given to Iraq during the first gulf war hindered the ability of the USA to gain adequate domestic 
legitimacy to invade in 1991 (Khaloozadeh, 2011:1). It was not until 2003 that the alternative narrative 
of Iraq as a troublesome, untrustworthy state enabled a harder stand on the Iraq issue – bolstered as 
it was by the general fall out of 9/11. (ibid :1) In this respect then the stability and security of formal, 
over informal, alliances are brought into question 
The specific interaction between Iran and the EU introduced above can also be explained 
within the framework of a study by Larson (1997), though for different but equally pertinent reasons. 
Larson (1997) applies social psychology to identify issues with trust in the international relations 
between states and the negative effects, and ‘missed opportunities’ that can arise from inadequate 
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interpretations of behaviour. The article highlights the tendency of policy-makers, preoccupied by the 
Realist lens of self-interest and power politics to incorrectly analyse an opponent’s aims and interests. 
A point to note here is the way in which it is assumed by Larson that states meeting to evaluate 
trust/risk benefits view each other as ‘opponents’ (p701) rather than, for instance, peers. Larson 
suggests that prudent policy-making rests on the need to be able to adequately asses the level to 
which an ‘other’ state is interested in entering into an agreement, as well as its reputation, past and 
present with regard to similar endeavours elsewhere. Like Hoffman, Larson agrees that distrust has 
the ability to hinder or prevent cooperation. Difficulties can be bridged by lower risk ‘test’ agreements 
and ‘good faith’ concessions and Larson also suggests that past reputations can be overcome in order 
to pursue common interests. It is important to note here that though such issues can be overcome, 
this does not mean that they will be. Though offering a social psychological analysis to trust and risk, 
the article would benefit from an acknowledgement of the cognitive factors at play within the 
schemata of the policy makers concerned. With such a consideration, questions necessarily arise with 
regard to the conditions and perceptions that require reassessment in order to develop previously 
contentious relations. The steps required for Egypt and the United States to develop closer, less 
suspicious, more confident ties with one another, for instance would be considerably smaller and 
more level than those required by Iran and the United states. This is based on significant psychological 
dispositions, based on historical experiences and feelings of betrayal.  
  This hindrance of trust is also highlighted by Morin and Gold (2010) in their analysis of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and its decision on access to medicines. Here the truth seeking 
deliberations between concerned parties were encumbered by their distrust. Another hindrance was 
the rhetoric of both intellectual property rights (IPRs) and access to medicines that were both 
committed to but appeared to be incompatible. They became trapped by their own mistrust and the 
rhetorical frameworks that they had constructed. This article debates the nature and effects of trust, 
risk and distrust within the theoretical space that lies between rational choice and Constructivism, 
positing that in the building of agreements and cooperation both discourse and strategy are of 
significant importance and distrust an impediment to progress. This can be seen in the contemporary 
post-Cold War era as the United States and Russia, through membership of international bodies such 
as the UN, were able to enter into dialogue and work together in the interests of common aims, such 
as a commitment to the War on Terror. A more lucid example would be the cooperation displayed 
between Iran and the United States following the invasion of Afghanistan, to try and set up a stable, 
and legitimate government there. Inkpen and Currell (1998), also assess the nature of trust, building 
on current understanding by crucially noting that ‘[r]isk is a pre-condition of trust’ (p3). To trust is to 
appear to be, and to actually be, vulnerable. The importance of confidence building measures here, 
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as with Larson (1997), are again highlighted as the greater the level of risk the higher the level of 
confidence needed to develop relations and commit to agreements. It should be noted that this article 
applies the language of trust and risk to corporate joint ventures, rather than to states and so is limited 
in its applicability. The overall analysis is relevant, however, with regard to the nature of, and 
relationship between, trust and risk. The essence of the argument is valid: Trust is a necessary 
consideration in the evaluation of risks and security and is underpinned by degrees of confidence in 
potential partners based on track records and interpretations, on psychological analysis.  
Fisman and Khanna (1999), summarise trust as being the condition in which the level of belief 
that the other will act in a way that is beneficial to the state is significantly high for cooperation to be 
considered or committed to. The authors discuss the correlation between information flows and levels 
of trust as a critique of both the traditional view that ‘trust is a purely historical residue’ (p79); (Dore, 
1987, Fukuyama, 1995) as well as rational utility-maximisation (Fudenburg and Tirole, 1992). Three 
types of trust are identified: deterrence based, knowledge based and identification based trust (p80).  
All are positively affected by information flows to decrease the assumption of risk. This article adds to 
existing literature on trust and risk in that it overtly recognises and analyses the roles of information 
and knowledge transfer in agreements, or desires, to cooperate. That the greater the activity between 
information flows and the giving and accepting of data and transparency then the greater the potential 
for trust to develop. Iran and China verbalize their relations in terms of trust, which is rooted in 
historical interactions and positive track records of no significant conflict with one another (Dorraj and 
Currier (2008:65). In this respect their trust can be assumed to be historical residue. The levels of trust, 
or confidence, that they express in one another can also be shown to be the result of myriad 
confidence building measures and information flows between them. As with Larson, the article has 
limited applicability across relations with non-likeminded states/partners, however. Information flows, 
and thus greater transparency may, and in many cases do, produce fertile ground for cooperation. 
There are instances when the information flows, or transparency, are misinterpreted or denied. In the 
case of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, it can be argued that Iran cannot be transparent enough for the 
United States who are dedicated to suspicion, no matter what. In this respect, what is needed is a 
common ground that considers Fisman and Khanna’s information flows and their impact on co-
operation whilst also recognising the psychological factors listed by Larson, as well as the significant 
considerations of Rathbun (see below).   
The United States and Europe may fear Iranian intentions regarding weapons of mass 
destruction and cite a lack of transparency in Iranian affairs as a foundation for their concerns. China 
does not share this view but rather describes Iranian intentions as appearing to be clear to them (Scott, 
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2015:1). Notably, China has greater access to Iranian firms and technology production as a heavy 
investor in this sector (Leyne, 16.04.2010). This idea of trust and identification, be it ethnic, historical 
or societal, is developed further by Rathbun (2012). Rathbun discusses NATO and challenges the 
constructivist assessment that it was created as a result of the shared identification of its founding 
members. The author states, rather, that its foundation rests, instead, on moralistic trust. NATO can 
be identified as a community of democracies underpinned by western ideological values and interests. 
Its creation was also a reaction to security concerns surrounding the USSR. Such a multilateral 
committee brings risks, such as the fear expressed by the United States that it would become trapped 
in European conflicts and be at the mercy of more opportunistic members. The United States’ 
commitment to the NATO alliance, it is argued is best understood through the lens of moralistic trust 
which allows for states to interact and begin to co-operate based on future expectations of positivity. 
Rathbun identifies what ensues as a ‘‘’virtuous circle’ of co-operation” (p325). In this model members 
create a spiral of trust, cooperation, collaboration and deeper trust. This article supports social-
psychological influences on relations between states, highlighting the compatibility of ideational 
variables and strategic interaction, or rather creating dialogue in the space between rational theory 
and constructivist accounts of risk and security, it also echoes the approach, if not the specifics, of a 
hermeneutic understanding of trust, risk and cooperation, being similar to Gadamers hermeneutic 
circle (the hermeneutic approach will be discussed in greater detail in the theory chapter, but the link 
to approach in this article is interesting to note  as the security interests of trust and risk are generally 
preoccupied by more classical paradigms) .  
The world has moved away from the theoretical lens of Classical Realist theory in which, under 
anarchy, all must be out for themselves and trust is the luxury of the domestic society. The world is 
highly interdependent and growing more so at a rapid rate, as the 2008 financial crisis shows: a 
domestic crisis in the United States which sent reverberations across the globe. In this ever-shrinking 
global village (Mcluhan, 1967:3) states and non-state actors must cooperate at all levels and spheres, 
from the territorial to the diplomatic. One area of significance, which was highlighted by the 9/11 
attack on the World Trade Centre – the symbol of US economic hegemony – and compounded by the 
above mentioned financial crisis is the sphere of security, specifically for the interests of this thesis, 
economic security, and going hand in hand with that, the greater securitisation of previously 
marginalised issues.  
Economic Security 
Mesjasz, in ‘Economic Security’ (2004), analyses the significant increase in debates, in international 
relations, concerning interpretations of security, as both a concept and an activity. Traditional thought, 
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such as that posited by Realist scholars, puts security within the realm of military and political policy 
(Burchill et al, 2005). Contemporary scholars also acknowledge its importance in the societal, 
environmental and economic realms. Due to strong links between the different sectors, and areas of 
overlap, Mesjlasz acknowledges the difficulty in isolating economic security alone for assessment, 
though does not recognise such isolation to be impossible. This builds on Cable’s article (1995) in 
which the modern era is identified as one in which the potential threats that must be safeguarded 
against by actors are significant and ever-increasing. Increased interdependence, as a result of 
marketisation and liberal economics, Cable states, has resulted in economic security becoming an 
increasingly common concern within its own arena, rather than as a marginal factor of military or 
political concerns. Economic interests in this respect also hold factors such as migration, 
environmental degradation and political ideologies, which Mesjasz prefers to classify as a third 
security sector, entitled ‘human security’. The two-way influence of affect and effect between the 
different areas is, however, inseparable.   
The foreign policy aims and interests of an actor, region or system are, irrevocably dictated by 
not only their ambitions but also, and arguably more importantly, their economic capabilities. In this 
interdependent world states attempt, where possible, economic punishment over military strikes 
(Mueller and Mueller, 1999:43). Indeed, it has been the US policy towards Iran to apply economic and 
trade sanction over military intervention. Though the reasons for this are far from limited and certainly 
beyond the scope and interest of this thesis, it nevertheless serves the point that the best way to 
‘manage’ and contain Iran, to exercise any form of control over its nuclear ambitions – peaceful or 
otherwise – is to hit it where it hurts: to stunt its trade capabilities and negatively affect its economic 
progress (Fayazmanesh, 2003:222). In the international arena, indeed globally, the growing role and 
dominance of economic capabilities was highlighted by the 9/11 attacks on the US. Al Qaeda, it seems, 
in wanting to attack US hegemony did not do so my attacking its various military bases (with the 
exception of the secondary attack on the Pentagon) but rather the World Trade Centre – the standard 
bearer of US and Western dominance and control.  
Securitisation is a contrast to traditional security paradigms which focus on material threats. 
It aims, according to Buzan et al. (1998) to analyze the conditions in which the profile of an issue is 
raised and reconstructed, based on the interpretations of the policy-makers and actors involved, to 
constitute a security concern (securitised). The source highlights the central concerns with ‘who 
securitises, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, 
under what conditions.’(1998:32). It must be noted that unlike military evaluations, the securitisation 
of an interest does not mean that lack of containment or understanding would mark the death or 
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survival of a state, but rather that the interest has been reclassified as an existential problem/threat 
that must be acknowledged and either safeguarded against or adequately managed. Williams (2008), 
notes that it was only in the post-Cold War, unipolar world that economic security has moved from 
the periphery of domestic concerns into the international arena. In this respect Williams’ findings 
appear to have been endorsed by the 2008 financial crisis, a domestic mortgage issue in the United 
States which reverberated around the globe, affecting particularly Europe but also being felt, to lesser 
degrees, in the MENA and Asia. In the new world order, Williams acknowledges, a state’s reputation 
is more greatly influenced by its trade and development capabilities – by its economic prowess than 
by its hard power resources. In such an environment, issues with the capacity to retard the economic 
potential of an actor, both domestically and in light of its regional stability vis-a-vis investment 
attraction and the autonomy of the private sector, have become securitised. This securitisation, Buzan 
states, authorises the legitimation of the use of extraordinary means to counter potential problems 
which may arise (1998:25).  
This point is neatly illustrated by Kozhanov (2011), who recognises the power and inclination 
of states to circumvent international economic and trade restraints in order to pursue economic gains 
and goals. Here US companies are shown to have exported equipment to their Branches in Brazil for 
re-routing to Iran (p146). These states, labelled ‘black knights’ are further described as pariah, or low 
trade, states which lack the ability to compete, in the economic arena, against powerhouses such as 
the United States or the EU. Kozhanov also highlights the overlap between geo-politics and economics 
as he notes China’s refusal to cut trade and economic ties with Iran, in the interests of upholding 
international sanctions, due to the position of Iran as ‘a crucial element in China’s energy security’ 
(p150). Kozhanov, interestingly, does not distinguish between ‘black knights’ and what Early (2011) 
entitles ‘sanctions busters’. Early differentiates these as acting in the interests of either political 
(knights) or economic (busters) incentives, whereas Kozhanov either chooses not to distinguish, or 
possibly sees no distinction to be present, as the end result is the same regardless of the means. The 
intentions of the knights or busters, according to Early, have a specific effect on the likelihood of 
sanction success. Early builds on the work of Hufbauer et al (1990) and analyses the negative impact 
that black knights and sanctions busters have on sanctions outcomes. Black knights and sanctions 
busters are third party actors; be they states or companies that trade with the sanctioned states for 
political or economic profit of some kind. They can also be employed by another state to sanctions 
bust on their behalf. This has been seen in Iranian-Chinese relations, in which forbidden bilateral trade 
between the two has been conducted via a third party black knight so as to evade the attention and 
knowledge of the international body that has applied the sanctions.  
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A higher profile case would have been the deviation of the Turkey-Iran deal, to include Brazil, 
at the 11th hour, so as to avoid the penalties of ignoring sanctions imposed on Iran (Kemanade, 
2010:99). Whether the actions concerned are an attempt, by the parties involved, to either circumvent 
or to undermine the effectiveness of sanctions is of significant relevance in the context of Iranian-
Chinese relations. It is not in Chinese (or Iranian for that matter) interests for sanctions against the 
Islamic republic to be upheld in so far as the sanctions generally transfer to Iran’s trading partners in 
the public and private sector, directly affecting China’s, and Chinese companies’, abilities to 
manoeuvre. They are profitable, or advantageous though, with respect to the fact that there results, 
in Iran and Iranian markets, no dominant western presence or monopoly, it is free ground for states 
such as China (Jacques, 2011: 134). China, whilst aiming to be a responsible member of the 
international community, is also a developing powerhouse. As such it may be interested in 
circumventing sanctions imposed on one of its chief energy supplies, and significant market. It must 
not, in maintenance of its coveted international reputation, be seen to undermine such sanctions, for 
this is at odds with its international foreign policy aims of harmony and diplomacy (Levrett, 2014: 2).  
The greater securitisation of economic issues has also been noted in relation to China’s 
currency and its inclination to undervalue the RMB (Yuan). Eichengreen and Tang (2011) evaluate the 
external impact of the exchange rate policy as a negative impact on foreign firms attempting to access 
Chinese markets. Morrison and Labonte (2011) go further, to provide an overview of the economic 
issues surrounding the current debate over China’s currency policy. They identify the economic costs 
and benefits for both China and the USA and the possible implications if China were to allow its 
currency to significantly appreciate or free float. Most interestingly, whilst both articles register US 
concerns for another state’s domestic currency, the latter also evaluates the proposed legislation in 
the US 112th congress, which seeks to address China’s currency policy. Here we can clearly see the 
securitisation of an economic issue. China’s domestic currency has been re-evaluated as an 
international concern due to its potential impact on a second state – namely the hegemonic USA. 
Economic strength is an important concern for any state wanting to interact in the international arena, 
and to grow and develop. As such the securitisation of economic issues is a key foreign policy issue for 
any state, but particularly, in this instance, for Iran and China, two significant powers in their 
respective regions who are on a drive to development.  
Economic Security as an Aspect of Foreign Policy 
Debates regarding the interpretations of security have increased significantly in IR in the current 
decade. Scholars have become concerned with concepts such as the broadening and deepening of 
security predominantly, and to a lesser degree regarding the foundations of security (Mesjasz, 2004). 
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Any discussion of security necessarily needs to outline adequate definitions and interpretations. 
Broadly addressed, security is specified in the military, political, economic, societal and environmental 
realms. The aim of this research is to address the nature and political economy of Iranian-Chinese 
relations, which itself can be difficult to isolate due to its strong links with the other realms (Mesjasz, 
2004). Traditional paradigms refer to security in military and national terms, in other words with 
regard to raison d’état, balances of power and alliances, as well as international security. In the 
modern era of interdependence and globalisation the range of potential threats to be considered by 
a state or actor have widened significantly. In the ever more interdependent world of marketisation 
and liberal economics, economic security is an increasing concern as an arena within itself, rather than 
a side-line of military or diplomatic concerns (Cable, 1995). Indeed, apparently non-directly economic 
factors such as migration, corruption, environmental degradation, political ideologies are all affective 
of and affected by economics and so must be considered within the realm of economic security 
concerns. The foreign policy preferences and goals of a state, actor or system are ultimately set within 
the limitations of its economic capabilities and ambitions. Bilateral agreements on cooperation, 
conflict and development have been conducted within the constructed perceptions of threats and 
fears vis-a-vis economic security (Rousseau, 2006). Note here that the key word is perceptions. A 
threat is only thus when perceived to be so, identical actions by two ideologically different states 
would be perceived by the viewer in very different ways as a result of constructed perceptions and 
interests (Rousseau, 2006). Iran’s nuclear programme for instance, receives very significantly different, 
and divergent reactions from the USA and China.  
Economic security then refers explicitly, not to the accumulation of monetary wealth or 
influence, but to increased trade and economic benefits and, more importantly, to the greater 
independence and autonomy that economic development permits, to the political role of economics 
and the securitisation of its interests (Cable, 1995:307).  In this respect state integration is elevated to 
an economic security interest in foreign policy terms. The role of the economic interests of both state 
and non-state actors can act as an agent for change or evolution above the global/regional structures 
that Neo-Realists such as Kenneth Waltz would suggest (1979) or even the shared ideas and ambitions 
of political elites as versions of Liberal theory contend based upon this concept of securitisation. 
Securitisation, a concept traditionally connected to the Copenhagen School as a contrast to 
traditional security which favours materialist approaches to the subject. Whilst traditional paradigms 
focus on the material dispositions of a threat, such as military capabilities and power distribution, 
securitisation seeks to address the extent to which an issue is constructed into a security concern by 
the concepts and interpretations of the actors involved. It is very much concerned with "who 
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securitises, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, 
under what conditions" (Buzan et al. 1998:32). For an issue to become securitised does not mean that 
it is deemed essential for the survival of the state, rather that it has been re-evaluated as an existential 
problem by a given actor, predominantly through rhetoric. In reference to this subject, the economic 
realm was traditional considered to be a peripheral concern of domestic security (Williams, 2003:512). 
With the fall of the bipolar era, however, the new world order became ever more centred on liberal 
economics and capital free markets. A nation’s standing comes to be less influenced by its military and 
hard power capabilities than by its economic prowess which results in an increase in trade and 
development opportunities and resultant soft, diplomatic power. Issues which are capable of affecting 
the economic potential of a state such as the economic sanctions against Iran and regional stability 
vis-a-vis investment attraction and the autonomy of the private sector became securitised and so 
legitimize the use of extraordinary means to counter potential problems which may arise (Buzan et al. 
1998: 25).  
Economic security has been a significant foreign policy interest of both Iran and China 
through-out their long histories. Both independently and with respect to one another. Their historical 
association can be traced back to their roles as joint guardians of the silk routes. Many scholars write 
at length about the silk roads as agents for the transfer and transportation of culture, language, 
religion and knowledge, which of course they were (Bentley, 1993; Elisseeff, 1998; Christian, 2000; to 
name just a few). They also served a more practical purpose: interest in, and protection of, the silk 
roads was, ultimately, born out of mutual gain and a common interest in trade preservation and 
protection (Abidi, 1982:15). During the subsequent Colonial years both states were at the mercy of 
European, or as with the case of Japan, European modelled empires. Their economies became tied to 
the ‘mother’ land which exacerbated their underdevelopment relative to European technological and 
economic prowess and evolution during these times of Iranian shame and Chinese humiliation. 
Certainly these experiences of subjugation left each civilisation far worse than they found them and 
coupled with feelings of victimization and assault, in the decolonized era, they were painfully aware 
of the need to develop, to industrialize and to prosper. For such ambitions a prospering economy was 
required and so economic security returned to centre stage in the arena of foreign policy formulation 
and application. Though in reality it did not, during the years of shame, leave the agenda so much as 
the agenda was superseded by Colonial dictates and control. In the contemporary era both states are 
actively committed to economic development and, more importantly, economic security.  
Panitchpakdi and Clifford (2002), in their opening chapter, highlight the nature of the divided 
contemporary world. On one side of the divide are states and actors who are in a position to benefit 
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from globalisation and the wealth and openness that it creates. On the other side are those states 
who are in no such position (p1), the resource poor, the underdeveloped. For both China and Iran 
development is crucial for the achievement of a true return to the international stage on a level playing 
field. It is often written, in Western history, that colonial missions were civilising ones. That the 
colonies, before occupation, were backward, barbarian, lacking in any real potential for advancement. 
Robert Bickers (2011) notes, however, that the China arrived at by the British was far from such 
stereotypes. It held “its central place in the global economy” (p9) with an internationalised trading 
system with its neighbours near and far. Indeed, when British troops sailed north to force access and 
the opening of trade opportunities with Chinese ports it was not the superior organization, intelligence, 
or civility of the British that was responsible for their success. Indeed, no clear winner was recognisable 
in advance until the arrival of British steam ships which brought with them the ability to sail regardless 
of wind patterns and so a vital and winning advantage (p82).  
China first tried, under Mao (0942-1976), to develop at an accelerated rate within the 
framework of a communist manifesto, highly influenced by Stalinist Russia. The Death of Mao Zedong 
and the rise of Deng Xiaoping (1978-1989), coupled with the failure of initiatives such as the Cultural 
Revolution and the numerous 5 years plans surrounding it (which culminated in the death of a 
reported 4 million Chinese) led to the development of a new system. The Chinese state was 
restructured into a “‘Harmonious’ combination of capitalist development and sustained Communist-
State apparatus’ (Wu and Lansdowne, 2009). This merge between east and west, between Cold War 
era first and second world ideologies, is suggested by Xudong and Junxiang (2009) to represent ‘the 
interaction between emulation of the west and resistance to its intrusion in modernising endeavours’ 
(p47). As such liberalization of the market did not run parallel to the liberalization of government. The 
latter maintained its socialist order and ideals in separation from capitalist, economic, reforms, but 
regardless of this, the twin peaked system nevertheless resulted in China rising to a position of 
recognition: a significant member of the global economy and a member of the WTO in 1999. Xudong 
and Junxiang, in their modern history of China, highlight that the drive to develop is not new, but 
rather modernisation is one of the few lasting themes throughout its history (p48) and that the 
colonial experiences taught them well the need to learn the “advanced skills of the barbarians to 
restrain them” (p54), or rather to restrain the power they have over China.  
This capitalist development and market economy has been the push and pull of China and its 
commitments to trade relations with a staggering array of actors in Asia, North and South America, 
the MENA and Europe. The result, from 1999 to 2006 alone was an annual increase in GDP growth 
rate from 7.1% to 11.4% (Chinability, 05.11.11). Increased trade has brought with it significantly 
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improved diplomatic relations. Ellings, Sheldon and Simon (1996) wrote about south east Asian 
security and the fears of neighbours near and far regarding the ultimate ambitions of a rising China 
(p36-7). A belligerent power whose military development must surely be a primary concern, was 
assumed to be a future challenge to Asia, and those interested in Asia: one that must be monitored 
and prepared for. China’s military development, as has transpired, appears to be more of a second-
tier concern and its foreign policies appear to be set to appease rather than to distress. China, thus 
promoted its ‘Five Principles of Coexistence’ (Garver 2012); a commitment to the fostering of trust, 
respect, co-operation and equality with its Asian neighbours in the interests of a harmonious order. 
Regional initiatives, were established, and supported by China, such as the ASEAN which sought to 
operate on a basis of democracy between nations to address security and developmental needs and 
concerns (Beeson, 2004:33).  
China, as a rising power committed to an accelerated rate of development is, naturally, a 
significant consumer of resources, specifically hydrocarbons. It is also a late arrival to the international 
scene where existing powers already dominate the market. China needs oil, natural resources of all 
kinds, and fresh, un-monopolised markets (Burman, 2009:203). Iran in turn, following the 1979 
revolution and the 1980-88 Gulf War, was left with a crippled economy and feelings of resentment 
from the USA and Europe. Afrasiabi (2003) recognises Iran’s foreign policy as deriving from two 
sources – its turbulent regional environment and its faction ridden polity – in the run up to 9/11. The 
attacks on the World Trade Centre, however, changed the security landscape globally. It also 
highlighted the increased role that Iran had been playing since 1990 as a mediator and crisis manager 
(p257). Reflecting China’s ‘harmonious world’ policy, but in no apparent way influenced by it, Iran has 
sought to develop diplomatic ties with regional powers and to actively promote regional security 
initiatives such as several ceasefire agreements between Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1994, the 
general agreement on the establishment of peace and national accord and protocol on mutual 
understanding in 1997, the OIC, of which Khatami was a chairman in the late 1990s (p258) and the 
ECO. Afrasiabi also highlights a growing pressure and security concern for Iran regarding water 
resources which it shares with Afghanistan. This could certainly explain Iran’s interest in mediating the 
peaceful settlement of governance issues between the US and Afghans following the US invasion post-
9/11. In this respect the article very much addresses the eastward looking priorities of Iran. Vakil 
(2006), however, suggests that, just three years on there has been a significant shift in Iranian foreign 
policy towards a balancing of East and West. Vakil argues that Iran has cultivated relations with powers 
such as China, Russia and India for economic and political coverage that cannot be found in the west 
and to counterbalance the threat of western sanctions (p51) as a result of fears over its nuclear energy 
policy.  
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Hashim 1995, argues that the state, under Ayatollah Khomeini abandoned the secularizing 
and modernising ambitions of the Shah in favour of a theocracy under religious law. Iran’s constitution 
was redrafted to include a commitment to the regional exportation of the Islamic revolution. Under 
Rafsanjani, following the death of Khomeini, this foreign policy interest was superseded by the 
national awareness of the need to execute a more pragmatic foreign policy approach. The reasons 
underpinning this turn were based on an economy crippled by the eight-year Gulf War, poor regional 
trust, limited allies, and a need to recover and move away from unprofitable isolationism. Ehteshami 
and Zweiri (2001) show that this pragmatism, despite being maintained and developed under the 
Khatami presidency (1997-2005), seems to have faltered somewhat under Ahmadinejad (president 
from 2005-2013) (p151) and his nuclear programme. It should be noted, however, that the reinstating 
of the nuclear programme, though supported by Ahmadinejad was not enforced by him, but rather 
was committed to by Khatami shortly before he left office (Sauer, 2007: 616). Regardless of such facts, 
however, the nuclear issue, and whether development is for peaceful or hegemonic means, remains 
one of international interest and concern and has resulted in numerous UN and US sanctions being 
applied to Iran and any state wishing to trade with it. This has further exacerbated Iranian options for 
development, economically and technologically (Sauer, 2007: 614).  
Iran has the hydrocarbons and markets that China seeks, and in return can provide the 
technology and trade so vital to Iranian developmental and economic security interests. Iran, however, 
is an international pariah and China a successful, responsible member of the international community. 
Michael Swaine (2010), draws attention to the difficult situation that China is in in colluding with the 
Islamic republic, likening it to a ‘tightrope walk’. Swaine recognises China’s interest in Iran as being 
based on the latter’s role as a major political and economic power in the Middle East with significant 
hydrocarbon supplies and diplomatic ties with developing nations (p1) as well as potentially 
developing nuclear weapons. In developing relations with Iran, China achieves influence and presence 
in what is arguably one of the most important geo-strategic and economic regions in the world. It also 
supports China’s commitment to peaceful and productive (as well as profitable) ties with all major 
powers and regions. Both Chinese and Iranian Policies are anti-hegemonic in character. Rather than 
seeking to align with the dominant superpower both states prefer the maintenance of a non-
threatening international system of regions and regional powers concerned with their own interest 
areas (Leverett, 2014: 2). China specifically sees this as the most conducive system for it economic 
growth (Swaine, 2010: 2).  
In line with mutual foreign policy interests and developmental directions. Iran and China have 
engaged in significant trade deals regarding hydrocarbons. Iran has also received investment in the 
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sectors of infrastructure, energy and technology. It is also a vibrant and thirsty market for imported 
machinery and crafts. The high traffic of goods and knowhow exchanged between the two states is 
conducted by states and firms alike as though China appears to be giving more than it is receiving, 
Swaine highlights the positive impact of such corporate activities on the home economy and the 
maintenance and development of Chinese economic prowess as well as economic security as it has 
the stable monopoly of Iranian markets and purchases as well as a testing ground for the development 
of new products and the improvement of existing ones. Iran in turn receives much needed foreign 
direct investment (FDI), technological knowhow and an injection of life into its stagnating economy.   
Iran and China have a long history of positive relations of trust, friendship and respect. This is 
an important aspect of their relationship, formal or otherwise. Regardless of such rhetoric, however, 
the relationship is ultimately underpinned by the sympathies and interests of the actors concerned. 
In their differing degrees of development both states need to obtain and maintain economic security 
in order to develop and ultimately influence.  It is the securitisation of these economic interests that 
most effectively drive Iranian-Chinese relations, and their ambitions politically, with regard to their 
abilities to influence regionally, extra-regionally and internationally. For influence, or rather the 
influence that a power can have over proceedings, issues, agendas and agreements is a representation 
of their success and development.  
Regionalism vs. Spheres of Influence  
Whilst it is tempting to position Iran and China into regions and discuss their regional roles, this raises 
certain issues and complications for the conduct of this thesis. China is unarguably of the Asian region 
and many of its foreign policies are constructed with regard to its regional interests and 
neighbourhood relations. Iran in contrast is positioned certainly politically, and arguably territorially, 
within the MENA region based upon its foreign policy directions, and central aims, interests and 
security issues. It can, however, fit equally well, though perhaps not quite as neatly, within ‘Asia’. 
Regions are territorially bound geo-strategic concepts which limit a certain understanding of Iranian-
Chinese relations. To talk of the regional relations or policies of either state is, to an extent, to 
homogenize the ‘other’ within their given environments. That is to say that Iranian policies and 
concerns regarding Turkey are very different to those regarding Iraq. China in turn has significantly 
different relations with Japan than with say Pakistan. To talk of Iran as being for a MENA state also 
limits analysis of its interest and influences in Asian states such as the former Soviet republics in central 
Asia, and likewise with regard to China’s interests in Africa. In order to attempt to side step such 
limiting and murky waters, what is proposed instead is an assessment of Iran and China, their relations 
with one another and their wider interests in terms of Spheres of Influence. 
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This is not to say that regional relations will not be discussed. Economic security is best 
achieved within an economically stable region after all. Regional initiatives for security and 
cooperation play important roles in the foreign policy interests of both Iran and China and this is not 
being disputed. What must be clear, however, is that the analysis is of Iranian-Chinese political-
economic relations and the extent to which they can be classified as a Tacit Alliance. In such an 
endeavour what is important is to consider the roles of norms, values and interests and the 
construction of cooperation and acceptance. In light of this what is more informative is the mutual 
recognition of each state for the other regarding their areas of influence, in political and economic, 
but also cultural terms. Iran has influence in some of the NIS states of Asia which does not cause 
conflict with, or seek to challenge, China’s regional superpower role. Likewise, Iran is not raising 
concerns at Chinese involvement in the MENA region, whatever its guise. This is more telling of the 
understanding, commitments, levels of trust and identifications of risk that each holds towards the 
other.  
Whilst it is easy, and rather tempting to identify their respective spheres of influence based 
upon existing literature, this runs the risk not only of compromising originality but also of attempting 
to squeeze analysis into a model of best fit which may compromise the ambitions of this thesis. So 
whilst literature will be reviewed regarding the concept of spheres of influence, it will not identify the 
spheres that will be considered relevant to the author. A full analysis of the spheres and areas of 
influence of the two states concerned will be discussed in greater detail than this literature review 
would permit in the following chapter.    
Spheres of Influence  
The concept of spheres of influence (SOI) is traditionally associated with the Realist and Neo-Realist 
schools of thought in IR, and the pursuit of traditional power accumulation and maintenance (Burchill 
and Linklater, 2007:47). It allows more dominant powers to direct their weaker charges, and to 
dominate and set their agendas. In this respect spheres of influence then are tools for control, being 
predatory in nature, and a form of neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism (Resis, 1981:417). The space, 
generally physical territory, over which competing spheres overlap is where conflict is most likely to 
result. SOI then are as much strategies for the growth and enhancement of dominant states as they 
are mere geographic areas. For the most part different spheres are acknowledged and respected to 
an extent by the dominant powers (ibid: 418), and considered part of their security concerns. Albert 
Resis (ibid) illustrates this point clearly and succinctly in his assessment of Soviet war time diplomacy 
prior to the Cold War and its iconic sphere of influence agreements. The article focuses on Stalin, and 
Russia’s preoccupation with its ‘security Zone’, its sphere of interest, which must be protected and 
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strengthened against Axis aggression (p418). Britain, the United States and Germany are also shown 
to have specific areas of interest which are reconstituted to present geographically located spheres of 
interest based on ideologies and rhetoric of shared experiences and/or ideologies between the 
dominant power and its internees. Generally, these lesser states of interest are within territorial 
proximity to the main power and so geo-strategically important in an environment of advancing 
neighbours.  
Resis, whilst discussing the diplomatic manoeuvres of the allied and axis powers in relation to 
their respective spheres, talks much of spheres of influence and of interest. Significantly, he does not, 
however, distinguish between the two. It is true of course that spheres of influence are born, first out 
of a sphere of interest or commonality. The former is best described as a potential, but not necessarily 
automatic, evolution of the latter. SOI are depicted by Resis as predatory and selfish in nature, a tool 
for survival and excellence under the overarching umbrella of anarchy, in line with Classical Realist 
thought. Spheres of interest underpin this and are one and the same. To what extent this is so is 
debatable. Interest does not necessarily denote influence, nor does it suggest that a battle for 
subversion will ensue. An actor can exercise both interest and influence over a body, be it territory or 
company, in equal or asymmetrical measure. Conversely it can also have interests but little or no 
influence, or indeed significant influence, though possess very little interest with regard to its main 
foreign policy aims and ambitions.  
Ronald Steel (1972), offered an analysis of US policy in the 1970s. He suggested that what the 
United States needed to pursue was neither a policy of isolationism, nor excessive interventionism. 
Steel called for the United States to expand its ‘cultural, social, political and economic ties with all 
nations of the world community’ (p107). What is called for is for US policy makers and executors to 
create and maintain for the United States a ‘global sphere of influence’, in which it is able to act as the 
universal peacekeeper and arbitrator, in line with its role as a superpower. In this respect Steel 
acknowledges spheres of influence as the necessary tools for the maintenance of balances of power 
globally. He marks global interventionism as a less viable policy than the development of SOI in areas 
necessary for security (p114). It is a process of manipulation of economic assistance, covert 
intelligence gathering and, occasionally and when warranted, use of force (p110). It is important to 
note, however, that Steel commits to the argument that ‘a power balance [and so its tool: SOI] does 
not depend on ideology, nor does it presume eternal allies’ (p112). The interest of one state in another 
or a set geographic space then is not dependant on commonalities or shared histories or experiences. 
Resis’ argument that the Soviet Union had a natural sphere across its borders, over certain neighbours 
based on tangible commonalities then is either misplaced or denotes divisions between interests. This 
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is to say that spheres of interest and/or influence mean different things to different policy makers. 
The very semantics are an issue, dependant on the theoretical framework employed. To talk of 
interests or influences within the Classical Realist framework will be to pertain to ideas of control, 
subversion, hard power security concerns and asymmetrical power relations; to talk of influence and 
interest as dominance. The application of alternate theories will naturally give rise to alternate 
explanations.  
Gartenstein-Ross (2004) wrote a challenging article of spheres of influence in the relationship 
between Christianity and Islam.  What is most important is his commitment to an analysis of SOI within 
a framework not of Realism or Neo-Realism, but through the employment of Liberal theory. He argues 
that Muslims and Christians view SOI as ‘more important to their religion than to nation states’ (p225). 
In this respect then SOI are underpinned less by power relations and security ambitions than by history 
and experience. This article is of course a discussion of faith and religion rather than states and 
relations between them, as such it is possible to argue that SOI in this context cannot be applied to 
the state which, in Realist guise, is inherently different to, and divorced from, the whims and 
inclinations of the domestic populace. The case stands, however, that an alternate application results 
in an alternate reading of events, processes and thoughts. As much as this statement may be common 
sense, it is a common sense that must be highlighted rather than overlooked and subsumed. It is the 
inclination of many, when thinking of spheres of influence to relate back to its most vivid 
materialization: The Cold War. This bipolar order had a specific nature, involving the development of 
SOI in an environment of ideological clashes and military arms races. Influence here was a matter of 
power but only in so much as it was created in and for this environment. Gartenstein-Ross utilises 
Liberal theory because, he argues, it shows how perceptions affect behaviour in the international 
arena. It also highlights state-society relations and their international impact (p234). This is of course 
a key concern of Liberalism which puts the individual, and his inherent potential for good, at the centre 
of the system: the international as a reflection of the individual and the state, rather than an actor, is 
a representative institution (p325).  
Paul F. Steinberg (2003), also applies the SOI concept outside of the Realist nation-state 
framework. Stenberg, using Costa Rica and Bolivia as case studies, uses the SOI concept as a 
framework within which to examine and explain societal responses of developing countries to global 
environmental issues (p11). This article is important to the development of this thesis not because of 
its vested interest in the ecological commitments of south American states, that is of course of little 
concern to this endeavour, but because, like Gartenstein-Ross, Steinberg applies the SOI theory in a 
non-Realist framework, showing the relationship between, and influence of, the domestic and its 
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societal interest on the nation states as a representative, directly influencing its international actions 
and relations (p14). This article supports the previous one as it shares the underpinning assumption 
that there are different, but equally valid, ways of reading and understanding concepts of influence 
and interest and their impact on relations in the regional and international context.  
Richard Pomfret (2005) presents a case study of the five newly independent Central Asian 
countries of the former USSR and their choices between multilateralism and regionalism with regard 
to their trade policies. Whilst the article is predominantly a trade policy analysis it offers a significant 
understanding of spheres of influence, and their natures. The Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), Pomfret advises, created a framework within which the former Soviet states could maintain 
economic ties (p45). It is also suggested to be an agent through which Russia can continue to exert 
political leadership over its new neighbours (and old empire). Here the influence exerted (or sought) 
by Russia is dominant and coercive. It is not merely the expression of interest but a commitment to 
intervention and persuasion. China is also discussed in the article. Interestingly the influence that is 
exercised by China is one of interests and economic and trade relationships and agreements: of 
economic flows. It is noted (p53) that whilst China (and Russia for that matter) follows anti-hegemonic 
foreign policies, the CIS states do not; and most notably, there has been no pressure exerted by China 
to persuade them to do so.  So here we have the expression of two types of influence – dominant and 
coercive, and economic and non-coercive.  
This article supports an earlier analysis of Chinese spheres of influence, completed by Ross H. 
Munro (1994). Munro, in ‘China’s Waxing Spheres of Influence’, analyses the different relationships 
that China has with its neighbours in three regions – Central Asia, South Asia and East Asia. China, with 
the fall of the USSR, saw an increase in its relative regional power which has resulted in the expansion 
of its hegemony. What is notable is that though Munro discusses this expansion in relation to South 
East Asia, he notes that it is executed with the cooperation of Thailand; Japan has adopted a policy of 
engagement with the rising power, Burma is an ally at the governmental and societal level with a 
boom in entrepreneurial endeavours in the private sector (p5). The sphere of influence here then is 
not one of domination and coercion but rather, as Ross claims, one of mutual interest and choice, 
resulting from numerous confidence building measures executed by China (p9). This is influence which 
grows from a proactive and pragmatic foreign policy of economic cooperation and engagement with 
landlocked and overseas neighbours which appears to be peaceful and non-coercive. Unlike Classical 
Realist analyses, these spheres of influence can be defined in relation to cultural, historic and 
economic ties and ventures; they are not mere tools of statecraft or military tactics.  
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In this respect, and importantly for this thesis, Munro’s article highlights the dominance of 
interest over influence.  This is to say that the driving factor behind China’s pragmatic and interactive 
foreign policy is based on its interests in security and access to vital resources, economic enterprises 
to aid growth and GDP increases and bilateral and multi-lateral initiatives aimed at the maintenance 
of a relatively stable Asian continent on which it grows.  The theoretical framework within which this 
thesis will be conducted will be a constructivist one, as such it is necessary to define the concepts 
within which Iranian and Chinese policy operate. As has been demonstrated, whilst the concept of 
spheres of influence has traditionally sat within the realm of Classical- and Neo-Realist thought, the 
concept can also be applied using a Liberal approach. The terms ‘interest’ and ‘influence’ have also 
been used inter-changeably, this thesis makes a distinction between them, however. In 2008 then 
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, in discussing Russians abroad, spoke of the state’s ‘spheres of 
privileged interest’ (Financial Times 31.08.08). Coming as this statement did, in the wake of the Russo-
Georgian war, many observers speculated over the relationship between these interests and 
traditional influences. That is to say that it was assumed that it was a new description of the old 
commitment to domination of neighbours. Whether or not such speculation is valid, plausible or a 
prediction is beyond the realm of this study. What is of interest in the sense of interests over influence 
being the central focus of foreign policy direction.  
Though this section is entitled ‘spheres of influence’ what is actually referred to is spheres in 
the non-Realist sense, based on interest (which are not to be assumed to be inherently predatory), 
over influence. China and Iran have, and continue to foster, relations with neighbouring and non-
neighbouring states through the development and creation of ties based on culture, history, economy 
or religion, and foremost on diplomacy. Such interests, whilst generally focusing on different 
geographic areas to one another can overlap, but do not, as classical theory suggests, result in conflict. 
Nor does the interest shown by either of these significant powers ultimately result in them exercising, 
or attempting to exercise control over smaller or weaker states. These interests are not assumed to 
form or reflect an imperial mentality or commitment. So for the remainder of this thesis, where the 
terms spheres of influence and spheres of interest are used, they will not be considered synonymous. 
Spheres of interest will refer to areas and relationships of interest, for various reasons, but not 
necessarily as an agent for the development of domination over another state. In turn SOI, whilst 
denoting influence, will not assume the presence of significant, or overt interests. The following 
chapter will highlight the spheres of both influence and interest of China and Iran and the drivers 
behind such interests, be they economic, cultural or historical.  
 
45 
 
Chapter Two: 
Theoretical Framework 
Introduction 
The interactions between Iran and China, across their long civilisational histories, has involved varying 
degrees of amicability and involvement, as well as periods of cooling and disinterest. The overall 
relationship, however, has remained relatively positive and, more significantly, lacking in the elevation 
of specific tensions to the levels of conflict or insurmountable hostility. This condition has not so much 
laid the foundations for greater interaction but rather has prepared the ground upon which such 
foundations may be built. The twentieth and twenty-first centuries are periods in which Iran and China 
have significantly developed new, and strengthened existing, bilateral ties with one another. Areas of 
mutual interest and involvement constituting political and social sectors of a diverse range – from the 
development of nuclear energy capabilities to trade and tourism (Gentry,2005:111). This gravitational 
pull between the two states can, superficially, be seen as a ‘natural’ progression based upon the 
previously mentioned historical ties and shared experiences as both great civilisations and victims of 
colonial expansionism, by some, but there is much more that must be considered. A more traditional 
reading of the international relations of the two states would recognise their mutual interests as key 
energy providers and consumers respectively in a wider world of increasing demand and decreasing 
resources. The relationship in this sense is bolstered by China’s dedication to development and a 
peaceful rise, the energy costs of which are significant to say the least. Iran in turn, as a result of 
difficult, or non-existent, relations with some key western states, is in desperate need of access to 
markets, technology and knowledge.  
China consistently follows a policy of military, economic and scientific cooperation with  Iran. 
Such cooperation is common knowledge and references to billion-dollar trade and energy deals can 
be found in popular newspapers and academic sources, often shrouded in a rhetoric of friendship and 
trust. There is, though, a distinct lack of formal alliance between the two states. In this respect the 
pattern of relations, being ‘something which implie[s] more than friendship and less than official 
government-to-government contract’ (Crosbie, 1974:4), echoes that of the ‘Tacit Alliance’ Theory 
(TAT). The proposal of the existence of an intangible relationship, or Tacit Alliance, between states 
was initially formalised in the work of Coral Bell and subsequently built upon by Sylvia Crosbie (1974). 
The ideas of a tacit alliance are not based on tangible treaties or programmes but within a framework 
of unspoken understanding and cooperation.  
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Tacit Alliance Theory will be addressed in greater detail later in this chapter. An initial 
introduction is necessary as it highlights the interconnected nature of domestic and international 
influences on the development, or evolution, of a tacit alliance, along with historical and cultural 
inputs and traditional security, foreign policy and national interests. In recognition of this, it is 
necessary, to pursue an analysis of Iranian-Chinese relations using a hermeneutic approach. The first 
section of this chapter will address this hermeneutic turn, and its merits – that is to say, how it is able 
to offer the most comprehensive understanding to the relationship in question, and their foreign 
policy formations. Conventional approaches to FPA suffer from a range of problems which limit their 
ability to provide coherent or convincing accounts, although the questions which they ask may have 
some value as the starting point for a more carefully grounded research agenda. This paper explores 
a hermeneutic alternative with a view to finding a more nuanced understanding of Chinese–Iranian 
relations.  
The second section of this chapter will narrow the framework down further with the 
introduction of the central theoretical tool of use in this thesis, Holistic Constructivism, and its merits. 
Constructivism is underpinned by two central tenets: the belief in the power of shared ideas of threats, 
goals or identities which create a reality within the international arena; and also that this reality results 
in the construction of the ideas and interests of the actors involved (Nia, 2011:280). The relationship 
between China and Iran represents a Tacit Alliance, informal and intangible in nature. This Tacit 
Alliance has been constructed and resurrected over time as a result of similarities in norms, ideas and 
historical experiences. This relationship, constructed through identity and cultural and historical 
narratives is best analysed within a Holistic Constructivist theoretical framework. Holistic 
Constructivism with its emphasis on the dual roles of domestic and international influences, allows 
the most comprehensive analysis of all factors of effect within the Chinese-Iranian alliance, enabling 
the combination of an analysis of explanations regarding ideational and normative factors at the 
international level and issues of social identity and domestic concerns at the national level (Burchill 
and Linklater, 2007:197). 
 Moving on from this, but necessarily interrelated, will be the third section which defends the 
use and application of cognitive approaches to FPA. The psychological influences in foreign policy 
formation specifically and society and identity generally, are of particular importance in the 
application of TAT with regard to the practical understanding of the roles not just of identity and 
historical experiences but also of processes such as knowledge assimilation and frameworks as well 
as concepts such as fundamental attribution error and schema theory which will aid analysis of the 
greater securitisation or de-securitisation of existing perceptions. Economic security is increasingly 
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considered an arena within itself, the foreign policy goals of an actor being framed by its economic 
limitations (Cable, 1995:305). The result is an international system underpinned not by power but by 
social norms and values. These, whilst outlining foreign policy formulation, have a far more intimate 
relationship with the cognitive factors at play (Williams, 2003:512). Iranian-Chinese relations, 
therefore, must be analyzed in relation to the construction of social norms and the ways in which they 
direct foreign policy, above predominantly traditional security concerns. The final section of this 
chapter will bring the discussion back to TAT. The discussion will posit that this theory offers 
interesting considerations regarding why and how states engage, building on cognitive approaches to 
FPA. China and Iran’s long history of diplomacy has an effect on their inherent images and assumptions 
of one another which, as a result, are important to consider in any assessment of their relationship, 
specifically when analysed in connection to the importance and influence of a Tacit Alliance. 
Since the central interest of this thesis is, of course, an analysis of Iranian-Chinese political and 
economic relations, it shall be shown that the two powers have a long history of cooperation which 
affects their perceptions of one another. This relationship has external implications regionally and 
internationally (Chomsky and Achcar, 2007:136). Consisting of an assessment of both formal and 
informal interactions and the influences of both traditional hard power concerns as well as the roles 
and influences of norms and values, both qualitative and quantitative methods will be utilised, and 
the research, though occasionally empirical, does not aim to be empiricist. With regard to ontology 
and epistemology, this research will be conducted and consolidated with an anti-foundational and 
interpretivist framework. It will assess the extent to which international relations, alliances and the 
construction of foreign policies are effected by inherent cognitive factors. Since the regional and 
international arena in which relations are conducted will be shown to be a social construct, 
interpretation will also need to be utilised and considered (Jervis, 1970:19). This mixed methodological 
approach, though complex, is necessary in that it permits the greatest array of methodological tools 
to be used (Creswell, 2011:35). In keeping with this anti-foundationalist approach, the epistemology 
will be normative. It will show that the patterns of interactions are not born out of a replicable series 
of considerations, but are uniquely fuelled by individual foreign policy aims with regard to political 
and economic interests and the maintenance of the Tacit Alliance, so long as this alliance is beneficial 
to either side.  
A Hermeneutic Orientation 
Hermeneutics is a critical approach to understanding the dominant discourse on international 
relations and to offering new interpretations and understandings of the world. It seeks to unpack and 
challenge the epistemological frameworks, their creation and construction and their roots in the 
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historical and societal environments of their creators and supporters – these are not ‘value free’ or 
independent of external influence (Dingli, 2015:722). They are created for a specific end. The approach 
suggests that a greater awareness and understanding of the biases and influences of foreign policy-
makers and their environments will allow for the greater possibility for change – understood as a slow 
evolution to emancipation from the dominant and agenda setting powers at play (Koddenbrock, 2014: 
245). A hermeneutic approach also acknowledges the importance of identity in foreign policy-making. 
Whether this identity is informative in its ability to act as an agent for change, or as a reactionary force 
against past oppressions is subjective. What is important for any analysis of foreign policy behaviour 
is an understanding of the agency of identity formation and reinforcement, grounded in the historical 
experiences of each state and their societal makeup (Legro, 2009: 38). Foreign policy is created by 
people who exist within a knowledge framework, which, despite being in a state of constant evolution, 
is taken as constant. This knowledge on which interpretations and actions and reactions are based is 
the result of both the direct and indirect experiences of the state at both the national and international 
levels. In order to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the foreign policy of Iran and China, this 
knowledge framework must be deconstructed and the areas of influence acknowledged. To truly begin 
to deconstruct interests, intensions and ambitions it is necessary to first start with a clear 
understanding of their histories, experiences, identities, sense of self, and interpretations of their 
environment. To analyse from a Western lens is simply to compound the existing biases which 
underpin a western-centric approach to a world which, in demographic and geographic terms, is 
predominantly non-western. 
When thinking of Iranian or Chinese Foreign Policy we are dealing with multiple and diverse 
sources and histories. This results in myriad diverse meanings and interpretations which cannot be 
reduced down to one, single, narrative. What is needed is the application of a critical, hermeneutic 
approach to unpack the details and influences behind its foreign policy and behind the different 
readings and interpretations of outside observers and actors. Only then can a true attempt at an 
understanding of meanings and interpretations be possible which will allow Iran and its previous 
adversaries, weary neighbours or observers to come to the proverbial table within a framework of 
positive potential outcomes; greater dialogue and improved relations. Which would be to the benefit 
of many – certainly in economic and security terms. 
The development of a hermeneutic approach can trace its roots back to Aristotle and his belief 
that ‘words spoken are symbols or signs […] of affections or impressions […] of the soul’ (Tierney, 
2002:203). In the twentieth century it developed in the social sciences generally and IR specifically, as 
a challenger to dominant positivist world views. Conventional approaches tend to focus on rationality, 
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to be western-centric, ignore distinctive cultural variations, and under-estimate the importance of 
specific value systems, identities and histories. Whereas Classical Realist scholars, from Morgenthau 
to Herman Khan, endeavour to ‘reveal’ objective, underlying ‘real’ truths, hermeneutics is the critical 
application of various methods which seek to understand situations and phenomena through 
interpretation both of the details themselves and their meanings for the interpreter. In this context a 
hermeneutic approach demands alternative ways of assessing and understanding ideas of knowledge 
and information transfers, or interactions (Walker et al, 20011:3).  
Traditional FPA has generally been concerned with the relations between states and actors at 
the Macro level. The rational approach defends the concept that decisions are made and policies 
formulated as a result of due methodological, rational and logical process (Jensen, 1982:5). Rationality 
can be argued to be a rare virtue in human beings, however, who are effected by existing allegiances, 
identities and personal interests. This is something that needs to be considered since states are not 
autonomous entities but rather made of up such human beings who are, ultimately, responsible for 
agendas, policies, actions and interpretations. What is sought is an understanding and explanation of 
what drives state interactions, their interests, motivations and intentions. The vast literature available 
tends to be in the form of case studies and theoretical models that seek to generalize, to predict based 
on the construction of ‘patterns’ of behaviour and policy structure, such as balance of power, 
democratic peace theory or mutual assured destruction. Such generalizations across states raise many 
issues and flaws. Foreign policy is more than this. Viewed also in its capacity to act as a blueprint of 
the social, political and historical structure of a given actor certainly increases its uses as well as its 
requirements. The study of international relations has conventionally been centred on security, or 
rather the securitisation of issues, with regard to, for instance, war and peace (Walker et al., 2011:2). 
Such approaches lend to the idea that it is possible, indeed common practice, to view activity through 
the lens of a single, dominant interpretation of common sense. This ‘common sense view' tends to be 
the one best appropriated by the dominant powers of the time. 
The foreign policy-making processes and procedures of any given state are inextricably 
intertwined with their national narratives which, despite obvious commonalities of historical events 
and processes, are always unique. They and their interests, are influenced by, and constructed around, 
the state’s unique ideologies, domestic pressures, historical experiences, international standing and 
sense of identity – ethnically, regionally and internationally. This approach tends to overlook the 
importance of meaning and interpretation which can have a transformative effect on policy 
implementation. The meanings and influences which underpin a specific foreign policy interest or goal 
should not be passed over as of lesser importance than traditional security concerns for they are in 
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themselves the ultimate concerns of a state or actor (Jervis, 1970:21). Intention and interpretation do 
not necessarily go hand in hand. The intention behind a policy may have little influence on its 
interpretation, on how it is read by another – or indeed how it is not read by the exterior actor either 
inadvertently or intentionally – when alternative meanings are silenced in the interests of reinforcing 
the dominant discourse of a situation or belief pattern. 
It should be argued then that the most effective study of foreign policy necessarily dictates 
the greater development of a more comprehensive system of analysis which is able to address and 
account for the inherent influences brought to bear by the decision-makers and how they interpret 
and react to their environment, but more than this, of their very sense of self. In relation to this the 
political identity of a given state is the complex formation of multiple sub-identities grounded within 
specific history, patterns of beliefs and experiences. It is never clear-cut and decisive. If this is true of 
all states generally, to varying degrees, it is especially so of the Asian continental landmass, with its 
rich mosaic of cultures as well as being the birth place of both three of the world’s oldest civilisations 
and most dominant religions (Boulding, 1984:12). 
On various levels it makes sense that Iran and China would gravitate towards one another. 
There are, however, important considerations that should not be omitted. An essential aspect of 
China’s development strategy is its aspiration to be recognised as a ‘respectable’ member of the 
international community. A community heavily influenced by the United States whose relations with 
Iran have significantly differed to those of China. Other Key powers are also Britain and the other 
states of Europe whose experiences with Iran have been equally as strained at times. Though it must 
be noted that a chronology of relations between China and its Western counterparts would also show 
various incidents of discord and outright violent conflict. China is becoming a key economic power and, 
more importantly, is being recognised and acknowledged as such by the international community (EUI, 
2012:4). China, whilst actively courting the USA and committing to pro-Western, and so pro-US liberal 
free market economic practices, is consistent in its commitment to cooperation with Iran in various 
sectors – political, economic, military and cultural – commitments at odds with US wishes. 
The inherent problem with any analysis of the foreign policies of both China and Iran are not 
the policies themselves but rather the interpretations that they produce, and going hand in hand with 
this, the interpretations which produce them. Foreign-policy decision-making and implementation do 
not occur in a vacuum. Any foreign policy analyst will be hard pushed to deny that in order to analyse 
it is necessary to first recognise and address the inextricable problem of how decision-makers view 
and react to their environment. Problems framed by perception, knowledge structures, pre-
determined biases and existing behaviour patterns. China annually celebrated its national humiliation 
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day – a reflection of past interventions and offences by Japan and European powers, this is an event 
ingrained in the national narrative of identity that recognises hegemonic powers as self-interested 
and subverting. Within this knowledge framework then, contemporary criticism and actions by these 
powers will automatically be compared to the knowledge structure and affect how these are 
responded to – this fuels a continual lack of faith and trust. This can also clearly be seen in Iranian-US 
relations where the latter views Iranian policies and actions through a lens coloured by the 1981 
Iranian hostage crisis which was viewed as a betrayal and marked the end of all diplomatic relations 
between the two powers.  
FPA has traditionally centred on a structure-oriented study of state-to-state interactions at 
the regional and global levels. The popular view here is of a macro-political system in which the actions 
of states are ruled by a system of constraints and/or incentives (Walker, Malici and Schafer, 2011:3). 
There is much missing from such an approach though, that must be considered in the interests of a 
more comprehensive, multi-layered approach to understanding, such as the ideologies involved, 
domestic pressures, international standing, and goals and requirements of an actor. For too long the 
study of international relations has been Western in focus, be it Euro-centric or US-led. This focus has 
been twofold in that western interests dominate study but that that study is also dominated by 
western theories – westerns ways of understanding and explaining. This overlooks important 
developments in other regions which can have profound effects on the international. For a point in 
turn see the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. One reason for the lack more accurate 
predictability was the predominance of assessments of the USSR in relation to the USA, rather than of 
itself. The result was half a story and lack of preparation for an unexpected outcome. In the 
contemporary era FPA is ever more hindered by the dichotomy between a world of neighbours, ever 
closer and more interactive due to technological advances, and a world of strangers who are unwilling, 
or unable, to understand one-another (Walker, Malici and Schafer, 2011:2). This gives rise to 
difficulties in understanding which are retarded by conceptual and historical prejudices (Ciuta, 1991:1). 
Above all it gives rise to misunderstandings and dubious interpretations. China and Iran have both 
been subject to orientalist analysis and western-centred values in many discussions of their foreign 
policies. A hermeneutic approach, with its encouragement of greater reflexivity in theory and 
deconstruction of discourse, rhetoric and ideas allows just such a multi-layered approach in giving 
credence to the importance of norms and values and inter-subjective understanding.   
Behaviour is not a determinant of normative structures or material factors alone. In this 
respect traditional approaches to FPA, such as the rational actor model, offer too little and omit too 
much. Material factors gain meaning when analysed within their normative context, in the same way 
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as ideas. Take for a point, the Iranian nuclear issue. This is a topic of international concern due, 
according to the USA, to Iran’s lack of transparency with regard to intention. But why is Iran’s nuclear 
capability considered a threat? This was certainly not the case before the fall of the Shah. The threat 
developed due to the US perception that such technology would increase Iran’s relative aggregate 
power and also act as a challenge to US interests in the MENA. This perception of threat is also 
embedded in the nature of historical relations between the two states. In the context of history – 
albeit relatively recent history, dating back to the Iranian betrayals of the US in 1979 (the revolution) 
and 1980 (the Hostage crisis) – and a lack of contemporary cooperation or affection: the US cannot 
but be suspicious of Iranian intentions. Indeed, in this respect it is likely not possible for Iran to be 
transparent enough to satisfy US concerns. Concerns that are not present with regard to Israeli nuclear 
capabilities, weapons and intensions.  
Taken from a different angle, China and Iran enjoy extensive economic and diplomatic 
relations, China likewise states less concern over Iran’s nuclear ambitions and supports discussion and 
dialogue over sanctions (Djallil, 2011:229). Interestingly, China and Iran both come to the table with 
no history of significant conflict between them to colour their views and historically built stereotypes 
of one another. Statements towards and about one another are also built within a rhetoric of mutual 
respect and trust (Dorraj and Currier, 2008:66-7). In comparison the rhetoric involved in either US-
Iranian relations or US-Chinese relations is framed by deep-seated mistrust, alongside fears regarding 
motives and intentions. This is also true of the relations of either state with Russia (as highlighted in 
the introduction). An abstract model of actor rationality does not consider such psychological 
dispositions, nor does it consider behavioural motivations. Rather the focus tends to be on the policy 
process and the organizational context surrounding decisions to explain behaviour (Garrison, 
2003:158). In the hermeneutic style, it is impossible to assess a state without considering its 
representation of the world. This is especially so with regard to Iran and China, with their unique 
histories and civilisations. They are also states with specific, socially constructed rules and operations 
and a sense of piety, for Iran it is religious piety and for China familial piety (Jacques, 2011). Democracy 
in this context, whilst being present to varying degrees is - and must always be - subordinate to the 
will of Allah or the authority of the state. This is not a minor factor and must be appreciated.  
Building on from this, or possibly underpinned by it, is the structure of society around a sense 
of shame, rather than the sense of guilt favoured in most western societies. Whilst guilt is tied to the 
individual, or actor, shame is a more social concept. It is not about an action and the ability of the 
actor to rationalize it internally, to reconcile it with their moral or ethical code. It is about the wider 
implications of actions and reputations; about how one is seen and considered and how they are 
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received by others, specifically 'their own'. To put this into context one could use various examples, 
such as human rights records. A person perceived to be at fault then is not judged on their guilt alone 
but on how their behaviour reflects the wider society and code of the nation – their apparent betrayals 
of its dominant norms and values. This sense of shame also has more specific ideological and political 
implications. Both states view their experience of invasion and control by external powers as shameful. 
They must necessarily seek to reconcile and resolve this, to build a developed and successful nation 
on their own terms; on their own ideological paths which place distance between the contemporary 
nation and its humiliating past experiences. Neither sees themselves as predators but rather as powers 
looking to return to their perceived rightful place as a regional superpower.  
A comprehensive analysis of foreign policy must then be able to explicitly address these issues 
and their cultural views. The domestic and political structure needs to be considered in this alternate 
light, through a non-western-centric lens which is able to challenge existing assumptions and 
representations of democracy, theocracy and respect – of the normative condition. The structure of 
society and the political system needs to be critically unpacked to enable the right questions to be 
asked, and so the right issues to be analysed. To apply this to the much debated 'nuclear issue' it may 
be better suggested that in order to assess the true degree of an Iranian threat is not to ask what 
Iranian capabilities or intentions would be if it were to develop nuclear weapons but to ask what the 
development of nuclear technology represents to the developing, pragmatic nation. Certainly it is 
interesting to note that China is far less fearful of Iran's nuclear intentions than the US. China is also a 
non-western, developing nation which regards democracy as of secondary importance to the 
authority of its ruling elite. It is feasible that this attitude towards Iran is based on economic and 
strategic pragmatism. It is equally plausible that it is the result of the interpretation of Iranian foreign 
policy through an alternative, non-western lens.  
A hermeneutic approach which enables the study of the theory and practice of interpretation 
is of invaluable importance. It allows the consideration of all aspects of interpretation – tangible and 
intangible – tacit and overt with regard to presupposition, pre-understandings, language and semiotics. 
To go further is to suggest that to address and assess Iranian-Chinese relations is to necessarily utilise 
Gadamer’s Hermeneutic circle (1975) for to understand the whole is only possible in reference to its 
individual parts – colonial legacy, historical situ, civilisational achievements, regional position (as 
introduced in the previous chapter and to be discussed further in Chapter five) – which again need to 
be understood in turn by reference to the whole, in other words, reactionary politics and regional and 
ideological ambitions and existing relations, or lack of, with other states. 
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Constructivism 
The Cold War, in academic terms, did not just open up opportunities for greater critique concerning 
the evident inadequacies of the traditional theories of IR (rooted in the Realist and Liberal camps) to 
adequately predict, or even to understand, the nature of its end. The end of the Cold War also led to 
the creation/awareness of the existence of greater space than the dominant paradigms were willing 
to acknowledge. This space became a breeding ground for approaches and interpretations of the 
nature of international relations that were more critical in nature and enriched by their awareness of 
the hidden influences, causes and effects of the previously overlooked, yet powerful, agency of culture 
and experience. Constructivism, a meta-narrative introduced in the work of Nikolas Onuf (1989) is one 
such development, though there are debates regarding the extent to which it is an actual theoretical 
approach. Alexander Wendt (1987) argues that Constructivism is too permeable and its precepts too 
broad for it to classified as anything narrower than an approach. Adler (1997) in contrast insists that 
it is very much a theory in progress and that it is still growing and developing but maintains a rational 
and reflective essence which marks it as a growing theoretical approach. Regardless of this particular 
debate concerning the exact nature and classification of Constructivism, it does offer researchers a 
unique tool, or lens through which to view worlds (Balzacq, 2005:173). Whether accepted as an 
ontology, a paradigm or a method, it is one such approach to refocusing our understanding of relations 
between actors (Marcel, 2001:3). Indeed, its success in rising to the level of an accredited contender 
to traditional mainstream theories arguably lies in its attraction as a ‘middle ground’ theory which 
critiques the mainstream without allowing itself to sink, or rise to the grey zone inhabited by post-
modern peers restricted by theories of structural determinism or their insistence in scientific, causal 
explanations (Guzzini, 2012:147-8). Constructivism provides a new lens through which to view existing 
issues or beliefs in IR theory, such as those regarding the meanings of concepts such as anarchy and 
the balance of power.  
Constructivism posits that many of the ‘core assumptions’ of classical IR paradigms are 
‘socially constructed’, formed by continual social processes and based on material foundations such 
as military capabilities, structures and institutions (Velody and Williams, 1998:6). Constructivist theory, 
in contrast, rests on two fundamental tenets. The first is a belief in the power of the shared ideas that 
are determined by human interaction and association. The second is that these shared ideas result in 
the construction of the ideas and interests of the actors involved (Wendt, 1993:394). These ideas and 
interests are not primordial, but framed within, and compounded by social practices. The primary 
proponent of this theory in the study of international relations is Alexander Wendt in his seminal piece 
‘Anarchy is What States Make of It’ (1992). Wendt addresses the Realist claim to the existence of an 
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anarchical international system with each state following their own raison d’état as much as their 
relative power will allow (Rosecrance and Stein, 2006:23). Wendt posits that if such concepts are 
socially constructed then they are fluid and so have the capacity for transform through social practice. 
That is to say that states will only act in a traditional hard power manner if they first buy into the idea 
that they exist within an anarchical system of negative interests (Burchill and Linklater, 2007:196). 
Iran has been, until the recent negotiations between the former and the P5+1, the recipient 
of numerous US-led UN sanctions as a result of its nuclear programme (Naji, 2016: 1). This programme 
is justified by Iran as being for domestic power capabilities only, with no intentions of gaining nuclear 
weapons (Béja 2011). Despite Iran being a signatory of the NPT, numerous members of the 
international community, such as the USA and EU member states, are dubious of this claim, fearing 
the worst and reacting appropriately. Indeed, no other state in recent decades which has developed 
a nuclear programme has been the recipient of such international scrutiny or criticism (Diamond, 
2012:3). Iran and many (but not all) western powers were at a stalemate. The USA, it appears, was 
convinced that Iranian intensions were expansionist and that Iran was incapable, in the face of such 
confidence in its irrationality, of acting in a way deemed transparent or considerate enough – short, 
of course, of abandoning enrichment all together. Conservative actors, rooted in Realist theories of 
balances of power and regional hegemony understand this nuclear programme in the only way that 
their reading of actions and intentions allowed. They viewed it negatively, as a precursor for nuclear 
weaponisation and, therefore, a security threat to the MENA generally and Israel specifically. Realists 
believe in a system of self-help under anarchy, with peace as the mere absence of war. To view the 
world in this say is to construct a reality in which the powerful are dangerous and to be feared, or 
hindered in any way possible. If you believe that the state of nature is short, brutish and harsh, a 
condition of all against all (Hobbes, 1996:9) then you will necessarily believe that Iranian intentions 
must be to gain greater military power with which to dominate and challenge others. 
According to portrayals and interpretations, the nuclear issue was a mark of Ahmadinejad’s 
presidency, which ran from the third of august 2005 until the third of August 2013, and a point on 
which Iran long refused to negotiate. Here, however, there is a fundamental fallacy. The first point to 
mention is that the recommencement of the nuclear programme was instigated and signed off by the 
moderate Khatami before the Ahmadinejad’s election to office in 2004. Iran has also not refused to 
negotiate – rather it has refused to abandon enrichment (which, interestingly, to the US is the same 
thing but to Iran is very different). Iran has offered a variety of compromise gestures, all of which have 
been either ignored or refused by the US. It is important to remember that the original suspension of 
uranium enrichment was an act of good faith by the Iranians as part of a negotiation process with the 
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EU3 over their concerns of Iran’s intentions. The six-month suspension was dragged out by the EU3 
for three years with no compromise offer. Add to this the colonial experiences of Iran, and the 
EU3/west in general can be interpreted as trying to undermine Iran again, to restrict its developmental 
capabilities and so keep it subverted and inferior.  
To understand that anarchy is not necessarily the mother to chaos and creator of insecurity 
and self-help is to construct an alternative reality. To understand states and relations on a case by 
case basis would be to acknowledge the long and progressive history of the Iranian people as both 
glorious and marginalised (Diamond, 12:4). This identity and memories of past injustices, as well as 
strengths and progressions is deeply imbedded in the Iranian psyche and directly affects its behaviour 
and willingness, or reluctance, to cooperate with international peers. Its history as one of the victims 
of colonialism also uniquely influences and structures its understanding of the powers and intentions 
of previous colonial powers as well as the consequences of bowing to hegemonic demands.  
Such constructions are not new and China has been treated to an equal, though less hostile 
measure of scrutiny during its rise. Indeed, in a book by Ellings et. al (1996) on Asian security it is worth 
noting that the general consensus of the dominant actors was that China was to be viewed with 
suspicion, that it may well be intent on developing its military capabilities with the intention of 
becoming the regional hegemon and a challenger to external actors. It is interesting how closely the 
rhetoric regarding China then reflects the rhetoric regarding Iran today. And of course it is important 
to point out that, when understood within the historic and normative framework, China’s rise can be 
attributed to ambitions regarding perceptions of self-respect and historical right and place rather than 
the Realist power desire to resurrect the tributary system for the purpose of subjugating neighbours 
(Zhou 2010, 31). Indeed, in light of the colonial heritage not just of China but also its neighbours, it 
can be understood that China’s independence and suspicion of Western and Japanese interest is more 
about maintaining its anti-hegemonic foreign policy interests than because it sees them as potential 
targets for future undisclosed plans.  
Constructivists, such as Wendt (1992), John Ruggie (1998), and Christian Reus-Smit and 
Martha Finnemore (1996) refer to ideas as the perceptions of threats, fears, goals and identities which 
create a reality within the international arena (Velody and Williams, 1998:40). This perceived reality 
exercises huge influence over actors; it can challenge materialistic power interests, goals, and 
concerns. For instance, the military build-up of a state can produce different reactions in its 
neighbours. A neighbouring ally would be relatively unconcerned, whereas one at ideological odds 
with the state, or one with a history of political tensions would view it with concern or as a threat 
(Burchill and Linklater, 2007:189). This can be seen in the current system. Iran’s nuclear programme 
57 
 
is a major security issue for non-familiar or unfriendly states such as Israel and the USA. China, 
however, is less concerned, preferring to support and call for greater dialogue between Iran and other 
powers and expressing confidence that Iran is, as it states, enriching uranium for domestic energy 
needs only – indeed China is positively assisting Iran in this endeavour (Gentry, 2005: 118). Actions 
and reactions, therefore, are determined not by traditional power politics but the perceptions of the 
observers and players. To apply this to foreign policy, anarchy is not a non-variable; it is dependent on 
the perceptions of the states concerned. Security concerns also are not the main dictates of foreign 
policy, as Realists assume, but rather the influence lies with social norms which are fluid and so subject 
to change and transformation. It is not a zero-sum game of absolute gain over absolute loss but an 
instance of concepts where cooperative and collective security can be equally, if not more, important 
and effective than perceived ‘self-help’ (Wendt, 1993:392). In challenging the founding assumptions 
of anarchy and self-help and the uses of language in the construction of reality, greater analysis is 
possible with regard to the interests, identities and resultant behaviours (Velody and Williams, 
1998:34). This allows the development of a systemic approach aimed at understanding these interests 
in the context of meanings and social values as opposed to a context of power. That is not to say that 
power is ineffectual or irrelevant but that the nature of power and its use needs to be addressed as 
much as the mere pursuit of it alone. 
Constructivism refers to a theory of knowledge in which emphasis is placed on the active 
processes inherent in the production of knowledge. This is epistemologically opposite to traditional 
paradigms which view knowledge as a set of unchanging propositions (Somekh and Lewin, 2005:334). 
This is to say that since all forms of practice and theory are underpinned by beliefs and assumptions, 
these must be deconstructed in order for the social and political world to be understood. 
Constructivism does not offer an alternative world view to the one posited by Classical Realism or 
Liberalism. Rather it provides a framework for the analysis of the construction of institutions, identities 
and behaviours (Velody and Williams, 1998:8).  
Constructivism is not a catch-all term, however, and within it sits considerable cleavages in 
interests. In the 1990s Constructivism branched out into three sub-theories. Systemic Constructivism 
as championed by Wendt is concerned with interactions at the international level – interactions which 
occur only in the external domain whilst giving little credence to domestic influences and occurrences. 
Unit level analysis, on the other hand, is concerned wholly with domestic norms and their effects on 
national interests (Burchill and Linklater, 2007:200). Holistic Constructivism acts as a bridge between 
the two, which are suggested to be both affected by, and effective of, one another (Nia, 2011:280). 
Holistic Constructivism allows the most comprehensive analysis of all factors of effect vis-a-vis the 
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Iranian-Chinese alliance. Holistic Constructivism as advanced by John Ruggie (1998) will enable the 
combination of an analysis of both explanations regarding ideational and normative factors at the 
international level as well as addressing issues of social identity and normative concerns at the 
domestic level (Burchill and Linklater, 2007:197). This enables a greater explanation of ideational and 
normative structures with regard to the international, whilst also addressing the social identities which 
have been engendered as a result. It addresses changes within the modern state as well as tectonic 
transformations in the relations between states (Burchill and Linklater, 2007:198). It addresses 
ontological and empirical issues and as such will be most relevant to this research piece. In order to 
address Iranian and Chinese foreign policy aims and interest and how these affect their relations with 
one another it is necessary to do so with a conscious analysis of effecting factors at both the domestic 
and the international level.  
Bilateral relations between China and Iran have expanded and strengthened in recent history, 
as they communicate and cooperate not just in the (obvious) military and energy sectors, but also in 
fields like tourism and education (Gentry, 2005:111). Through the Realist lens of course we can note 
that China is a developing country with huge energy consumption requirements and so in need of new 
and undiluted markets on which to ply its trade (Kemp 2010: 75). Iran and China have a more ‘natural’ 
bond, however. Their contemporary mutual interests are underscored by historical ties and 
similarities of experience regarding their heritage of ancient civilisations and rich, persistent and 
assimilating (rather than assimilated) cultural identities on which they have each built strong national 
identities (Bickers 2012 and Scammell 1989). They both share a commitment to an anti-hegemonic 
foreign policy – though of course it should be noted that the strengths and commitments to this have 
always been asymmetric and fluid. Iran is largely Shia and a central pillar of the 1979 revolution was 
to export the revolution. In light of this, and if one were to follow the works of thinkers such as Samuel 
Huntington then it would be acknowledged that there is great potential for conflict between Iran and 
China which has very real concerns regarding its Muslim minorities. Iran has publicly denounced 
support for Asian Islamism groups, however, preferring to maintain ancient Silk Road ties into the 
future (Gentry, 2005:111).  
This interpretivist epistemology, with its ontological focus on norms and values provides a 
sound foundation for the development of a more nuanced theory of the roles of agency and change 
(Hopf, 98:172). It also enables Constructivism to sit comfortably beneath the overarching hermeneutic 
umbrella. The core of both approaches is the idea of intersubjective understanding. This is to say that 
an act, be it political, economic or social, can only gain genuine meaning when contextualised, or 
contemplated in relation to the normative influences and constraints (institutions) which sit alongside 
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them (Marcel,01:2) l; and it is only once they have been ascribed meaning that they can be understood. 
Both Constructivism, as posited by Ted Hopf (1998) and hermeneutics, as endorsed by Geertz, then 
are essential tools for the execution of an interpretive approach which, unlike post-modern interests, 
allows room for manoeuvre and understands capacities for change. Normative structures are seen as 
heavy influencers, rather than action determiners. Moreover, they are highly compatible with one 
another in building a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of Iranian-Chinese relations, 
the material and normative structures within which they operate and the historical contexts which 
inform their interests in, and understandings of, the world.  
Cognitive Foreign Policy 
FPA is the study of activities and relations between the state and other actors in the international 
arena: “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor […] in international 
relations” (Hill, C., 2003:3). It covers a diverse and dynamic area of interest and research as well as 
bridging the gap between the domestic and the international (Neack et al. 1995:17). Foreign policy is 
the study of international relations at the micro level, looking at how states interact and why, what 
motivates expansionism, war and cooperation. Foreign policy is not just about crisis situations, 
however, but the ideologies of the states involved, their domestic pressures and international 
standing, as well as their goals and requirements such as the promotion of human rights and liberal 
democracies by western countries or the creation of the ECSC after World War two to aid economic 
revival and cooperation as well as creating an environment that would prevent a repeat of the last 
war through economic interdependence.    
The effective study of foreign policy requires the development of an adequate system of 
analysis. It is an important area of research and study which has borne out various models of analysis 
which are divided into two camps, the ‘traditional approach’ and the ‘decision-making process’ 
approach. Since the 1950s academics have attempted to create a more systematic approach to the 
study of the foreign policymaking process, challenging traditional assumptions with the development 
of a ‘decision-making approach’ which has greatly enhanced the ability of academics and politicians 
alike to identify and understand the core determinants of behaviour (Clarke and White, 1989:2). 
Developments have been made in the areas of contemporary theory, those under analysis are the 
cognitive and psychological approaches.    
 When adopting a decision making approach to the analysis of foreign policy making it is 
necessary to recognise and address the inextricable problem of how decision-makers view and react 
to their environment. Factors for consideration are perception, knowledge structures and pre-
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determined bias as well as the behaviour patterns of the individuals involved as ultimately “the ‘facts’ 
of a situation never speak for themselves” (Clarke and White, 1989:135). All knowledge must be 
underpinned by a theoretical framework to be credible, and the facts proposed must be chosen and 
assigned meaning before they are valid (Booth and Smith, 1995:3). The process by which the human 
brain performs this act is called cognition and determines behaviour (Neack et al. 1995:50) in contrast 
to the rational actor perspective favoured by the traditional approach. Developed by Snyder, Bruick 
and Sapin (1974) this former approach posits that the individuals involved are not the logical, open-
minded and rational creatures previously assumed, but are closed-minded and resistant to 
environmental or situational changes that may bring into question their inbuilt knowledge frameworks 
(Clarke and White, 1989:143). Not just being affected by his environmental stimuli but also affecting 
it in turn and actively responding to it. The schema theory views individuals as having rigid knowledge 
structures in place on which they rely and simulate new information into to compound existing bias 
and dispositions. These frameworks are shortcuts to processing knowledge deposits and 
understanding the individual’s world.   
After the Second World War the world settle into a bipolar system with influence divided 
between the two superpowers, the USSR and the USA. Conflicting ideologies and a fantastic arms race 
escalated to the brink of world destruction. On the surface this appears to be a tale of power politics 
in the traditional Realist sense with each preoccupied by their own raison d’état and self-interest 
(Little and Smith, 1991:71). This was a system, however, which with the exception of Yugoslavia 
(Hobsbawn, 1995:150) divided the planet. The two powers themselves did not enter into direct 
combat but oversaw various proxy wars. The rational actor model would suggest that when these 
occurred they were the result of a rational and logical decision-making system which left conflict as 
the only viable means of conduct. The psychological approach challenges this assumption. A theme 
developed by Ole Holsti et al. (1962, cited in Neak et al. 1995:) uses the Cold War as its central case 
study and developed a theme known as images of the enemy and mirror images to explain sustained 
international tensions and conflict. The data for analysis was gained via qualitative data sources (Neak 
et al. 1995: p55). All of this data concerning John Dulles (a former American Secretary of State) showed 
that he held an uncompromisingly hostile view of the USSR regardless of the latter’s actions or 
intentions. That is to say that if the Soviet Union did a ‘good deed’ Dulles would view it as being part 
of a bigger bad plan or because it had no choice. They were communist and so the polar opposite of 
everything that Dulles believed in and supported. This is known as the “inherent bad faith” model 
(Neak et al. 1995:55). The mirror image model follows on from this but concerns both parties who 
hold mirror opposite beliefs about each other, viewing themselves as peaceful and cooperative but 
their enemies as war mongering, difficult and uncompromising. This builds on the basic psychological 
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belief in the fundamental attribution error which posits that the individual will view his own negative 
actions as subjective but will view the same actions carried out by an enemy as being a reflection of 
their innately bad character or any good deeds that the enemy conducts as being purely situational 
and in opposition to his basic character (Clarke and White, 1989:145). This leads to gross 
misperceptions and can result in the escalation of conflict or crisis situations. 
This mirror image concept is clearly present in the contemporary era and can been seen in the 
interactions between either China or Iran and other international actors. Following the recent financial 
crisis, the USA sought to close ranks, to assist the recovery of its domestic economy. This was, the US 
assured its external audience, not because it was inherently bad or selfish but because certain security 
measures needed to be executed in the interests of domestic concerns and security. US reactions to 
Chinese behavior regarding the RMB, however, are somewhat contradictory. The USA has consistently 
put pressure on China to float its currency, rather than to peg it. The rhetoric in both cases is far from 
similar, however, The USA is the ‘good’ guy, looking out for its civil society, China on the other hand 
does not fare so well but rather is acting in an opportunistic protectionist manner to control trade and 
profit margins for its own foreign and domestic policy goals.  
The USA, Britain and Israel (unofficially) are just three states of several that have nuclear 
weapons and aim to keep them. They are also gravely concerned with regard to Iran’s enrichment 
programme. These western powers can be trusted with nuclear weapons, yet Iran, irrational and 
aggressive, it seems cannot. In the wake of 9/11 Tehran publicly condemned the attacks and allied 
itself with the West in the war against terror. Tehran also supported strikes against terror cells in 
Afghanistan and played a significant role in the Bonn peace conference. In the build-up to the 1991 
Gulf War, Iran was again diplomatic – encouraging cooperation. Despite this, Iran was still labelled a 
member of the ‘Axis of Evil’ by President Bush (Chomsky and Achcar, 2007:151). Another reading or 
interpretation, however, could be that the ultimate ideal for our current superpower is regime change 
in the Islamic republic and nothing less. Therefore, actions and policies are forced into existing 
frameworks of bias which silence alternative interpretations or readings that would enable us to view 
any actions by Iran in a positive light. Such deep suspicion and mistrust has a significant impact in 
Iranian foreign economic and security policy, for it would appear imprudent to offer any degree of 
trust to states incapable of returning the compliment.  
Taken from a different angle, China and Iran enjoy extensive economic and diplomatic 
relations, China likewise states less concern over Iran’s nuclear ambitions and supports discussion and 
dialogue over sanctions (Djallil, 2011:229). Interestingly China and Iran both come to the table with 
no history of significant conflict between them to colour their views and historically built stereotypes 
62 
 
of one another. Statements towards and about one another are also built within a rhetoric of mutual 
respect and trust (Dorraj and Currier, 2008:66-7). In comparison the rhetoric involved in US-Iranian 
relations is framed by deep seated mistrust and fear of motives and intentions. Likewise, Iranian-
Russian relations, though co-operatively expanding, are framed within a history of Soviet 
expansionism and interference in the MENA, as are Chinese-Russian relations though these also have 
the added facet of communist competition highlighted previously (page 7).  
The Iranian arrest of British naval personnel in 2006 was viewed by Britain as illegal and 
malicious. On the other side though, it could be argued by the Iranians that they were simply 
protecting their borders and arresting trespassers who were acting suspiciously (Norton-Taylor, 2007). 
This is not just a model of analysis with regard to crisis and conflict situations as the lessons can be 
applied to the foreign policy making process of a country at the more general level. These mirror 
images and images of the enemy have a determining effect on governmental behaviour. The IR Liberal 
statement of belief that liberal democracies do not go to war against one another (Little and Smith, 
1991: 71) appears to be true but not as a result of economic interdependence alone. Liberal 
democracies view each other as they do themselves, innately good and cooperative whilst opposing 
governmental regimes are seen as ideologically opposite and so innately bad and untrustworthy 
(Huntington, 2002). This cognitive and psychological approach has an apparent determining effect on 
most countries’ foreign policies.  
Another core approach is what is known as the ‘operational code’ (George 1969, cited in 
Neack et al. 1995:56). This has been highly influential in the cognitive approach as it looks at the belief 
systems of political figureheads and how they strive for cognitive consistency (Jervis, 1970: 20) in those 
beliefs with regard to the international system and their individual view of political life. Leaders hold 
two sets of beliefs, philosophical and instrumental, the former concerning the basic knowledge 
framework of politics, conflict and the enemy, as well as assumptions about history and the future. 
The latter is concerned with the planning procedure, timing, strategy, risks, self-interest and tactics. 
These two subsections are arranged around ten core questions which produce a blueprint for decision-
making, the philosophical beliefs determining the definition of the situation and the instrumental 
beliefs determining the decisions open for consideration. 
The actions and rhetoric of both the leaders and representatives of China and Iran put this 
into clearer context. Their actions and reactions to external pressures and demands, such as those 
regarding sanctions reflected pre-conditioned notions of how they each (as ancient, powerful and 
previously advanced powers), should behave and communicate with ‘the enemy’, or rather old 
colonial, neo-imperial powers under which they were once subjugated. According to Walker, who 
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conducted a study on the Vietnam crisis: “the operational code has been a powerful cognitive 
approach to determining the ‘content’ of political leaders’ foreign policy beliefs” (Neack et al. 1995:56). 
Moving on from this Robert Axelrod developed the theory of cognitive mapping which also analyses 
the impact a leaders’ belief system has on his decision-making, actions and implementation though it 
is only relevant in specific crises (Jervis, 1970:23). It is clear to see that cognitive and psychological 
factors have a determining effect on the belief systems of political leaders and since it is they that are 
ultimately responsible for foreign policy statements and implementation then it is plausible to argue 
that with regard to the operational code, most countries’ foreign policy is to a great extent the result 
of determining psychological and cognitive factors. 
The development of psychological and cognitive approaches to the analysis of foreign policy 
have been many and varied, although they work together to provide an insight into the belief systems 
and structures held by political leaders and decision-makers in both crisis and non-crisis situations. 
Cognitive and psychological approaches give a clearer understanding of Iranian-Chinese relations; of 
how and why they are sustained and how potential crisis situations, such as China bending to 
international pressure and backing further sanctions in 2006 are prevented from escalating (Vakil, 
2006:52). These approaches also allowed greater analysis with regard to the perceptions of intentions 
and possible courses of action open for consideration (Bayliss and Rengger, 1992:249). In non-crisis 
situations these determinants are still in play. Foreign policy decision-making and implementation is 
carried out by human beings who are socially conditioned creatures with pre-set bias, assumptions, 
and knowledge frameworks or schemas which direct their thoughts, perceptions and decisions (Jervis, 
1970: 23).  Since it is human beings who are making foreign policy and they are pre-determined to a 
great extent by their inherent cognitive processes then it follows that the policies they are making will 
be constructed and hindered in the same manner. The rational approach suggests that decisions made 
are done so through a long methodical, rational and logical process (Jensen, 1982:5). Human beings 
are not rational. The bureaucratic politics model advocates the idea of a pack mentality or rather 
departmental allegiance and career self-interest (Jensen, 1982:7). Before a person is part of a 
department they are first and foremost simply a ‘being’. Before they have the time and mental 
capability to approach a decision in a purely rational and logical way they have to ingest the data 
through basic sensory perceptions and pre-conceived knowledge structures.  
How far are Chinese and Iranian foreign policies the outcome of determining psychological 
and cognitive factors? These factors have a huge and powerful role to play in not only the 
implementation but also the initial policy making process. The foreign policy goals made are a 
reflection not of rational objective decisions made but the belief systems, ideologies and bias of the 
64 
 
people who set those goals. Cognitive and psychological factors are inextricably intertwined with 
foreign policy goals, decisions and procedures.  
Tacit Alliance Theory 
The proposal of the existence of an intangible relationship, or Tacit Alliance, between states 
was initially formalised in the work of Coral Bell and subsequently built upon by Sylvia Crosbie in ‘A 
Tacit Alliance: France and Israel from Suez to the Six Day War’ (1974). Crosbie analyses the informal 
alliance developed between the two states in the 1950-60’s (1974:660). These ideas of a tacit alliance 
are not based on tangible treaties or programmes but within a framework of unspoken understanding 
and co-operation. This alliance can be traced back to feelings of sympathy openly expressed by the 
French towards the Jews in the post-WWII period. The French assisted the Jewish communities via 
immigration to Palestine and arms supplies. The relationship grew into a tacit alliance out of mutual 
need. France’s loss of its position in the Middle East combined with its loss of Indo-China and the loose 
structure of the Fourth Republic resulted in France viewing Israel as a suitable counter to other 
Western Powers (Crowe, 1974: p660). These ideas of a Tacit Alliance were further developed by Coral 
Bell (1977) who applied the theory to the Cold War relationship between the US and the USSR, that is 
to say that relations and decisions are not always based on tangible and recordable decrees, treaties 
or programmes but within a framework of unspoken understanding and co-operation.  
Gregory Moore (2014) contributes to the work on Tacit Alliance theory in his assessment of 
the end of the tacit alliance between China and America in 1989. Though this article is predominantly 
concerned with the events that brought this collusion to an end (ibid, p541), it does also identify the 
normative underpinnings of the relationship in so much as ‘mutual perceptions’ and concepts of 
‘friendship’ (ibid, p:540) are highlighted. Moore assesses this relationship within the theoretical 
framework of Wendts ‘Cultures of anarchy’ (cited in Moore, 2014: 540) to give a thoughtful account 
of the shift in ideologies and cultural processes which result in the demise of the alliance. What is not 
considered here however, is an assessment of the very construction of the relationship itself. Though 
ideology and friendship are identified as factors within the alliance, no consideration is given to their 
role in its very construction. This lapse is also present in the analysis of Israeli-South African relations 
analyses by Polakw-Suransky (2010) in the ‘Unspoken Alliance’. Here again the pragmatic drivers of 
Israeli-South African relations are identified (p32), as well as the processes of identification and co-
operation building, leading to trust formation. What is omitted however, or rather taken for granted, 
is the role that such rhetoric plays in the initial construction and then continued maintenance of the 
relationship. Coral Bell, in contrast, identifies these dynamics very well, emphasising the role that 
empathy and sympathy played in French overtures to Israel during the 1960’s. Again though the 
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normative construction, though identified as relevant, and indeed essential (p131), was not analysed 
at the base level vis-a-vis the process of assigning such importance to these norms and values. This of 
course is to be expected as the publication was not intended to fulfil such a purpose. This thesis 
however does state such intent. The creation of a Tacit Alliance, and then its subsequent maintenance, 
is a complex project, and one that underpins specific overarching pragmatic interests and complex 
interactions. As such its very nature, its creation, is one that warrants analysis in order to better 
understand the complexities of relations between states in the absence of formal alliances and indeed, 
in the case of Iranian-Chinese relations, in the face of much international pressure and criticism.  
The relationship between China and Iran represents a Tacit Alliance, informal and intangible 
in nature. This Tacit Alliance has been constructed and resurrected over time as a result of similarities 
in norms, ideas and historical experiences. This relationship, constructed through identity, cultural and 
historical narratives, is best analysed within a holistic constructivist theoretical framework which will 
show the relationship to be powerfully influenced by normative and ideational factors at both the 
domestic and international level. This holistic constructivist framework, which incorporates the 
analysis and application of cognitive FPA will best enable the analysis of the presence of tacit alliance 
between Iran and China and the ways in which it is structured. The states involved are highly complex 
and very secretive however, which makes data analysis quite difficult with regard to restrictions on 
the accessibility of such data. As such the following chapter will develop this thesis by introducing and 
developing the methodological framework within which such an analysis will be conducted, and it is 
to this endeavour that the thesis will now turn.  
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Chapter Three: 
Methodological Approach 
Introduction  
Having established the theoretical approach to be taken, it is now necessary to establish how the 
research will be carried out, identifying key procedures, strategies and research methods that will be 
utilised to collect, analyse and present the evidence upon which this endeavour is founded. This will 
certainly address questions of ontology and epistemology, which are ‘crucial because they shape what 
we think we are doing […] how [...] and [to what end]’ (Marsh and Stoker, 1995) as well as tautology, 
within an overall theory driven evaluation.  
Theory driven evaluation is a relatively recent approach to social science research, and is 
demonstrated by the work of Huey-Tsyh Chen (1990). Methodology provides the theoretical 
underpinnings for understanding which sets of methods can be applied to a set case and the logical 
connection of elements. Chen, whilst acknowledging this, highlights the role of theory in this pursuit 
over traditional ‘black box impact assessment’. Substantive knowledge (or theory) is important for 
without it, only a one-dimensional understanding is achievable. This is to say that in order to evaluate 
change, it is necessary to first be fully conversant with the pre-change status quo, through the 
incorporation of both normative and causative understandings (Chen, 1990: 14). This theory driven 
approach is in contrast to the black box approach to evaluation which fails to consider, or register, the 
political and organizational contexts of data, with regard to input or outputs – that is to say, between 
official goals and operative goals (Chen, 1990:18).  This is important to mention here as this project is 
theoretically driven by the application of TAT to the political economy of Iranian-Chinese relations and 
what this is able to reveal regarding the motivations and interests which underpin their relations with 
one another, and in the face of third party interests.  
The title of this research and the core research questions have been clearly established and 
introduced in the introductory chapter. There are, however, two dominant approaches to social 
science research which need to be considered. These are either seeking to offer tautological claims or 
interpretations of phenomena. Tautological claims aim to understand and explain the nature of social 
processes/relations and causal factors, such as the nature and implications of a formal Chinese-Iranian 
alliance for instance. The latter in contrast has an overriding interest in offering interpretations of such 
phenomena, such as interpretations regarding the lack of a formal alliance between the two 
aforementioned states and the potential reasons for this. In this respect establishing the 
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tautological/interpretive ambition of the research project is necessarily the first, and most defining 
decision to be made. A foundationalist approach consists of the belief in a ‘real’ out there world which 
exists independent of the researcher’s awareness and understanding of it, but which is, nevertheless 
objectively observable, as posited by scholars such as Brown (1994) and Romaniuk (2014). An anti-
foundational (interpretive) approach, in contrast holds that there are many worlds, rather than one, 
which are the result of (social) constructs and as such can and need to be interpreted in different ways 
which are phenomena and situation dependant. In relation to this, objectivity is an illusion with the 
researcher being present in the research, a fact that s/he should recognise and include in overall 
evaluations. 
The second issue to address is whether it will be foundationalist or interpretivist, which is to 
say whether it will be a quantitative or qualitative study. Indeed, historically these two approaches 
are viewed by many protagonists as being mutually exclusive and forming a wider debate regarding 
the ‘issue of quantitative precision versus descriptive richness’ (McQueen and Knussen, 2002:27). 
There are reasons for this apparent chasm between a procedural and a philosophical approach. Whilst 
a quantitative approach concerns itself solely with averages, variations and relationships – causal or 
otherwise – the roots of the qualitative approach can be found in anthropology and interpretivism. 
The space between them is not necessarily so vast, however, the central aim in each case is to explore, 
describe, explain and predict. The difference is not in ambition but in the path travelled, in this respect 
they can be viewed merely as opposite ends of the same spectrum, rather than mutually exclusive. To 
adopt research methods which are solely one or the other is to pursue an exclusionary methodology. 
Whilst this may work for some research topics, it is not always the best course of action for the 
creation of the most effective research endeavour. Rather a mixture of research methods can be, and 
indeed increasingly are, used to produce and support more concrete and legitimate results. There are 
a variety of mixed approaches and their supporting scholars, including parallel database design (Hall-
Kenyon et al. 2009), data-transformation design (Kaldjian et al. 2006) and multi-level design 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2002) to name just a few. All advocate that the most comprehensive research 
results benefit from a mixed methodological approach (Edmonds and Kennedy, 2013: 152). For the 
purpose of my research I will be applying the latter, multi-level, approach, as detailed below, but it is 
necessary to first state the ontological orientation of my work. This will be followed by an assessment 
of the perceived positive and negative characteristics of both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods and then a discussion of the mixed methods approach to be used for this research.  
Ontology refers to that which we believe to exist, our foundational or underpinning, common 
sense assumptions about the world. These are important to outline at the onset of the methodological 
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discussion and, for this research endeavour, regardless of acknowledgment or recognition, there 
exists a ‘real’ social world which is constructed of myriad variables, how this world is understood, 
however, is (and can only ever be) the result of the development of interpretations regarding the 
nature and interactions of its constituent parts (Neak et al. 1995:50). In the same vein, there exists a 
progressive international, or global political economy which can be quantified in terms of presence 
only. Again the relationships between its constituent parts (including states, MNS, and NGOs), can 
only be analysed as interpretations due to the myriad differences in time, culture, development and 
discourse between them. Finally, connected to this is the concept of alliance. Whilst the presence of 
an alliance can be qualified with regard to the presence of agreements, signed and ratified, treaties 
and communiques, informal alliances are harder to codify. They exist and are based on the intentions 
and interests of the parties concerned. Their presence, however, relies on the educated 
interpretations of the researcher based on the presence or absence of data.   
Quantitative Research Methods 
Quantitative methodologies have traditionally held greater weight across the social sciences and in 
international relations theory and …’reflects the philosophy that everything in the social world can be 
described according to some kind of numerical system’ (McQueen and Knussen, 2002:27). The 
methods of research and data capture utilised in such an approach centre heavily on the observations 
and measurements of patterns (ideally recurrent) of a given interest, averages, variations and 
differences, for example. Such an interest could concern either (a) social incident(s) or economic 
trend(s), such as trade relations between two countries or the creation/dissolution of a bilateral 
agreement and their effects on national development strategies. The observations of such incidents, 
over an established period of time, enable the researcher to produce an objective study which is able 
to not only understand and explain the events in question but also to predict potential outcomes or 
the likelihood of a similar case occurring within a similar remit elsewhere and so to be able to prescribe 
possible responses or behaviours in relation to the facts presented. Such a methodological approach 
necessarily employs set methods for research, such as the accumulation of data which is managed in 
a rigorous way, being framed within graphs and tables, as well as various charts, diagrams and models 
which display the information present in a way which it is clear to see the predictive capabilities and 
casual relationships between variables and non-variables.  
There are, however, certain drawbacks to this method of enquiry, or rather limitations with 
regard to its effectiveness. Quantitative methods centre on the collection and management of data, 
though this raises issues for the researcher concerning the sources of such data, be they primary or 
secondary. Secondary sources raise particular issues and criticisms concerning their potential to be 
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biased or pre-manipulated. Official documents regarding Chinese trade activity with other states, for 
instance (particularly Iran) may already have been subject to bias with regard to the interests and 
concerns of the formulators of such statistics. Likewise, the value of the Chinese RMB, despite being 
governmentally regulated is dubiously accepted as accurate by many, such as Washington (Morrison 
and Labonte, 2011). The reproduction capabilities of quantitative research are also open to criticism, 
particularly with regard to comparative state relations, or even political economy issues which cover 
myriad interests, policies and bodies. In order to explain an incident or condition and its relationship 
with another variable or referent would necessary require the accumulation and assessment of a huge 
amount of data to be truly accurate and even then criticisms would still hold regarding the objectivity 
of such results and analyses.  
Qualitative Research Methods 
Qualitative methodologies and research endeavours, in contrast to their above counterparts, do not 
hold, as their primary concern numbers, measurements and scales in the pursuit of statistical 
fastidiousness. Unlike quantitative researchers who see themselves as being detached from their 
object of enquiry, qualitative researchers view this approach as not only impossible but also 
isolationist. They must necessarily insert themselves, actively into their research to become part of 
the research and, importantly, to recognise that this is what they are doing. Qualitative research relies 
on various texts and transcripts but it also involves the taking of extensive notes, the maintenance of 
a diary or journal, and recordings of events. Rather than questionnaires, in-depth interviews with 
either individuals or groups are used which comprise of either guided yes/no questions or open ended 
questions which allow a lengthier discussion of the topic under scrutiny as well as the inclusion of 
previously marginalised or rejected interests/facts that may come to light as having a previously 
unconsidered effect or influence. The group of people being interviewed is generally smaller, though 
the amount of interviews that take place can be greater as interviewees may be re-visited as required, 
in light of new events or greater clarifications or even simply time lapses. This approach enables the 
execution of a more in-depth study than mere statistically evaluation would permit.  
As with quantitative approaches to research, this set of methods also has many criticisms 
levelled against it. The issue of small sample groups for interviews calls into question the 
representative capabilities of the results formulated. There are also issues of who was interviewed, 
why they were chosen, or from where and why others were not. During the interview process, or 
following it, the researcher may also ask the subject if s/he were able to recommend another person 
that they may feel it would be beneficial to interview. This process if referred to as snow-balling and, 
despite being useful with regard to the networking of sources, it also raises issues with regard to 
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sample diversity. Though it must be noted that some of these criticisms can be countered by the use 
of supporting information from a wider body of sources to substantiate the findings offered. 
The small sample size of quantitative research also raises issues of legitimacy with regard to 
an inability to draw expansive, generalizing conclusions or results across similar incidents or events. 
Rather qualitative research is better suited to case studies or case specific interests as any attempts 
to apply them at a wider level would produce only weak generalizations or guidelines. Qualitative 
methodologies are also anti-foundationalist. This underpins a major criticism concerning bias or 
misrepresentation as the results or findings of the research endeavour have the potential to be 
dismissed as a result of the researcher’s interpretations of the information gathered, and therefore, 
subjective and of little merit or worth as a form of social enquiry. This, however, can be managed by 
the overt awareness of such a possibility and explicit defence of such interpretations.  
Mixed Method – The Multi-Level Design 
Research in the fields of the social sciences generally, and IR specifically, has tended to be constitutive 
of a quantitative methodology, following the first great debate leading up to World War Two and into 
the 1950s, which was won by the foundationalists and their interest in historical repetition, 
predictable patterns of behaviour and the descriptive, and predictive capabilities of phenomena. This 
view was challenged in the 1960s with the second great debate which took place between the 
foundationalists and anti-foundationalists. Between objective truth seekers and subjective 
interpretivists. Between theories that can be proven or disproven to the recognition of theory as a 
body that can only ever be falsified (only ever a theory of best fit until proven otherwise).  Across all 
of this there has been a tendency to view the two approaches as opposing camps. As highlighted above, 
however, an alternative approach, and one that is growing in popularity, is to view these two 
methodological approaches as being at alternate ends of the same spectrum. In this way, rather than 
being mutually exclusive, they can be regarded, as simply different ways of gathering and representing 
data. Furthermore, these two different modes, rather than running parallel, can instead be used in 
varying measures to complement and reinforce one another, known as a mixed methods approach 
(Creswell, 2011:35).  
Mixed methods is not an approach in itself but rather an umbrella term for the amalgamation, 
in varying degrees, of foundational and interpretivist methodological approaches. There are three 
dominant strands within this: convergent-parallel, embedded, and explanatory-sequential. Within 
each of these there are again further deviations. This approach to research mixes qualitative and 
quantitative methods of enquiry and evaluations inductively or deductively, in what is seen to be the 
71 
 
most pragmatic way possible for the researcher (Edmonds and Kennedy, 2013: 146). This offers 
greater legitimacy for the research findings in that they are able to stand up, to a greater extent, under 
scrutiny by scholars of either inclination. It should be noted, however, that despite using a mixed 
design, the researcher will still sit predominantly within one camp. This is to say that their work will 
still be classified, generally, as being predominantly foundational with qualitative support, or 
interpretivist with quantitative support, depending on the particular mix and order of the data 
gathered and results gained (Edmonds and Kennedy, 2013: 147). Within mixed methods there are two 
strands: emergent and fixed (Creswell and Plano Clarke, 2011). A fixed design denotes that the 
researcher begins with a study or design of how and when the alternative approaches will be used, 
whereas an emergent design denotes the researchers (pragmatic) inclination to consider and include 
the data, regardless of type, as and when it emerges and is either necessary or relevant to the wider 
research topic. This then is known as a ‘typology-based’ approach (Collins and Cathain, 2009), and one 
that has been developed and supported by researchers such as Tashakkori and Teddlie (2010) who 
created a matrix of the varying models and degrees of the mixed method approach to research. One 
of which being the ‘multi-level design’ which falls within the wider convergent-parallel approach 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2002).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Cited as Figure 15.4: Multilevel design, in Edmonds and Kennedy, 2013:155) 
 
As the flowchart above demonstrates, the multi-level design enables the researcher to use 
differing methodological tools to gather both qualitative and quantitative data, within their pre-set 
system. These are then merged together to assist an overall interpretation/result. This is in contrast 
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into the other (Edmonds and Kennedy, 2013: 150). Overall, or underpinning all of these approaches is 
the identification of the extent to which the two forms of data captured converge, and so, the extent 
to which they support one another and so add greater weight and legitimacy to the research 
endeavour.  
Whilst it is highly dubious that a researcher would be able to study trade relations without the 
inclusion of quantitative data (such as trade figures, imports and exports). A combination of the two 
methods, however, enables the most pragmatic synthesis between ‘hard’ facts and ‘soft’ 
interpretations in understanding a specific phenomenon. whilst this is true of most research studies it 
is particularly pertinent which regard to this thesis which is seeking to develop an understanding of 
the relationship between Iran and China at the economic, political, diplomatic and cultural levels. Both 
states are wary of outside interest, tightly monitoring and highly censoring the information that is 
made available to the international community, and indeed their own domestic spheres due to their 
specific security interests concerning civil unrest and governmental legitimacy. The underlying aim of 
this research is also, specifically, to assess the extent to which the relationship can be classified as a 
Tacit Alliance. This in itself is equally challenging as it refers to an informal arrangement or series of 
agreements between the two powers. Hard data regarding treaties and agreements are only present 
in an overt alliance whereas a Tacit Alliance is marked, naturally, by the very absence of such evidence.  
Methods 
An analysis of bilateral trade agreements and investments will necessarily involve an analysis of factual 
trade and economic data which is often empirical in formulation though the central concern of such 
analysis is not so much to develop tautological facts and truths resulting in scientific prescriptions. The 
endeavour rather is to develop an understanding of Iranian-Chinese relations with regard to economic 
security and diplomatic and political pre-dispositions. The aim is not to simplify the component parts 
of the research concerned down to their basest simplifications but to adopt a more holistic approach 
that recognises the limitations of empirical analysis and the need for reflection and an understanding 
of language as affective as opposed to sterile (Bauer. M.W., and Gaskell. G., 2000:8). Since the regional 
and international arena in which relations are conducted will be shown to be a social construct, 
interpretation will also need to be utilised and considered (Jervis, 1970: 20). Quantitative data will be 
gathered, however, mainly relating goods and knowledge transfers between the two powers, as may 
be available regarding import and export levels. 
Due to the potential limitations regarding access to primary sources and official secrecy, the 
multi-level design approach enables both quantitative and qualitative sources to be gathered as and 
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when they are found. The data regarding each can then be combined to enable the most legitimate 
understandings to be achieved and defended. Having said this, it is important to note that whilst the 
multi-level design will be implemented and quantitative data gathered and analysed, the overall 
ambition is not foundationalist, but rather along the spectrum from foundationalist to interpretivist, 
will fall within the interpretivist camp. Whilst there are certain constants which have been 
acknowledged above, regarding the presence of the nation-state and the existence of a political 
economy, it is also acknowledged that these concepts can mean different things to different decision-
makers and so cannot be truly codified. The overall ambition then is to produce the most insightful 
and theoretically and methodologically legitimate interpretation of the nature of the political 
economy of Iranian-Chinese relations and the extent to which it can be classified as a Tacit Alliance.  
Existing literature has been analysed regarding Iranian-Chinese relations, their interests 
(mutual or exclusive), and foreign policy structures and ambitions. Such literature has been sourced 
from noted academic journals and books, as well existing theses. The latter of these have been sourced 
from the collections of Nottingham Trent University and the University of Nottingham and the British 
Library. Official documents such as government white papers, and media sources will also be analysed 
to understand the levels and tiers of involvement and cooperation amongst the two powers. 
Recognition will be given to the fact that these are secondary sources but the combination of data and 
source variety will assist the development of a legitimate representation of the information gathered. 
Media analysis is highly important to this thesis, regarding the reported content of the rhetoric used 
in public address between and about the two powers. The media representation of dialogue between 
the two powers and positive representations of one another, as detailed in the earlier chapters, sheds 
new light on how certain decisions can be understood – an example of which being China’s decision 
to support UN sanctions against Iran. Media reports also assist, when scrutinized, an understanding 
of the perceived similarities of history, culture and civilisational heritage between the two powers 
which again frame understandings of history, or historical representations and interests – or their 
identities, political, civil and historic.  
What is ultimately under analysis, as previously stated is not primarily the material 
interactions between the two states with regard to what specifically they trade, how frequently or at 
what cost/benefit ratio. These aspects are important in that they provide the concrete incentive for 
the development of positive relations. However, what is of acute interest is the actual development 
and maintenance of positive relations. That is to say, what normative processes underpin relations 
between the two powers and are they constructed in such a way, with such consistency that they can 
be codified as constituting evidence of a Tacit Alliance. Since what is under analysis is a normative 
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concept of the promotion of values, respect and amenability, statistics and concrete interactions are 
only able to offer a one-dimensional description of Iranian-Chinese relations, rather than a 
multifaceted analysis and understanding of it. The focus is not on what they do, or even why, but 
rather how: How they interact with one another within the realms of trust and risk assessments in 
ways which promote the former and offset the latter. In order to approach this task, the main 
methodology that will be applied to the data selected (as discussed below) will be that of critical 
discourse analysis (CDA).  
Discourse Analysis (DA) enables not just an identification of the social and political world, but 
also provides the methods for assessing that world (what can be referred to as a constructed reality) 
for research purposes. According to Wodak and Meyer (2009: p2) it is the extension of linguistics 
beyond sentence grammar towards a study of action and interaction. An analysis of the rhetorical 
devices and discursive practices utilised in verbal and written interactions offers insights into the 
relations represented which are lacking in statistical analysis of trade relations or other purely physical 
practices. This builds on the idea of Der Derian’s thought which posits that language, its very presence 
and use, is significant due to its agency vis-a-vis the constitution of a reality underpinned by the 
construction of both identity and of difference (Baker-Beall et al., 2015: 73). As in the case of all policy 
production, in the case of Iranian-Chinese relations, which are tethered to national and historical 
narratives, identities are not objective, primordial realities. Rather they are in continual, though often 
limited, flux as they are continually renegotiated, restated and, where required, reshaped on a case 
by case basis. Just as all knowledge can be said to have been created by somebody for some purpose, 
so too can it be posited of language, or more specifically, rhetoric and discourse. They represent 
performative meaning, as such discourse refers to not only the compilation of a set of textual data but 
to the practices, and of the systems of thought that both create and are created by them. As a result, 
Wetherall et al. (2002: 339) identify CDA as an intensive, rather than an extensive, interpretation as it 
offers routes into the study of meaning and social action (p2).  
Whilst DA is a useful methodological approach, it is important to note that it is not one specific 
tool per se, but rather a collection of approaches, and as such it is important to identify the specific 
strand that will be utilised, and more importantly, how this research will define the specific use of 
discourse due to the numerus applications available. CDA focuses on the revelation of ideologies and 
power. It is the systematic and retroductable investigation of semiotic data which posits the context 
of language, which is deemed social practice, to be crucial (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). This implies a 
dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation or social structure 
within which it is framed. CDA emerged in the 1990s and has been identified as most appropriate for 
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this research project as it views discourse as both socially constitutive and conditioned. That is to say 
that it constitutes objects of knowledge and the social identities of people as it acts to maintain and 
develop the desired status quo. Iranian-Chinese relations, and the investigation of an intangible 
alliance, as analysed in chapter six, utilise the construction of a range of shared norms and values, 
which are underpinned by commonalties of historical experiences of civilisational heritage and 
external victimization, combined with similar foreign polices based on anti-hegemony, security, 
development and the maintenance of domestic stability.  
The textual analysis of relations between these two powers refers not just to material 
economic interests but politico-economic interests and the ways in which these are constructed within 
a framework of amenability which in turns seeks to construct trust and predictability. An alliance, in 
theory, in the absence of formality must be maintained, and it must be accepted by the audience. 
Herein lies the all-important issue of power which is a central aspect of CDA. There always is a power 
relationship in the interplay between the discourse and the audience in so much as the practice must 
be acknowledged and accepted – they must be legitimized. Krings (1973 cited in Wodak and Meyer, 
2009: 7) identifies the critical aspect as detailing the practical linking of social and political engagement 
with a sociologically informed construction of society (p7), therefore, ‘critique’ identifies the 
interconnectedness of the different facets of the object of analysis. As such an attempt at CDA 
necessarily begins with a deliberation of the texts that will be utilised. These deliberations are 
concerned with what exactly should provide the basis of the study – which texts should be selected 
and upon what justifications. Following on from this, under consideration is also the form of text, on 
whether the focus should be on official texts only or include non-official texts. Parallel to this is also 
the issue of opposition to consider. Are competing or challenging narratives also to be included and if 
not then why not.  
In order to assess the representations of Iranian-Chinese relations constructed by the two 
states, CDA has been applied to a compilation of media sources produced by each. The sources have 
been selected from embassy white papers and joint communiques as well as items from the national 
newspapers of each state. The white papers are included, despite not being traditional media sources 
because they are issued by the government for domestic public consumption and so represent the 
official policy and decision-making interests and representations. The China sources were selected 
from Xinhua news agency which supplies the China Daily and the People’s Daily. The Iranian sources 
were selected from the IRNI, Tehran Times and Pars news. Whilst John Richardson (2006) states that 
journalistic sources have the power to shape issue agendas and public discourse (p13), he also 
recognises the presence of reporter bias. In this respect the focus is on official and quasi-official 
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sources only as the underpinning aim is to assess the official, political formulation of the relationship 
being assessed.  In the case of the sources selected for this data analysis, however, it should be noted 
that the sources used are official, highly censored media outlets for the relevant governing bodies. As 
such much of this bias is offset as the newspapers are recognised as the mouthpieces of their 
respective ruling bodies, allowing for little, if any, reporter autonomy and bias. These media sources 
are utilised to shape the opinions and reinforce the beliefs vis-a-vis the place and role of the recipient 
audience. As Richardson (2006) sates, they ‘shape views of social reality’ (p13) with regard to the 
domestic audience and the political reality with regard to the political audience which is the other 
state. Here then language use is inherently political.  
In selecting the sources, it was necessary to locate this audience, which is identified as twofold. 
All news items relating to Iranian-Chinese relations were gathered. The sources selected relate to 
these relations specifically and so the tone and message reflects this. The initial search yielded 1527 
sources over the previous 15 years (timeframe identified in the previous chapter), with an increase in 
recent years due to the nuclear negotiations taking place in the contemporary era. 134 were found to 
constitute a direct Iranian-Chinese channel of communication. In comparison, of the remaining 1366 
items, 27 related to sports results and 821 were rejected as irrelevant on the grounds that the articles 
included the names of the two powers but nothing more. 545 sources were directly irrelevant but 
informative by-proxy in that they relate, specifically in the case of China, to external perceptions of 
their relations and so are generated for an alternative audience identified as the international arena. 
Whilst these can be seen to represent a different facet of strategic decision-making, they alone do not 
constitute a direct opposition to the construction of an informal alliance. Indeed, such an oppositional 
narrative, as queried above, is not to be included in this thesis. The reasons for this are simply due to 
a lack of relevance. Since there is no formal alliance there is also no formal parallel narrative to 
challenge it. The lack of positivity’s - these are collections of words or phrases directed to one another 
that construct a positive reflection such as ‘welcome’ ‘pleased to,’ ‘happy new year’ - and codified 
terms found in the omitted sources do not challenge the relationship but rather endorse its tacit 
nature.  
Third party audience-focused items are those which are interpreted as addressing the foreign 
policies of either state, but not in relation to one another, or are addressing issues at the international 
level and so include other state actors. An example of this would be 521 sources that centred on the 
Iranian nuclear issue and recent attempts to resolve it. These sources addressed the P-5 and China 
describing developments in the talks. They were void of any and all references to Iranian-Chinese 
relations beyond stating China’s mediatory role in the process. Likewise, items that address UN 
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sanctions against Iran in terms of reporting on the developments of this alone, were also absent of 
any discursive practices relating to the construction of Iranian-Chinese narrative. The audience in 
these cases are more general and so the absence of these practices can be seen to be indicative, within 
themselves, of a parallel need on the part of China in this case to also cater to this construction of its 
parallel narrative of China as a responsible member of the international community. It can also be 
analysed with reference to confirmation of a Tacit Alliance – one not publicly (wider audience) 
endorsed. Eliminating these items left 134 sources for analysis. These sources either directly 
addressed one another or specifically referenced maintenance or development of relations between 
them. These sources all referenced specific interactions such as cultural exchanges, investment 
opportunities, or cooperative actions between the two powers with reference to their relationship or 
previous exchanges and so can be deemed to be aimed at one another.  
There are two possible approaches to the analysis of this data. One would be to analyse the 
texts with regard to the ways in which they interact with – or talk to – one another. The second would 
be to segregate the two as Chinese and Iranian created and analyse the ways in which each party 
formulates their side of the relationship. This thesis takes the latter approach, which is considered a 
benchmark of the former which is seen as a secondary activity and so one better suited to future study. 
In segregating the sources, they become more useful in their ability to reveal the intentions and foci 
of either party and how the discursive practices relate to their own foreign policies as well as their 
constructed realities of themselves – their interests, aims and considerations. A focus on how the 
items converse with one another would put greater emphasis on the political relationship between 
the two powers, however, this would hinder the domestic pressures and considerations at play. The 
level one audience is the civil society who must accept the relationship, in the face of international 
criticism, and so legitimize it. The rhetoric of shared experience and mutual gain is as much a 
justification to the people of each state as it is a political commitment.  
The second step in conducting a CDA of these sources was to identify key semantic notes. 
Since what is being analysed is the possible construction of a normative, value-laden relationship. The 
key words relating to this construction are identified as trust, exchange/s and cooperation. These are 
words that represent the interests at play in forming a narrative of relations. It is the actions 
represented by the words. Trust is included here as an action in that it fits with cooperation and 
exchanges in representing confidence building measures and so risk-aversion that can be located in 
interdependences in the same way as cooperation and exchanges within a positive context. Also 
codified are words relating to the concrete interest that underpin relations between the two states – 
and indeed any state. These are: peace and stability, development, region, diplomacy and dialogue, 
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security, strategy, and trade. Finally, words were located in the texts which related to amity, these are: 
friend, partner, relate/relation(ship), and history. Also included here are references to what I have 
termed ‘positivity’s’ (see fig 1). These words, though overlapping on occasion, were grouped into the 
three separate categories in order to create frameworks that address the three layers of interaction 
which potentially form a (tacit) alliance – mutual benefit, confidence building, and risk-aversion – the 
what, how and why that constructs their relations.  
The next stage consisted of reading the sources for context and so analysing the functioning 
of the discourse. This involved three steps, the first of which was to identify how the discourse fixes 
meanings and truths to the relationship described. With regard to this thesis this includes the 
recognition of references to history and thus the historical lineage of interactions and amenability. It 
will also include the cross-over of interests, intentions and illustrations of action and discursive 
practices in the consolidation of confidence building and cooperative endeavours. Milliken (1999: 227) 
recognises this as discourses being productive of the world that they construct. It is necessary to 
contextualize the words identified in relation to the subject matter being reported, be it a trade deal, 
diplomatic support or cultural engagement. Again the power relationship with the audience is 
important here. As the application of CDA facilitates the identification of constructed norms, values 
and commonalities that not only work to maintain and develop state-to-state relations but also 
highlight the social acceptance base of such activity. This is to say that, as is discussed in chapters 
three and four, each state needs to maintain governmental legitimacy, their policies and processes 
must conform to the statements and intensions of their respective constitutions and domestic 
pressures and interests – CDA enables an analysis of the discursive practices that constitute this 
endeavour. The second step is to identify the knowledge and practices which are legitimized by the 
discourse. Again this includes confidence building measures and concrete, underpinning interests that 
drive the development and maintenance of an alliance. This step yields the productivity, and utility of 
the discourse and discursive practices under analysis and the ways in which policy implementation 
operationalises them. In this respect the focus will be on the interplay between the three frameworks 
identified from the words codified in the search.  
The final step of the CDA was to quantify the discourse as data in order to assess the ways in 
which the discourse constructs a Tacit Alliance between Iran and China. This will involve an assessment 
of the construction and prevalence of the different frameworks utilised by the respective states. 
Interpretations of why this is – based on foreign-policy decision-making preferences are identified in 
chapters three and four. This will enable the identification of the representational practices through 
which identity is articulated, [re]produced and [re]enforced (Baker-Beale, 2014: 10). This will enable 
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assessments of interests and inclinations as well as audience legitimacy requirements. For instance, if 
state A were to place greater importance on the construction of trust this would need to be 
interpreted with regard to their foreign policy interests and risk assessments. The interpretation of 
the discourse data within the framework of trust and risk analysis is of particular importance with 
regard to the endeavour of this thesis since an informal alliance requires the respective increase and 
reduction of these concerns in the absence of any binding agreements (as discussed in chapter two). 
Here again is a power relationship present which lies in the construction of this reality of trust and 
friendship to mitigate enmity and increase predictability of behaviour and support. In this respect 
power is not seen as the relation of difference identified by Wodak and Meyer (p9) between the two 
but rather in relation to the wider body of practices relating to the ‘third audience’. The power lies in 
the acceptance and development of the narrative and its underpinning norm and value-production 
which form and explain the relationship between complex historical processes, and hegemonic 
narrative. Identity politics on all levels always entails the integration of past and present events and 
political visions. This final is designed to draw out processes of securitisation and/or politicization (as 
discussed in chapter two) and constitute identity. Here then the aim is to identify the wider political 
and societal implications of the operationalization identified in step two which will aid the concluding 
identification of the different layers of the discourse.  
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Chapter Four 
Cognitive Factors and Chinese Foreign Policy Making 
 
Mao Zedong was the father of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the party/state system that it 
evolved into in 1949. This period was marked by isolationism until his replacement by Deng Xiaoping 
in 1974 which saw an evolution in policy centred on a more diplomatic, regionally pro-active and 
internationally engaged China. In the era following the Death of Mao Zedong there have been many 
attempts to explain the constantly evolving governance model of Deng Xiaoping (McGregor, 2012: 
xviii) and his successors. In the contemporary era there are few observers that would describe China’s 
governing regime as purely communist. And there is also great debate with regard to China’s current 
status as a rising power/global power/partial power. Whilst these are important areas of discussion, 
engaging with debates about the identification of China as a communist or capitalist state as well as 
its overall real or potential power in the international system, are outside the remit of this thesis. 
Instead the emphasis of this particular analysis does not concern what China is (Mcgregor, 2012, De 
Burgh, 2006) but rather how it is. This is a significantly different and far more insightful issue with 
regard to its external relations, interests, ambitions and, most importantly, its perceptions of itself 
and others. 
This chapter, which sets the necessary ground work for chapters five and six, introduces the 
government and governance structures of China, identifying the structure of the Chinese Communist 
Party and also of the Chinese governmental system and the symbiotic relationship between the two. 
It examines how the bureaucracy are arranged and ordered, the relationship between the party 
machine and the state, and the diffusion of power and authority within the two overlapping systems. 
The central focus of this aspect of the thesis is to identify the decision-making structures as the 
necessary first step to a greater understanding of the decision-making processes of foreign policy 
formation in China. The chapter identifies key decision-makers within the two overlapping systems, 
both in the form of individuals, such as the General Secretary or President, and in the form of bodies 
such as the ministry of foreign affairs, or propaganda and thought work, and leading groups.  
Moving on from this the analysis will shift to the construction of identity and experience and 
how they feed into perceptions of the self and the other in Chinese foreign policy and for decision-
makers, and how these are manifest in Chinese domestic and foreign policies which are shown to be 
interdependent. Once the key policy decision-makers have been identified their cognitive drivers and 
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constraints at both the personal and national levels are analysed. Foreign policy formation, contrary 
to some strands of IR theory (Langteigne. 2013:1), does not take place within a black box, but rather 
is subject to internally assimilated external and environmental stimuli. It is subject to cognitive factors 
that not only define what information is received and how, but also how the information is processed 
and codified and, finally, which reactions and responses to said information are most acceptable and 
therefore pursued. When adopting a decision-making approach to the analysis of foreign policy 
making it is necessary to recognise and address the inextricable problem of how decision-makers view 
and react to their environment. Factors for consideration are perceptions, knowledge structures, and 
pre-determined bias as well as the behaviour patterns of the individuals involved as ultimately: “the 
‘facts’ of a situation never speak for themselves” (Clarke and White 1989:135). 
All knowledge (upon which information is based), as explained in chapter two, must be 
underpinned by a theoretical framework, with the facts chosen being assigned meaning before they 
are valid (Neack et al. 1995:50). This is not a unilateral process of being affected by environmental 
stimuli, rather it is bi-lateral in that the environment is affected through active responses to it. Schema 
theory views individuals as having rigid knowledge structures in place on which they rely and 
assimilate new information into to compound existing bias and dispositions (Mintz and De Rouen, 
2010:102). These frameworks are shortcuts to processing knowledge deposits and understanding the 
individual’s world. In relation to China, experiences with western powers and its ‘century of 
humiliation’ frame perceptions of external behaviors. This process is not just present in relation to 
reacting to external events, it is also followed in developing and formulating national narratives and 
foreign policy interests (Thies, 2010:5). 
This is often overlooked in relation to China (and also Iran which will be addressed in the following 
chapter), due to its reactionary foreign policy status – having no formal foreign policy department of 
power within itself – Chinese foreign and domestic policy are intimately intertwined and the former 
exists independent of external variables, it is just harder to identify due to the push and pull of its 
domestic parentage. 
Operational code analysis, cognitive mapping and theories such as the inherent bad faith model, 
mirror image and enemy image, and the fundamental attribution error (Clarke and White, 1989; Hill, 
2003; Beach, 2014) (as also discussed in chapter two) will all be applied to understandings of China’s 
foreign policy formulators, in order to provide the most comprehensive understanding of China’s 
interests and objectives, but also its perceptions, which are the drivers of its international behaviour 
generally and responses and reactions to external events and processes specifically. The foreign policy 
goals made are a reflections not of rational objective decisions, but rather of the belief systems, 
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ideologies and biases of the people who set those goals (Callahan, 2012:15). A capitalist society will 
aim to secure resources such as raw materials and overall economic profit, just as an individual who 
prefers control and regimented order will run a dictatorship or a fascist regime, being inherently 
suspicious of all others in the international system (Jensen, 1982:15). Cognitive and psychological 
factors are inextricably intertwined with foreign policy goals, decisions and procedures. This chapter 
ends with a set of conclusions on the make-up of the most salient and influential psychological and 
cognitive factors that influence Chinese foreign policy decision-making. In doing so it clearly identifies 
China’s key interests, ambitions and concerns – domestically, regionally and internationally – which 
are the very foundation upon which not only its identity but also its external relations are constructed 
and maintained (Dong et al. 2013:110). Such an identification and analysis of Chinese decision-making 
processes will highlight the role of constructed norms and values and a specific identity constructed 
through a narrative of history and sense of self which is vital for the execution of chapter six which 
will analyse the very nature of Iranian-Chinese relations. Since what is ultimately under investigation 
is the construction of a Tacit Alliance this chapter will set the groundwork for this analysis by 
identifying the cognitive processes at play and the ways in which they influence policy-formation. This 
will then underpin the analysis of chapter six in which the Tacit Alliance is argued to be constructed 
based upon, and within the framework of, such domestic and foreign policy interest and ambitions 
relating to international expectations, concepts of regional status and domestic legitimacy concerns.  
The State, the Party and the People’s Liberation Army 
China is governed by a system of governance which, in turn, runs parallel to the omnipresent Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) (McGregor, 2012, Callaghan, 2010). The relationship between these two 
hierarchically structured systems, though symbiotic, is asymmetric in terms of power and authority 
with the state sitting in subservience to the party machine. In official discourse all power relating to 
the governance of China is divided between (but in no way evenly) the three main bodies of the 
Chinese governance structure, the State Council and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The CCP was 
founded in 1921 and has been the ruling party of mainland China since the ‘new-democratic revolution’ 
of 1949 (Strauss, 2006: 892). The party is founded on ideology and politics, as influenced by Mao 
Zedong and the motto ‘seeking truth from facts’, in a form of concentrated, or representative 
democracy, bringing into law the ideas and polices that are passed by the selectively elected national 
people’s congress as a result of formal legal processes (Strauss, 2006: 893). The PLA was crucial to the 
independence of new China and gained influence as a result. Mao’s experience as a military leader 
within the PLA ensured and supported the increased and tangible presence of the PLA in domestic and 
foreign affairs, though the Party Secretary was clear that it was the party that ruled the gun and not 
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the other way around (Scobell, 2005:229). At this time Chinese policy was very much reactive rather 
than proactive – influenced by a history of intervention from outside sources and being the sick man 
of Asia, along with its limited degree of development it did not proactively seek foreign policy goals, 
preferring to react to issues and interests as they arose, whilst finding its feet and cementing the CCP’s 
rule and stability (Scobell, 2005:232). The party is inclusive in the respect that any and all citizens aged 
18 and above who accept the party programme and the constitution are eligible to apply for 
membership – though there are naturally expectations that such candidates will be actively involved 
in one of the party’s organizations, adhere to the party line, and pay membership dues. The party 
technically operates within the framework of the state system and the formal constitution with all 
members being equal before the law, however, the relationship between the two structures is 
somewhat more complex in reality.  
Whilst it would be easy at this juncture to digress into a description of the relationship 
between the various party, state and military structures, this would be of little use other than to 
further emphasise the highly complex, symbiotic relationship between these organizations. Yes, they 
are directly and indirectly involved in policy making, both domestic and foreign, as is the intention of 
this chapter to assess. However, what is more important in an understanding of the construction of 
interests and aims, are the underpinning ideological, historical narratives, and identity issues that 
drive China’s view of both itself and others and so frame its motivations.  
Power Distribution  
Since the state system is run, and also superseded, by the CCP in a condition of implied rather than 
actual distribution of power across and within its mechanisms, then the new post-1949 China is a 
Party-State with the difference between the two being a matter of protocol and administration 
(Shambaugh, 2008:65). Despite the NCP being the highest body and the Central Committee having 
much decision-making power, the true governing force lies with the Secretariat, the Politburo and the 
CCP Standing Committee – all of which are headed by the General Secretary, who also heads the NPC 
(as President of China) and the CMC, which oversees all of the armed forces, including the PLA 
(Shambaugh, 2008:125). The PLA was initially established in 1927 as the Red Army, forming the 
military arm of the revolutionary party, and since 1945 has maintained a strong role not only in the 
defence sector but also in Chinese politics and foreign policy (Elleman, 2009:5). Having said this, it is 
important to note that the PLA is founded upon the underpinning principle that “the party commands 
the gun” and its primary mission of keeping the party in power makes its ultimate and overriding 
concerns very much a domestic issue. The CMC, as stated above, sits apart from the state Ministry of 
Defence. The latter, unlike its Western counterparts, actually has no command authority as its primary 
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role is to liaise with foreign military bodies, and in this respect it has no domestic or foreign policy 
power (Elleman, 2009:158). The former, in comparison, oversees the departments of the general staff, 
general political, general logistic, and general armament as well as the air, ground, and naval forces 
and services. In simple terms it decides the budget, personnel and movement of domestic and 
international military related interests, developments which impact relations and interpretations of 
external actors and observers (De Burgh, 2006:37). The relationship between the leaders of the CMC 
and both the party and state organs, underpinned by the overlap of personnel across roles and 
departments, ensures an almost symbiotic party/military loyalty mechanism (De Burgh, 2006:27). It 
also ensures a committee empowered with agency to the degree that the leaders and agenda setters 
within it have a degree of genuine support and of authority within the system through their parallel 
CCP roles and memberships as well as a common understanding of and respect for the official party 
line.   
In a similar vein, the Ministry of Public Security, which comes under the remit of the state 
council within the state structure, governs the PAP and some domestic security issues. However, 
responsibility for these also lies within the preponderant authority of the CMC, along with the second 
artillery corps, national defence universities, and the academy of military science within a framework 
of shared command, though the subservience of the latter would point to an asymmetric division of 
power, or a facade, at best. In each of these cases, in relation to an aspect of military activity or 
responsibility the main state body is impotent with regards to the actual degree of power as well as 
agency and autonomy that it realistically possesses. The roles of the President and the Party Secretary 
are also revealing in relation to the construction of realities of power and influence both within and 
outside of the state. 
These two roles are occupied by the same man, who also holds the position of head of the 
military. The state-party system is one that was inspired by and constructed upon the coat-tails of the 
Russian system, specifically Leninist Communism, and for all of its past and present shows of disdain 
for the Russian model, the Chinese system still very much reflects its origins (Dikotter, 2010:12).  The 
Chinese communist manifesto may well preach inclusion and community but this is executed within a 
stridently elitist system. The leaders of the CCP are elected, not by the society it runs but by that 
society’s representatives – those responsible for the care, guidance and safety of the society. And this 
process is democratic – just in an inherently Chinese sense of the term (De Burgh, 2006:19). The 
political process is an elitist endeavour and as such is not open to the scrutiny of the people it governs. 
Indeed, of the nine elected party leaders, eight are very much aloof and arguably only visible in times 
of crisis, with the exception of the day that they are publicly welcomed into office (McGregor. 2012: 
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22). The ninth, the President, is of course familiar to all due to his media campaign on ‘running’ for 
office, which highlights his professional capabilities and experiences as well as his regional ‘footprints’ 
across China (Wilkinson, 2015). It should be noted, however, that what the people know is the 
strapline – the professional image. What is held back is the true personality of the man. This is very 
much in contrast to western politics (in the USA, the UK and France for instance) where running for 
office is as much a personality race as it is a policy race (Dikotter, 2010:7). The head of state in China 
is elected, but from a carefully pre-selected list of appropriate candidates who have the qualifications, 
experience and maturity to handle the role, as well as having proven loyalty to the Party and being 
supported by existing Party members of weight and import.  
In 2010, Richard McGregor published a book entitled ‘The Party: The Secret World of China’s 
Communist Rulers’. In this book he identifies an item and process which he calls the ‘Red Machine’. 
This refers to the fact that upon the desk of every CEO of the top industry companies in China, which 
are state-led, there sits a ‘red’ telephone which dials only in and is connected directly to the CCP party 
rulers. It is through this that they maintain a presence in the organizations, being outlined in fear or 
respect, as well as the power to swap CEOs across companies and direct their visions, plans and 
investment ambitions (p45). In the west the market is seen as autonomous and capitalist, and big 
companies are generally multi-national. In the west they follow the liberal model of laissez-faire 
economics and autonomy with many companies having their own foreign policy departments. They 
are not bound to the whims of a state per se – other than in relation to internationally applied 
sanctions to those that wish to trade with pariah states such as North Korea and Iran, for instance. In 
China the rules of the game reflect a very much more Realist model. The national and international 
industries are very much an extension of the power of the Party to whom they are ultimately 
accountable. The Party President, with his parallel roles as Head of State and Head of Military, then is 
also head of the market in that he controls not just the policies and procedures of the companies 
concerned. He also has some influence on their growth and success through the ability to transfer and 
replace key personnel within each company who may be seen to be too inefficient or too comfortable 
(McGregor, 2010:45). 
The Party Secretary is very much in control of all aspects of the state, within his various guises. 
On international trips he is listed as the President of China, reflecting the habits of the international 
system that see leaders meet to conduct state business rather that to air ideological interests. At home 
the protocol is more fluid and Party-centred (McGregor, 2010: 20). It is the Party Secretary that will 
raise the receiver of the Red Machine and ensure that Party policies are being upheld. It is also the 
CCP structure that supports and reproduces discourse and documentation on the ‘Century of 
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Humiliation’ that China must never forget, and indeed cannot forget through education books, 
museums, national humiliation days, statues and other symbols (Callaghan, 2010:62). This discourse 
is empowered by the Party organ and used to empower Chinese history and identity. It is also used to 
support the state, specifically China since 1949 When the old rulers were evicted from power and 
China, under the tutelage of the party, would shed its humiliations and rise again to its waiting place 
as a great power. In times of crisis the head of the military is also useful in squashing any dissent that 
may arise, the most famous arguably being the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989. Though this is not 
a good example of China’s success with its society it does act as a representation of the power of the 
party to maintain its position in the face of impunity and also its grip on power. The century of 
humiliation discourse is very much tied up with Chinese identity but more specifically with the CCP’s 
identity, as the mechanism to wash clean past stains and strengthen the nation of China, to attract 
back the Chinese diaspora, and tie them also with the similar narrative, a narrative that they do not 
just empathise but recognise, producing ties that bind, and parallel bank transfers of investments from 
ex-pats which continue to be a significant source of income for China and its economic rise (Smart and 
Hsu, 2007:5480).  
The omnipresent, invisible hand of the CCP and its overarching agenda of self-preservation 
and legitimacy maintenance is where the main power resides within China (Shambaugh, 2008:7). This 
power rests upon what Leninists would recognise as the three pillars of survival which can be identified 
as control of personnel, control of propaganda and control of the PLA (McGregor, 2010: xix). Due to 
the nature of the Party-State system, this is not a particularly revolutionary or controversial statement, 
and indeed it is not framed to be. What is important to note is that the state system is an organ of the 
party and its interests – complicated by the fact that the key personnel within and across each are one 
and the same. Likewise, all media is controlled by the CCP propaganda department, included 
narratives of humiliation and history – or identity – and the PLA are held within a vice grip of control 
by the party as well as being permitted to partake in profitable capitalist enterprises within the 
economic field. Therefore, in order to understand foreign policy-making and the cognitive factors of 
influence within it, it is necessary to identify the key foreign policy actors and agents. This is true in 
relation to any state, but particularly so in the case of China where a foreign policy department – 
within either the State or the Party mechanism – is absent and indeed, the majority of its foreign policy 
actions have traditionally been more constitutive of reactions – both to domestic and external 
pressures.  
 
 
87 
 
Foreign Policy Decision-Making 
China is unparalleled in history for its transformation from an isolated, and isolationist, command 
economy into one of the largest market forces in the current globalised system (Langteine. 2013:3). 
Whilst the structure of the Party State system has been addressed above to identify the power 
structure of the symbiotic system it is now necessary to turn to the actual foreign (and domestic) 
policy decision-making bodies and processes, how they have been constructed and how they have 
evolved in relation to key policy issues. As China has developed in all spheres generally, and the 
economic sphere specifically, it remains a socialist state, or rather builds upon the blueprint of 
socialism that it was initially born of. This is not to say, however, that political reform is absent from 
its development strategies or goals, indeed when analysing foreign policy decision-making it is clear 
that there have been numerous and significant reforms in the very nature of policy formation, as well 
as its implementation (Unay, 2013:132).  
Whilst the external observation of decision-making processes have traditionally been very 
difficult, China has increased interaction with the processes of globalisation, and economic 
liberalization has resulted in significantly greater transparency, as a result arguably of endeavours to 
meet the criteria to join organizations such as the WTO and the UN but also as part of the older Maoist 
initiative of peaceful co-existence and Deng’s ‘Open Door’ Policy, though of course increased 
transparency is not synonymous with complete transparency. Regardless of this, this section will 
assess the decision-making processes of China in relation to who makes policy and, equally important, 
what makes policy. This will of course be conducted within the framework of Holistic Constructivist 
theory to assess the normative and ideational structures that influence actions and reactions, which 
influence decisions, alongside the domestic and societal impacts and influences of policy aims, 
ambitions and agendas. A core approach to cognitive understandings of foreign policy relates to what 
is known as the ‘operational code’ (George 1969, cited in Neack et al. 1995:56). This has been highly 
influential in the cognitive approach as it looks at the belief systems of political figureheads and how 
they strive for ‘cognitive consistency’ (Jervis, 1970:23) in those beliefs with regard to the international 
system and their individual views of political life. Leaders hold two sets of beliefs: philosophical and 
instrumental. The former is concerned with the basic knowledge framework of politics, conflict and 
the enemy, as well as assumptions about history and the future. The latter is concerned with the 
planning procedure, timing, strategy, risks, self-interest and tactics. These two subsections are 
arranged around ten core questions which produce a blueprint to decision-making, the philosophical 
beliefs determining the definition of the situation and the instrumental beliefs determining the 
decisions open for consideration. 
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During the time of Mao Zedong, there was very much a structure of the cult of personality 
which influenced power and control. This was important for the attainment and maintenance of state 
control (Leese. 2014). In the case of Mao, it was also harnessed and cultivated in order to facilitate 
controversial projects such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution (Dikotter, 2011:14-
16/84 and 336-7 respectively). Mao was the standard bearer of a new China, one that would overcome 
the humiliations of the past at the hands of imperial powers. China would be great again – at almost 
any cost (Dikotter, 2011:9). Foreign policy, limited as it was to reactive policies in a hostile world of 
bipolar order and great power games, was very much the result of the interpretations and intentions 
of the party leader, with limited assistance from the narrow and elitist Politburo Standing Committee. 
As the leader of the new state, and of the party, Mao Zedong was granted an inherent authority to act 
autonomously in the best interests of the state. The cult of personality here was important in 
maintaining state legitimacy as the usurped former government maintained a presence off shore in 
Taiwan, and was very much still active in the international arena (Matsuda, 2004:5). This cult of 
personality can also be traced to the rule of Deng Xiaoping, from 1974, though with a marked 
difference in relation to the foreign policy decision-making process (Leese, 2014). Deng ushered in a 
new era in Chinese development with the restructuring of the socialist model with liberal market 
forces. Deng was a CCP veteran, as well as living through the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
Revolution he was a military man, a guerrilla leader in the fight for Chinese independence (against 
Japanese occupation in the 1930s and 1940s), which sought to throw off the shackles of foreign 
interference and the stains of the century of humiliation at the hands of imperial powers (Callahan, 
2012:37). Within this framework of personal experience, it becomes easier to understand his policy of 
concealing China’s capabilities from external actors.  
Both Mao and Deng where members of the PLA as military leaders which resulted in close ties 
and relations with the latter. The military during their rule held a lot of influence despite being, 
ultimately, subservient to the party and were always central to any decision-making. The process of 
foreign-policy making – its very structure, in this instance, can be seen to be related directly to the 
existing schemas, or psychological frameworks of the men central to their development. Existing 
schemas relating to experience of imperial control and interference affected Deng’s decision to 
conceal capabilities (Zhao, 2013: 102), just as their military experiences influenced their relations with 
the PLA, so their ties to it increased the degree of influence the PLA was able to exert in domestic and 
foreign policy-making (the role of the PLA will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter).  
Mintz (1993, 2004), Mintz and Geva (1997), and Dacey and Carlson (2004) are just a few 
scholars who endorse cognitive and social-psychological theories of decision-making. These scholars 
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in particular focus on what is termed Poli-heuristic theory which is a blend of the Rational Actor Model 
(RAM) and cognitive approaches which seeks to build bridges between the two in a two-step process 
(Beach, 2012: 119). The first step is cognitive – whereby the actor, or decision-maker, seeks options 
based upon cognitive processes, the second is based on the RAM process of option selection based 
upon utility maximising choices. This appears to be evident at the individual level of analysis with 
regard to the inherent styles of the various ‘generations’ of Chinese leaders. Each leader, and his 
standing committee bring to the table specific personal and cultural variations, based upon where in 
China they have lived, and thus their experiences, and learning curve and character building events 
such as Chinese independence, the Cultural Revolution, options for travel, and perceptions of the 
international environment. As stated above, each leader wishes to put their own stamp on the Chinese 
history books – to leave a specific mark, whilst at the same time being constrained not only by firm 
foreign and domestic policy interests and commitments but also national and historic narratives of 
both splendour and humiliation which unite and direct a sense of nationalism, society and stability 
(Zhao, 2013:102). 
When adopting a decision-making approach to the analysis of foreign policy making it is 
necessary to recognise and address the inextricable problem of how decision-makers view and react 
to their environment. Factors for consideration are perception, knowledge structures and pre-
determined biases as well as the behaviour patterns of the individual decision-makers. The cult of 
personality may be a thing of the past, however, each president aims to leave a specific legacy of their 
leadership. There has been a clear shift from foreign policy underpinned by ideology (such as exporting 
the socialist revolution that was endorsed by Mao) to one that is underpinned by pragmatism, as well 
as a degree of detachment from the military. The third, fourth and fifth generations of leaders, and 
specifically their supreme leader (the Party Secretary and state President), did not cut their teeth in 
the military, nor do they draw on personal experiences of events such as the Cultural Revolution in 
quite the same way (Langteine, 2013: 31). The focus for these leaders is not the augmentation of 
power and control, as a tool to help bring the stability required to enable the reproduction of domestic 
reforms in the interest of state and societal development and the continued pre-eminence of the CCP. 
Rather the emphasis is on the development and diversification of economic links and good relations 
with the ‘near abroad’, and later the ‘far abroad’. Deng’s open door policy required a broadening of 
the circle of policy makers as greater expertise was called for in policy formation. This pattern has 
been reproduced in subsequent generations. Jiang, as stated, did not come from a military background 
but from a scientific one and sought to develop Deng’s lead by initiating re-contact with near 
neighbours in the Pacific Rim, as well as other developing states. Jiang’s policy of a ‘Peaceful Rise’ not 
only marked a clear separation of ideology and policy it also bolstered China’s international status, 
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which was harmed during the Tiananmen Square disaster of 1989. Jiang believed that foreign policy 
was about ‘making cool observations, dealing with situations calmly, grasping opportunities and 
making the best use of the situation’ (Bijian, 2011:9).  
He was an advocate of trade development – and all of the benefits that it provided – with 
neighbours, setting up a number of bilateral agreements in the Asia Pacific area. For this Jiang needed 
an even greater base of expertise in order to not just craft policy but also to understand it. This greater 
expertise was also important within the context of the wider international stage. Jiang’s presidency 
came during a time of significant change – specifically the end of the Cold war, expertise was also 
required in order to better understand and implement post-Cold-War international relations and 
structures and to learn from the existing dominant international powers and actors (Xudon and 
Junxiang, 2009:50). This was not a new idea, however, as China has long been aware of the need to 
learn from the imperial powers (McGregor, 2010:32). As stated Jiang also bolstered China’s 
international standing as his presidency moved away from capabilities concealment to the initiating 
of power diplomacy with great powers in what is known as his ‘rapprochement’ policy. In the 1990s 
he made a number of partnership agreements (see appendix one), though relations with the USA were 
hampered by mistrust on both sides (Goh, 2005: 238). This mistrust was exacerbated by the 1995-96 
Taiwan Straits crises in which attempts to bring the island closer to the mainland failed, as well as the 
2005 anti-secession Law (aimed at Taiwanese calls for independence) which recognised the 
independence movement as illegal and punishable by force if necessary.  
To say that the issue of Taiwan is controversial is something of an understatement, because 
despite it being characterized as a province of China, there have actually been two ‘Chinas’ since the 
end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 when the Kuomintang leaders of the Republic of China (ROC) 
were unseated and withdrew to the province to regroup and prepare to retake the mainland where 
they had been replaced by the CCP (Roberge and Lee, 2009:3). Whilst it is the former which actually 
rules the province it is the latter which continues to claim it as greater Chinese territory as part of its 
‘One China Principle’ (ibid:2). Whilst Taiwan as it has since come to be known, underwent 
constitutional reform in 1991 and no longer made any claims on the mainland it did seek 
independence and has exacerbated recent disturbances relating to the 21-day anti-China protests on 
the 10th of July 2016 (Jennings 2014). This changed in 2008, however, when previous claims were re-
asserted by the newly elected Ma Ying-Jeou. The ROC was an international actor, with membership of 
international organizations such as the UN, however, as China rose in power it made a point of insisting 
that Taiwan should not be recognised internationally as a sovereign entity, calling for its membership 
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of organizations to be predicated on the expulsion of the province from such entities; China won a 
seat at the UN in 1971, at which time the ROC was expelled (Trevelyan, 2007).  
The Taiwan question is a very real and significant foreign and domestic policy issue for China, 
and one that no leader would want to be seen to be losing. As such, in 1981 Jiang proposed a ‘one 
country two systems’ model for Taiwan that has been implemented in Hong Kong (Jennings 2014). 
China has 14 direct, border-sharing neighbours and as such territorial integrity has been a policy issue 
throughout its history. It has been victim to different forms of invasion, interference and subjugation 
throughout its long history which has led to greater emphasis being placed on protecting its territory. 
This concept of territorial integrity, however, is not based upon the contemporary map of the world 
which has been heavily drawn and redrawn as a result of the processes of empire, colonization and 
decolonization. China identifies its territorial rights as those stated on much older, pre-colonial maps. 
As such its successful rise and recovery from the wounds of past humiliations is based on it returning 
to its role as a great power – within the territorial format of this earlier time (Xudong and Junxiang, 
2009:56). This directly influences policy formation in relation to disputes such as those in the South 
China Sea where island ownership is highly contested (See Storey, 1999; Rowan, 2005; Wray, 2015). 
This issue has gained prominence in recent years with the discovery of valuable minerals and ores on 
some of the larger islands and therefore mining and resource ownership rights (Poling 2013: V). As a 
result, the foreign policy aims of all generations of CCP rule have been positive border relations.  
A mark of Jiang’s leadership (1989-2002)is protection of the status quo, developing trade and 
cooperation as well as the domestic issues of economic development and enriching peoples’ lives. The 
presence of mineral deposits and their ownership then is a very real, material interest for policy 
decision-makers in China. However, it is also tied into existing knowledge frameworks, or schemas, 
relating to its historical narrative of rights and restitution. The Spratley Islands, according to China, 
were part of an ancient map of China and so belong to China. Within the framework of identity-
formation then these islands (just like Taiwan) represent honour, achievement and right. To be 
perceived domestically as having lost them to a foreign power would be seen as failure to resist 
another instance of foreign control and domination (Callaghan, 2010:33). The application of images of 
the enemy and mirror images offers an explanation for sustained international tensions and conflicts 
such as recurrent foreign interference. For instance a show of concern by the EU regarding Chinese 
policy, its human rights record or form of democracy for instance, can be identified negatively, as a 
form of continual harassment and criticism, whilst continued Chinese aggression or stalemate over 
issues such as the South China Sea islands is seen in a more positive light as being necessary to fulfil 
Chinese commitments to territorial integrity and domestic stability (Blanchard, 15.07.2014) rather 
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than an instance of it acting dogmatically. It would also reflect poorly on the CCP and its claims to 
protection and stability that were made as it took power in 1949. 
Whilst Jiang was focused on protection, development, trade and cooperation at the regional 
level his successor took this to another level. In the ever more globalised world, or global village 
(McLuhan, 1967), which compresses distance and increases interaction, President Hu’s leadership was 
marked by the greater internationalisation of economic and diplomatic ties with far neighbours (states 
and actors which would be considered international rather than regional neighbours), instigating 
partnerships cross-regionally in Africa, Latin America and the Pacific. The key policy of border 
maintenance remained but was increasingly supported through bilateral agreements and involvement 
in international regimes such as the ASEAN, SCO and APT as well as engagement with the UN 
(Lanteigne, 2013:31). This supports the growing shift from ideology to pragmatism and from the direct 
influence of historical experiences of the Century of Humiliation and schematic mistrust of 
international organizations framed within the mirror image theory of policy formation (see chapter 
two). The shift is also a normative one, however, as it points to an alternation in normative 
understandings of self- and external-identification. The Chinese leadership no longer viewed itself as 
being at the mercy of the international system in the same way that it did during Deng’s era of 
concealment. Improved diplomatic forays, bolstered by rapid economic development, raised its voice 
and helped to change its narrative, to one not of victimization but of healing, of returning to the great 
power game (note that this is not a reference to the great power game of the European powers during 
the 20th century).  
President Xi (2013-present) has been in a position of leadership only a short time, however, 
he again marks a change of style. Xi comes from an economic background rather than a military or a 
scientific one, however, he is what the Chinese refer to as a ‘princeling’: a son of one of the original 
CCP orchestrators and so in receipt of much ideological support within the CCP (Callahan, 2012). He is 
also more well-travelled then previous leaders and has had direct knowledge of the international 
arena and other powers within it – in this respect it has the result of making the far abroad not quite 
so distant but more tangible and accessible. The identity and history narrative of Chinese power and 
weakness, and experiences with foreign devils must also be reconciled with personal schemas based 
upon actual experience in such foreign states in a way that avoids cognitive dissonance and supports 
the greater commitment to party legitimacy and survival. This is known as the “inherent bad faith” 
model (Neak et al. 1995:55). The mirror image model follows on from this but concerns both parties 
(for instance China and Britain) who hold mirror opposite beliefs about each other, viewing themselves 
as peaceful and cooperative but their enemies as war mongering, difficult and uncompromising. This 
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builds on the basic psychological belief in the fundamental attribution error which posits that the 
individual will view his own negative actions as subjective but will view the same actions carried out 
by an enemy as being a reflection of their innately bad character or any good needs that the enemy 
conducts as being purely situational and in opposition to his basic character (Clarke and White, 
1989:145). This leads to gross misperceptions and can result in the escalation of conflict or crisis 
situations. 
As stated above, the Party Secretary plays all major head of state roles in China and this is 
significant also in relation to foreign policy production, implementation and execution. As shown in 
Figure one, China has a Foreign Affairs Department (FAD). It does not, however, have a foreign policy 
department. Whilst it is easy to overlook the meaning of this or even to assume that they are one and 
the same thing they are not. The FAD is an executive agency under the State Council and is responsible 
to the State Department. It is very much involved with international relations and on the surface 
appears to be quite powerful. It formulates foreign policies, produces foreign affairs documents, press 
statements and organizes the travel of representatives to and from other countries. It is also 
responsible for the negotiation of bi-lateral and multi-lateral trade agreements and treaties as well as 
being China’s representative at the UN. The FAD, therefore, is an arm of the state, representing its 
interests on the international stage. This is, however, not a state entity but a party organization (see 
Figure 1.2). Whilst it formulates policies, these polices then have to be put to the Central Committee 
which decides their outcome. It is also headed by Wang Yi – the Foreign Minister of the Party and one 
of the nine Politburo members. It is, in practice, very much a bureaucratic office with very little actual 
autonomy or affective power. It is subordinate not just to the party and the state but also to the 
military.  
Whilst the office of foreign affairs may well arrange treaties it is useful to highlight the power 
of the PLA whose higher echelons are not only heavily intertwined with the CCP but also with the 
economy, investing heavily in business and industry. Within their official capacity the PLA are also 
involved with the development of military contracts with regard to the supply of military hardware 
(and maintenance thereof) and technology to other states, such as centrifuges to Iran (to be discussed 
further in chapter five). In a similar vein, though the FAD may well be responsible for the issuing of 
statements and the international travel of dignitaries, all media acts ultimately come under the control 
(and so monitoring, guidance and insistence) of the CCP Propaganda Department which channels 
power and control back to the party machine, rather than the state structure (McGregor, 2010). China 
can be seen, therefore, to be the formal, visual representational façade of the CCP, set within a system 
of committees and offices that reflect the national norms of states within the international arena, as 
94 
 
well as the formal blueprint to present to the people it appears to rule. The state would be the mother 
– the housewife that directs the children and gives them comfort, education and support. The party, 
in contrast would be the father, not always visible but always present, putting food on the table, 
clothes on backs and maintaining the household, as well as being the one to bring the punishment if 
the children are naughty. This similarity also fits with the Chinese view of familial piety that was 
previously discussed in chapter two.  
The Rise of China 
The rise of China has arguably been one of the most significant potential agents for change with regard 
to international relations at the dawn of the 21st century, and continues to be so (Unay 2013:130). As 
it ‘rises’ so too does its capacity to exert increasing influence, not just regionally but globally. This can 
be seen through its growing presence in security, economic, cultural and even environmental issues. 
More specifically, in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, China has been able to play a significant role 
in the global economy. China is also in the unique position of rising in circumstances alien to previous 
rising states. Never before has a state risen to pre-eminence in the international arena in an 
environment embedded with the degree of organizations, regimes, norms and information flows that 
mark the current era. Very rarely also, has a state risen without displacing an existing powerhouse. 
This makes the China question not only a pertinent one but also a contentious one. States in the 
current liberally interdependent system are now more risk-averse to such conditions and China can 
be no different if it is to maintain its development. For it is, despite its spectacular growth in all areas, 
still a medium level power and playing the game of the existing power-houses. Under this condition 
of globalisation and international scrutiny the variables for action become inherently different and 
foreign policy design and implementation must, and indeed does, reflect this. This is especially so in 
the case of China as history has shown that the foreign policy interests of great powers are 
considerably more populous, and distinct, than they are for medium and lower level powers. In 
cognitive terms, such a situation, or status, is important and affects the decision-making process. 
China must measure its actions, re-actions and policies, against international norms structures, and 
expectations in order to offset fear of the potential threat its rise may cause.   
For China the evolution of its foreign policy-making from that of a reactionary state to that of 
a rising and potentially great power is exacerbated by the parallel challenge that it faces in maintaining 
the domestic environment it began to form over 70 years ago with the rise of the CCP. These domestic 
interests are very specific, relating to the continual improvement of standards of living for Chinese, 
the continuation of processes of economic (and political) reform and the promotion of stability, that 
were introduced in the 1970s. This environment is based upon stability and development, whereby 
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economic development will filter to technological progress and societal prosperity and stability; the 
development of the Chinese entity on the international stage not as the sick man of Asia, or the 
underachieving Russian comrade but as a reflection of a previous time of its original power and 
influence within the structure of an anti-hegemonic constitution. As a result, Chinese policy 
development can be seen as a ‘Two Level Game’ (Jacobsen and Putman, 1993) where domestic and 
foreign policy, whilst feeding into one another must at the same time be carefully balanced. If foreign 
policy can be codified as the interplay between structures formed by social relationships and various 
political agents (Wendt, 1987) then the most substantial change to affect Chinese foreign policy 
decision-making is the increase in the sheer number of agents that are involved, either directly or 
indirectly, in the process. These agents relate to the increase in Chinese interests regionally, with 
regard to territorial integrity, which is a key national interest (Zhao, 2013:104), and regional stability 
through the mechanisms of regional economic and security forums such as the ASEAN, APT and the 
SCO, trade liberalization and regional trade agreements and initiatives (Munro and Orbis, 1994:2).  
The interests are also present further afield with corporate investment initiatives and 
opportunities being sought with western counterparts, along with information and technological flows 
for product development and efficiency, alongside the strengthening of cultural ties with off-shore 
diaspora. In pre-colonial times Chinese-ness was restricted to those Chinese who lived on Chinese 
territory (Jacques, 2012:87). To leave China was to surrender your Chinese identity. During colonial 
and early post-colonial times, it was seen as betrayal, and very little consideration was given to this 
ex-pat community. However, with the rise of China at the hands of the CCP a renewed interest was 
found for these communities abroad who were western-educated and so of technological and 
scientific use. There was also a very real economic benefit in that they have played a significant role 
in China’s development through investment. National humiliation education, as a result, is now also 
geared to diaspora communities, instilling a sense of unity – of ‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 2006: 
5), affiliation and ownership amongst those abroad in pro-national terms. This can be seen in analysis 
of the Chinese protests that took place in various states during the Beijing Olympics where Chinese 
ex-pats came out in force in the near and far abroad in an expression of solidarity with the mainland. 
This was arguably a major shift in China’s concept of identity and belonging, which was re-structured 
into a new schema of a Chinese diaspora, to be re-configured within an imagined community of 
belonging rather than dismissed as ‘deserters’. They were targeting as economic tools but also 
politically as foreign policies of migration and diaspora influence and potential as investors and 
contributors, had to be re-assessed and revised. 
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Domestic interests in CCP legitimacy and societal stability have meant that crime is also a 
significant foreign policy issue; not just in relation to corruption charges and the effect that they can 
have on how China is perceived abroad but also, more immediately in relation to permeable 
international crime and terrorism which can cause problems not just for the economy but also for 
societal stability in a state with over fifty large ethnic minorities (Shambaugh, 2008:7), in particular 
the large Muslim quarter of Xinjiang which has been a source of tension in the past as well as having 
the potential to colour relations with Middle Eastern counterparts. Particularly in the current 
phenomenon of religious extremism and divisive identity politics that has given rise to the prominence 
of groups such as Hezbollah and Islamic State in recent years. China is highly dependent on oil for its 
continuing development, being the second largest consumer in the world. In this arena it is coming to 
the market place late, long after industrialized western powers have already established firm relations 
(whether positive or negative) with hydrocarbon producers and the accompanying supply contracts 
which affect its purchasing parity. But this area is not just important for hydrocarbons – though this is 
an over-riding factor. Western states are technologically advanced with high quality products. 
In Eastern Asia, many states export similar low-tech or low quality products (with the 
exception of the production of high tech products for western firms based on cheap labour), being at 
similar levels of development they are also limited in terms of their spending power. The MENA, 
however, is home to some of the poorest states in the world but also some of the richest. This is the 
perfect place for China to sell its non-hydrocarbon products – providing a testing ground for product 
viability and, more importantly, development. Shortly after the 1979 revolution, Chinese products 
were not popular in Iran due to their poor quality. However, in the contemporary era they are much 
improved and far more popular. Such products include textiles, ceramics and electronics.  
The large Muslim minority in China is also used as a foreign policy tool as it assists in bolstering 
relations with Muslim states in the hydrocarbon rich Middle East on which China is highly dependent 
(Davidson, 2010:1). There have been many high-level public visits by Middle Eastern diplomats to 
China’s Xinjiang province to showcase education and religious freedoms as well as ethnic minorities’ 
treatment. This is important internationally were China comes under fire for its poor human rights 
record and in relation to international terrorism as Xinjiang can be seen as fertile ground for 
fundamentalist recruiters, with disastrous economic effects domestically, regionally and 
internationally. Therefore, the maintenance of a stable and un-contentious Muslim quarter is of high 
importance for China, though there have always been levels of difference between the Muslims and 
the native Han in China, which has resulted in societal inequalities for the latter. What is important is 
the awareness of this issue and the commitment from China not just to squash any potential 
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disturbances but to utilise the group for potential advantages based upon commonality and similarity 
when faced with Muslim states in the MENA. Lowell Dittmer (2003:904) posits that the purpose of 
foreign economic relations is to make the domestic politics of a state more compatible with the global 
economy, in the case of China, a socialist state ideology and historical anathema of the west, this is a 
significant concern, attested to by its alteration of policies against neo-imperial organizations to 
positive endorsement of organizations such as the WTO and active membership of the UN, along-side 
the above mentioned security and economy forums of the Asia-Pacific region; China has developed 
into a team player it would seem, and in doing so is reaping greater Soft Power with which to enjoy 
the foreign policy benefits of such cooperation.  
Though the decision-making process has been more centralized in China than in western 
states, with its government being dominated by a sole political actor, namely the CCP, this dominance 
is not traditionally recognised authoritarianism. The party-state requires legitimacy in order to fulfil 
its overriding (or underpinning) domestic and international policy of party survival (Zhao, 2013:103). 
In this light there has been a significant shift in the construction of ideas and perceptions that marked 
the rule of Mao and Deng regarding international relations. Though much state-to-state interaction is 
underpinned by Maoist peaceful co-existence, outdated ideas such as the exportation of the socialist 
revolution are being discarded for more pragmatic and linear policy ambitions, formulated by a 
bureaucracy less directly affected by events such as the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap 
Forward. There is also less dependence on military thinking as current and recent leaders hail form 
economic and scientific backgrounds (respectively) rather than being ex-guerrilla leaders of the 
independence movements of 1949. The role of the military is also an overtly domestic one, with 
limited projection capabilities abroad and a navy that is predominantly ‘green water’ and so defensive 
as opposed to ‘blue water’ which offers greater range and is more indicative of offensive projection. 
China is a nuclear power, with all that that may entail, but its military also lags significantly behind 
that of other dominant powers in the international (and regional) arena. What it has in sheer numbers 
is relative to its size and also far ahead of its technical expertise. It is a self-defence force.  
The presidency, or secretariat, of Jiang Zemin saw the implementation (in the 1990s) of 
improved relations with great powers well as regional powers – active dialogue over mere co-
existence. This was developed by Hu who shifted this initiative to incorporate far neighbours also – or 
cross-regional diplomacy. Though it should be noted that the majority of this development at the 
foreign policy level was trade driven, and so economically underpinned. The obvious exception to this 
is of course those matters which relate to sovereign territorial integrity such as the South China Sea 
disputes and the less directly related issue of Taiwan and its relationship – and political proximity to 
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the mainland. These domestic and political issues are also key foreign policy issues as they again not 
only colour international perceptions, to which, as we have seen above, China is sensitive, but also 
have diplomatic and economic impacts. China now has an ‘open door’ policy with Taiwan despite 
passing anti-secessionist laws, and is now enjoying greater economic relations with the former within 
a less hostile environment, though international recognition of Taiwan, or rather the ROC, can and 
does still result in Chinese outrage and can seriously threaten diplomatic relations. Chinese successful 
and impressive economic rise is highly attractive to investors and fortune seekers however which 
limits the number of cases to arise where Taiwan would be considered the preferred partner. There is 
also the near-constant stalemate with Japan and other neighbours over Island ownership, which has 
been exacerbated by the potential hydrocarbon resources that they may wield. Again, however, their 
policy has not been overly aggressive, outside of the arena of discourse. Indeed, China has attempted 
to build diplomatic bridges and come to ‘agreements’ with contesters – though of course on China’s 
terms and in ways that support China’s historical territorial map. 
Conclusions 
Zemin and Hu both expanded the degree of education and professionalism within foreign policy 
decision-making, which resulted in the greater empowerment of governmental ministries and 
commissions, as well as non-governmental organizations such as think tanks and academic centres 
that were required for information gathering and analysis. Many of the professionals affiliated with 
these also have a far greater knowledge and personal experience of the international arena having 
grown up in a China that was less isolated, and so with greater capabilities to travel and study abroad. 
This has a clear impact on decision-making as all of this has coloured their views and their 
understandings and acceptance of norms and information flows at the regional and international 
levels. Included in these information flows is the role of the media. Despite state censorship, this has 
introduced and aided the development, not just of additional links with diaspora communities but also 
with other media and internet users and sources. The protests that erupted during the Beijing 
Olympics did so in numerous Asian and western countries and were assisted by the lightning speed 
flow of information permitted by the internet. Globalisation and China’s rise within its framework, has 
also demanded greater transparency from a state traditionally and predictably hard to read from the 
outside.  
During the era of Mao, foreign policy decision-making was the responsibility of a narrow and 
closed elite, the expansion of this circle by Zemin and Hu was first initiated by Deng as a result of the 
need for greater trade expertise. This has resulted in a more diverse circle of decision-making which 
also allows for dissent, or criticism, though of course only within the framework of party protocol. The 
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era of domination through the cult of personality and a single leader is well and truly over, with 
decision-making being the result of consultation between ministerial groups, the bureaucracy and 
non-governmental agents. The number and diversity of decision-makers is significantly larger in the 
contemporary era, however, therefore the party is, and will remain, the paramount political actor in 
all areas, particularly those that have the ability to affect its survival and/or legitimacy such as foreign 
policy (Zhao. 2013:103). The cult of personality has made way for collective leadership, a trend that it 
is impossible to reverse, with the upper tiers of the CCP being more decentralised and law creation 
and foreign policy making being dependant on support and information from ministries and other 
sources, and consensus building being crucial to day-to-day politics. The NPC is the highest body of 
power in China, however, the reality of the situation is that it is far too large to be truly effective. More 
power is actually held by the smaller CMC. This power is, however, more of a veneer than a reality as 
actual power in truth sits with the Secretariat, the Politburo and the PSC. China is still a party-state 
symbiosis, with emphasis on the party, and ultimate power still sits within the echelons of the 
Politburo Standing Committee and its concept of democratic centralism and dichotomy between 
actual and implied power. The relationship between these forms of power and decision-makers is a 
hermeneutic circle of types. The party developed its structure in symbiosis with the state structure, 
constructing norms and values which are self-re-enforcing and self-perpetuating. The role of a single 
ruler facilitated cooperative decision-making at the higher levels and the structure of the party now 
maintains its members and their ideologies through membership inductions, histories and education 
just as the members maintain the party structure and its constructed core values and ambitions – 
namely survival and prestige.  
This chapter has introduced and analysed the decision-making process of China and the CCP, 
and the cognitive factors that influence or drive them. The application of cognitive FPA, in concert 
with a Holistic Constructivist lens which gives weight to identity and domestic-international influences 
is pertinent. It reveals the role that norm, value and again, identity structures, and constructs play in 
decision-making and so foreign policy formation. Leading on from this, chapter five will repeat this 
process with regard to the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to highlight similarities in their decision-
making processes. Once this has been done such similarities will underpin the analysis in chapter six, 
of Iranian-Chinese relations and the role that cognition plays in the construction of their relations with 
one another.  
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Chapter Five: 
Cognitive Factors and Iranian Foreign Policy Making 
Introduction 
When thinking of Iranian foreign policy, we are dealing with multiple and diverse sources and histories. 
This results in myriad diverse meanings and interpretations which cannot be reduced down to one 
single narrative. Conventional approaches to FPA suffer from a range of problems which limit their 
ability to provide coherent or convincing accounts, although the questions which they ask may have 
some value as the starting point for a more carefully grounded research agenda. This chapter explores 
some alternatives with a view to finding more nuanced understandings of Iranian foreign policy, in 
relation to the cognitive factors that influence the decision-making processes. Conventional 
approaches tend to focus on rationality, be western-centric, ignore distinctive cultural variations, and 
(even when they are explicitly considered) to under-estimate the importance of specific value systems, 
identities and histories. These points are made in summary since there is a substantial literature to 
support them in general which has been used, for example, to re-assess Indian, Chinese and 
Indonesian foreign policies. But relatively little attention has been given to a more critical account of 
the foreign policies of Iran since the 1979 revolution. Equally, relatively little attention has been given 
to the distinctive character of Iranian political and social processes in foreign policy debates, not least 
because so much of the academic literature on foreign policy has its origins in the United States and 
the evolution of US-Iranian relations since 1979 has discouraged the kinds of critical thinking which 
might open out new possibilities of explanation rather than closing down explanations. 
The external, predominantly Western, perceptions of Iran today are that it is a state held 
within the vice-like grip of tyrannical Islamist hardliners, where dissent of any and all forms is crushed, 
perpetrators ‘disappear’, women are hidden behind the black veil of the chador and provocative books 
and media sources are banned (Farndon, 2006:15). The USA is the greatest enemy – the ‘Great Satan’ 
– and Israel is an illegitimate state and needs to be wiped off the map (MacAskill and McGreal, 2005). 
This is only one way of looking at Iran. In reality the governmental and leadership structure is a 
complex power play between different factions with specific push and pull factors in the wake of the 
1979 revolution, with both elected and non-elected institutions as well as those that are appointed by 
the elected and unelected officials. Currently the state consists of a Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah, 
who oversees, monitors and directs the lower system of government, based on Sharia Law. Below the 
supreme leader are the unelected institutions of the Judiciary, the armed forces and the expediency 
council. Parallel to these bodies are the elected Parliament, President and Assembly of Experts. The 
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personnel from these latter bodies are directly elected by the general populace, nevertheless, they in 
turn share responsibility with the supreme leader to elect members to the quasi-elected institutions 
of the Guardian Council and the Parliamentary Cabinet. The Assembly of Experts, in an almost cyclical 
fashion is also responsible for the appointment of the Supreme Leader, just as the Guardian Council 
vet’s candidates for the directly elected institutions. The Supreme Leader and all members of the 
Guardian council and assembly of experts are Shia clerics, as required by the positions. Many members 
of the other institutions are also clerics but this is not a stated requirement. What this amounts to is 
a complex political system which combines religion and democracy as there is a balance between the 
institutions of the Supreme Leader and the directly elected President and Parliament.   
In the post-1979 era the lines of authority are both clearer and more blurred, as will be shown. 
Sitting atop of the structure is the Supreme Leader, presently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who replaced 
Ayatollah Khomeini following his death in 1989, and is only the second supreme leader to rule the 
state in this unique capacity as both the highest religious and political leader. The supreme leader, as 
authorized in the constitution, is responsible for the supervision of all of the general policies of Iran. 
In this capacity it is he who ultimately sets the tone and direction of all domestic and foreign policy 
aims, ambitions and actions (Coughlin, 2009:166). The supreme leader is also the de-facto 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces and intelligence and security operations, having the sole 
power to declare a state of either war or peace. He also has the authority to elect and dismiss leaders 
of the judiciary, state-owned media networks and the commander of the military guard corps as well 
as appointing six theologians to form part of the twelve-strong guardian council. He also has a number 
of representatives, in excess of 2,000 throughout the government who extend his power and reach 
(Coughlin, 2009:166). This role as both political and religious superior is specifically unique to Iran (and 
the older state of Persia) but also to the teachings of Islam generally: until the rise of Khomeini, and 
indeed after, many clerics such as his mentor Ayatollah Borujerdi, believed that religion had no place 
in politics (Farndon, 2006:116). The Ayatollah disagreed, though, stating that ‘all Islam is politics’ and 
it was this drive and belief that fuelled his criticism of Reza Shah Pahlavi in state and in exile, and his 
support during and following the 1979 Islamic Revolution as he was able to relate to and connect with 
the humble and the poor, the pious and the under-represented in the days of the Shah’s elitist 
opulence as a perceived puppet of western imperialist ambitions (Rostami-Povey, 2010:31). There is 
no denying that the supreme leader is the ultimate ruler of Iran and source of power. It is he who, as 
the position insists and requires, directs all foreign policy actions, reactions and decisions. Yet there 
are other sources and forms of power to be attained that can result in the gaining of influence that 
can also affect, though less directly, foreign policy decision-making in Iran.  
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Once such position that provides this is that of the President (Monshipouri and Dorraj, 2013:2). 
An assessment of social issues since 1979 would also show that, contrary to popular belief, the 
Ayatollah’s power is not absolute, but rather as Monshiopouri and Dorraj (2013:1) point out, he can 
be “subverted by the forces of civil society and the social Dynamics that his policies unleash”. Though 
this position is concerned predominantly with domestic policy issues, the president does act as a 
figurehead for the state and so affects external perceptions of it. In this respect the President has 
perceived power, but the power is also affective. President Khatami, elected in 1997, altered the 
approach to foreign policy in that he used it to address domestic issues rather than as a tool to 
highlight crisis as a diversion away from such issues (Rakel, 2007:178). The approach to policy, as a 
careful execution of power, saw very real results as diplomacy was exercised, resulting in closer 
relations with neighbouring Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and improved relations with the EU, as 
well as taking steps to create room for dialogue between Iran and the USA (Rakel, 2007:178). Whilst 
Khatami was a protagonist of the reformists his successor, Ahmadinejad, elected in 2005, was very 
much a supporter of them and used his presidency to move away from Khatami’s dialogue approach 
in favour of a more hard-line approach of the ultra-conservative factions in power and had a resultant 
negative impact on external perceptions of the regime as a result of insightful and revolutionary 
language which confirmed Iran’s role as a pariah state. The newly elected Rouhani (2013-present), in 
contrast, sits between the two, again leaning heavily on pragmatic necessity and preaching greater 
dialogue and cooperation. Ultimate foreign policy decisions lie with the supreme leader yet the 
motivations and political influence of the elected presidents also have some sway, and have significant 
power with regard to perceptions of Iran by external actors, and of the outside world by Iranian actors, 
particularly in a state whose population now holds a youth majority that were not witness to the 
excesses of the Shah and are too young to appreciate or remember, first-hand, the 1979 revolution.  
In relation to Iran it is important to address the unique make-up of its political structure but 
also its history and identity which will show the intricate relationship it has developed between 
domestic and international relations, so much so that to understand one is necessarily to understand 
the other (Axworthy, 2011:110). In this respect there are echoes of similarities with China, as discussed 
in the previous chapter, in that external perceptions, and perceptions of the external at the domestic 
level, affect foreign policy decision-making. The push and pull factors of power relations between the 
different government factions will also be addressed as these highlight contrasting and conflicting 
political and societal interests that form decisions. Within this there is also the issue of the cult of 
personality highlighted in the previous chapter which is significant in relation to identity politics in Iran 
and the constant power plays between the different political factions, as well as in terms of 
maintaining domestic legitimacy. As such this chapter will follow the format of chapter four in 
103 
 
identifying and analysing the cognitive processes of, and influences on, Iranian decision-making at 
both the national and foreign policy levels.  
Contrary to popular, or media-framed belief, Iran does have a long history of democratic 
practices and interests that directly impact on the legitimacy of its governments – past and present 
(Gheissari and Nasr, 2009:vi). A discussion and analysis of key foreign policy interests of Iran and the 
cognitive processes that influence their development and/or implementation, as well as their 
relationship with key domestic and societal interests follows below. Again (as with chapter four) 
precedent will be given to over-arching foreign policy drivers over specific decisions where applicable. 
As such the chapter focuses on identity and the way that Iran is identified and how it identifies itself 
and the affect that this has on foreign policy interests such as territorial integrity with neighbours such 
as Saudi Arabia, nuclear ambitions and historical residue in relation to perceptions of humiliations and 
previous glories, this will also include the application of status theory also introduced in the previous 
chapter. The growth in soft power will also be analysed in relation to the implementation of foreign 
policy interests relating to neighbouring MENA states generally and conflict zones such as Iraq and 
Syria specifically.  
The Long Shadow of History 
Iran has been an international Pariah, of sorts, since 1979 when it sought to remould its international 
relations with both regional and extra-regional powers on its own terms. The state, under Ayatollah 
Khomeini abandoned the secularizing and modernising ambitions of the Shah in favour of a theocracy 
under Sharia law (Hashim, 1995). Relations with the dominant Western powers of Europe deteriorated 
rapidly or, as with the USA, were severed all together (Sabet-Saeidi, 2011:69). The constitution was 
redrafted and included, specifically, a commitment to the regional export of the Islamic revolution. 
Just two presidents in, under Rafsanjani (1989-1997), and following the death of Khomeini in the June 
of 1989, and the appointment of Khamenei, such an ambition was superseded by the national 
awareness of the need to execute a more pragmatic foreign policy approach (Hashim, 1995). The 
reasons for this were many, based on an economy and morale crumbling under eight years of war 
(with Iraq from 1980-1988), a lack of regional trust, a lack of allies, and a need to recover and move 
away from unprofitable isolationism. This pragmatism was maintained and developed during the 
Khatami presidency but faltered somewhat under Ahmadinejad (Ehteshami and Zweiri, 2001:151).   
Iran has a long and rich history of culture, civilisation, internationalisation and diplomacy 
(Fischel, 1951). It also has a long history of having been at the mercy of invasion, interference and 
domination. As a nation it has been at the mercy of the Greeks, Arabs, Mongols and Turks (7th-13th 
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Centuries) , and exploited and subjugated by the Russian and European empires and invaded yet again 
during World Wars One and Two (Ramazani, 2009). In the modern era their natural inclination to 
home-grown democracy was perverted by the 1953 coup that ousted Musaddeq in favour of the 
return of the autocratic Shah – a leader best suited to maintaining allegiance to the neo-colonial 
powers that had a vested interest in the country and its rich energy reserves (Ramazani, 2009). These 
events are ingrained in the Iranian collective psyche and directly affect their interpretations of events 
and behaviours. This is not to say that Iran is naturally, or psychologically, anti-west however. Indeed, 
it is a state with many positive memories of western relations also (Parikarakos, 2013: 8). This results 
in a unique Iranian self-identification.  
Yet Iranian foreign policy, like that of its Chinese contemporary, is heavily influenced by its 
colonial past, its constitution demanding that it not give additional weight to any hegemonic power 
(Nia, 2011:280). The post-colonial mind-set is a psychological one and dependant on an increased 
sense of self-worth and of status – something that Iran has as it develops its diplomatic ties regionally. 
One key problem, as a result of the colonial era, however, is the creation of the notion of the enemy. 
The revolution was the cutting of the colonial apron strings – reaction and resistance to external 
domination and interference (Coughlin, 2009:11). The post-1979 era saw the state actively reorganize 
its identity in opposition to that of its oppressors – the shatans (devils) of Russia and the West. Chants 
of ‘death to America’ are as much habitual as they are representations of intent (Chopra, 2007). 
Indeed 9/11 was marked in Iran as a day that such chants could not be heard, as the people instead 
opted for pro-western street demonstrations in a show of solidarity against terrorism (Pipe, 2013:15).  
In contrast to China, Iran in the contemporary arena, is very much at the mercy of the 
processes of globalisation. A growing population must be supported, economically, politically and 
socially. Iran has difficulties due to inherent mismanagement, both as a result of the 1981-88 war with 
Iraq which put longer-term structural developments on hold and as a result of stalemates amongst 
the ruling elites (Aminmansour, 2007). Economic sanctions and limited trading and investment 
opportunities with the external world have also led to the retardation of economic growth. A direct 
result of this is the rapid urbanization of the Iranian population in a climate of economic stagnation 
internationally which has a direct domestic domino effect (Axworthy, 2011:109). The state can be 
separated into two camps, those that urbanize with development and those that urbanize without it. 
The result is the lack of a clear middle level urban centre to bridge the gap between underdeveloped 
cities such as Hormozgan and Kerman, with major cities such as Tabriz and Tehran (Aminmansour, 
2007). Iranian advancement and development, however, is an area of concern both regionally with 
regard to the MENA and internationally, especially with its development of nuclear technology. This 
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FDI is concentrated in a few sectors of the economy, namely the hydrocarbon industry, vehicle 
manufacture, copper mining, petro-chemicals, foods and pharmaceuticals. In 1993-2007 Iran 
absorbed $24.3 billion in FDI and $34.6 billion for 485 projects from 1992-2009, rising to $4488 in 2013 
as shown in table one (Central Bank of Iran). 
Table 1: 
 
Iran has made development of non-hydrocarbon exports a priority, which is advantaged by its 
broad industrial domestic base, educated and motivated workforce, cheap labour and energy 
resources and geographical location, which makes accessible a population of over 300 million people 
in the Caspian markets, Persian Gulf states and countries further east (Maloney, 2015: 2). In this 
respect Iran, like China, has also been looking to Africa, seeking (though with limited results) to build 
a coalition of allies there (Rosen, 2013:1). Iran’s record in Africa has been a poor one, with little success, 
the last firm ally being Sudan, until it chose to align itself with Saud Arabia (Rosen, 2013:1). 
Ahmadinejad’s 2005-2013 ‘South-South’ policy of developing relations with African nations yielded no 
positive results. Though it can be argued that this is, in large part, due to Iran’s affiliation with terrorist 
or opposition groups in the continent when are seeks to disrupt stability – such as the Yarmouk 
explosion which is suspected to be an Iranian front to smuggle arms to Hamas. And the smuggling of 
weapons to southern Senegal (Rosen, 2013:2). Despite this however, the current Iranian deputy 
foreign minister for Arab and African affairs has declared that Iran will be updating its Africa strategy 
and seeking to develop greater strategic ties with actors in the region (Vatanka, 2016:1). FDI in Iran 
has been hindered by unfavourable and complex operating requirements and by international 
sanctions (Freeman, 2012). In the early 2000s the Iranian government attempted to overcome the 
former of these issues by liberalizing investment regulations which has had positive effects: Iran ranks 
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69th out of 139 in the global competitiveness report and ranked 6th globally in 2010 in attracting FDI in 
the same report. 
Iran is characterized as an enemy of the USA and Israel, and it is the latter two who are 
responsible for much of the interpretations with regard to Iranian foreign policy. The most common 
of which at the time of writing being the nuclear issue which has received considerable media 
coverage (Patrikarakos, 2012: xv). Iran is portrayed as hostile to western attempts at dialogue and 
discussion – bent on its own path of regional hegemony and the acquisition of nuclear arms – with 
former President Ahmadinejad as the hostile representative of foreign policy implementation (Lindsay 
and Takeyh, 201:33). To what extent this is based on pure truths, however, above the interpretations 
of the USA, still smarting from the 1980 hostage crisis and Iranian refusal to toe the hegemonic line is 
an area for analysis within itself (Drenou, 2011:74). The ultra-traditionalist President Ahmadinejad 
came to power in Iran in 2005, and received much criticism. The nuclear programme1  which was being 
pursued at this time produced much fervour and exacerbating international concerns that Iran is 
intent on developing nuclear weapons (Ehteshami and Zweiri, 2011:151). As a result, it has, until 
recently, been the recipient of numerous and extensive economic and trade sanctions, instigated by 
the USA, through the United Nations (Drenou, 2011:76, 79). 
The nuclear issue was seen as a mark of Ahmadinejad’s 2005-2013 presidency and a point on 
which Iran had refused to negotiate (Khozanov, 2011: 3). Here there is a fundamental fallacy, however: 
the recommencement of the nuclear programme was instigated and signed off by the moderate 
Khatami in 2004 before Ahmadinejad’s election to office. It is also a policy that shows no signs of 
weakening under President Rouhani, who advocates centrist-pragmatism and even wished Jewish 
communities ‘Rosh Hashanah’ greetings via Twitter (Monshipouri and Dorraj, 2014:1). Iran had also 
not refused to negotiate – rather it refused to abandon enrichment. Iran watchers such as Benari and 
Ross (2013) and Davenport (2014) note that Iran had in fact offered a variety of compromise gestures, 
all of which were either ignored or refused by Washington. The original suspension, outlined in the 
Paris Agreement of 2004 (Sabet-Saeidi, 2011:69) was an act of good faith by the Iranians as part of a 
negotiation process with the EU3 over their concerns about Iran’s intentions. The six-month 
suspension was, as previously highlighted, dragged out by the EU3 for three years with no compromise 
offer (Santini, 2010:473, 475). Assessed with the existing Iranian knowledge schemas of European 
behaviour, this is seen as part of a western pattern of  attempting to restrict Iranian  developmental 
                                                          
1 The nuclear programme is actually not ‘his’ policy but rather a long running national interest. Media 
representations, however, aligned it with his ultra-conservative stand and its re-implementation as he came to 
office in 2005.  
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capabilities and so keep it subverted. Iran is a state that learns its lessons well, reluctant to repeat past 
mistakes, which should be understood when attempting to deal with an old problem through the 
implementation of an old ruse. 
It is essentially a matter of interpretation. Sanctions against Iran did not have the immediate, 
desired effect (Early, 2011:400; Early, 2014:1). Such threats and indirect attacks are merely counter-
productive to a state whose foreign policy is predominantly reactionary, based on its historical 
perception of subversion. Iran is an ancient civilisation and has a history of prudent statecraft, despite 
momentary mistakes – relatively speaking – and in light of its 1979 throwing off of the shackles of 
domination and subversion, it expects to receive a level of respect from the international community 
in keeping with its historical successes and self-proclaimed due status (Ramazani, 2009). When the 
USA calls Iran to negotiate but follows through with an announcement that all options are on the table 
– this is seen as a threat of military action or further sanctions if compliance is not granted. More 
importantly it is interpreted as disrespectful. Indeed, improvements in EU-Iranian relations have been 
addressed by Khamenei as a result of the increased level of respect that Iran has received from the 
former (Cebeci, 2011:2015). 
Underlying the actions and foreign policy goals of Iran is a belief, be it a colonial legacy or a 
truth, that the only outcome of satisfaction to the present global superpower is one of regime change 
in the Islamic Republic and that the demonization of Iran and fear mongering concerning its nuclear 
ambitions are simply tools for manufacturing the consent of the international and civil community to 
support such a desire, or in turn, as Ramazani (2013) states, that the aim of the sanctions was to stifle 
the domestic society to a degree that they would themselves welcome, or instigate such a regime 
change (p55). This latter view gained credence in the wake of the 2005 presidential elections following 
allegations of corruption at the ballot box. Public demonstrations and protests were reported and 
heavily circulated in the media, increasing the presence and recognition of what has come to be known 
as the green movement, after the ‘Green Wave’ campaign by Mousavi which triggered the initial 
protests over anger at electoral fraud (Dagres, 2012; Anderson and Anderson, 2010:108).  
In relation to FPA, Holistic Constructivism offers important considerations with regard to the 
nature and importance of identity politics and the historical experiences influential in the foreign 
policy-making process (Chopra, 2007). This critical discourse consists of reactions to the post-colonial 
legacy, at times, as with the case of Iran, lending to anti-conquest narratives (Patrikarakos, 2013: xxv). 
The national narratives of a state are significantly shaped by their past experiences, such as that of 
colonial domination, uniquely so in the MENA, and indeed Asia, where the nation state system was 
implanted, altering the very landscape of the region at the whim of distant powers. In this respect the 
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nuclear issue, for Iran, represents (and is perhaps founded on) its perceptions of previous injustices 
(Patrikarakos, 2013: xxvi). Here the concept of the ‘Other’ is of high importance. Colonies were created 
in opposition to the European powers – uncivilised, underdeveloped peoples in contrast to European 
advancement and glory. All that the West was not, nor wanted to be, yet crucial for their ideological 
unity. The reactions to the experience of interference and intervention can be many, from states still 
seeking imperial patronage and to emulate the Western model, to states such as Iran and China, to 
name just two, whose reaction is to seek greater identification with their pre-colonial heritage (Garver, 
2006:4). These two states, however, are relatively unique in that they have a clear sense of past 
identity and culture, unlike present day Indonesia, for example, which when seeking independence 
did so within the borders set by the colonial rulers, rather than the natural, pre-existing borders of 
trade and culture.  
Western hegemony is still evident in academia and sets the tone with regard to setting the 
agenda of topics of interest and importance. Iran, post-1979, has a reactionary foreign policy, born of 
a history of external intervention. It seeks to distance itself from hegemonic powers, focusing instead 
on the security of its own independence and respectability within its own narrative. This is to say that 
a foreign policy goal is not to gain the trust and respect of the USA but of its regional neighbours and 
civilisational equals. Iran has committed its foreign policy actions to fostering greater trust and respect 
amongst regional neighbours and international peers such as the EU and states of Latin America 
(Cebeci, 2011:215).   
In this respect Iran is a greater supporter of democracy amongst nations, rather than 
democracy within nations, seeking to foster regional diplomatic and security ties that bind (Nia, 
2007:283-4). Identity plays an important role in this endeavour, indeed it could be suggested that not 
only is Iran’s foreign policy reactionary but so its national identity, in a sense, is also dependent on 
external forces. The demonization of the USA and the West generally serves a specific, unifying 
purpose, in a similar way to that of China which uses narratives of unity amongst the domestic society 
and diaspora communities to cement alliance and loyalty across a large and disparate state against 
external, colonial aggression and criticisms of, and rivalry with, Japan. Iran is defined by what it stands 
against. It identifies itself in opposition to its ‘Other’ – the big and small Satan’s of the world. Death to 
America is not so much a declaration of intent but the continual enforcement of a national narrative 
(post-1979) born in opposition to the old puppet master and keeping alive memories of humiliation 
and subversion, to create unity and maintain an alternate model of rule (Nia, 2007:285). Unity is a 
domestic concern for Iran which is home to multiple faiths and ethnicities. The populace was united 
in its condemnation of the Shah, with the communist Tudeh party, the clerics and marginalised groups 
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all uniting to oust him. In the aftermath pre-existing political differences resurfaced but were initially 
quashed by the growing power of the Ayatollah who was best able to represent the majority of the 
people, having garnered the support of the countryside and peasants who were larger in number. The 
Tudeh Party failed to garner as much support in part due to the wider failures of the Regional 
Communist movement and the domination in the Soviet Union of a wealthy and corrupt state elite 
(Rosatami-Povey, 2010: 35). Unity in Iran was formed in the face of the Shah, in his absence, and to 
garner and maintain power, the new Islamic government found a new enemy, and so a new unifying 
force in the form of Iraq in the First Gulf War (Rakel, 2007:160). Since the end of this war, the unifying 
enemy has been the USA – though this is not so much a new enemy as a refocusing on what has 
become the traditional enemy that underpinned the corruption of the Shah and the continuation of 
the Iran-Iraq War (Rakel, 2007: 162).  
As with China, Iran is suspicious of external interest in its affairs, specifically by Western states 
or regional powers deemed to be their puppets – such as Israel or Saudi Arabia. Criticism and 
interference are assimilated into, and compared against, existing knowledge frameworks that recall 
previous similar shows of interest. In this case, such experiences include the 1953 coup to install a 
puppet leader in Iran as well as similar acts in regional states such as Libya (pre-Ghaddafi), and the 
Iraqi Monarchy in the 1950s, insultingly low concessions on hydrocarbon production under the Shah, 
with European and American Powers and support of Iraq during the First Gulf war, to name just a few, 
and some of the more well-known. Comparisons to such previous events, combined with negative 
rhetoric, as mentioned above, whether for domestic unity against an ‘Other’ or genuine criticism of 
actions, draw negative results that arouse suspicion and mistrust. Western presence in the MENA 
militarily, politically, and diplomatically also acts constant reminders of their power and influence – 
gained in part from colonial conquest and imperialism – affecting foreign policy implementation as 
well as decision-making. This in part explains Iran’s reactionary nature and unwillingness to engage 
with hegemonic powers who, in the past have been seen to abuse acts of trust and alliance – such as 
in the case of the Shah post-1953, and in neighbouring states such as Iraq during the 1990 Kuwait 
Crisis and Second Gulf War in which case Iraq was not prevented from attacking but then penalised 
for it, or US support of the Taliban in the interests of its own bi-polar war with the USSR rather than 
genuine assistance to the state during the 1980s.  
Religion, Territory and Identity 
Iran has long believed itself to have an important regional security role to tackle issues such as drug 
trafficking and to maintain stability generally, insisting that if they ‘wanted to cause problems then 
they would have done’ (Sabet-Saeidi, 2011:65), highlighting that there have been no claims that Iran 
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has been inappropriate (from military personnel) in Iran or Afghanistan (Khazzaee interview: 
Bloomberg). The events of 9/11 and the more recent uprisings in the MENA, termed by the media as 
the Arab Spring, however, have had a significant effect on both the political environment and power 
structures of the region (Freeman, 2013:1).  
The growing democratic movements, coupled with the on-going conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Iraq 
and Libya (2011 onwards) have, arguably, opened up the space and need for a more comprehensive 
and consolidated form of leadership in the Persian Gulf (Jahner, 2012:38). This is also underwritten by 
the decline of Iraq, previously a significant regional power. These issues have had a direct effect on 
Iran and its regional relations. This also involves China which has developed a growing presence in the 
region with developing relations with Libya, involving valuable Libyan oil supplies ending as a result of 
the Arab Spring uprisings which saw China evacuate a staggering 35,860 Chinese citizens from the 
state (Ronen, 2014:17), as well as influence in Afghanistan, Israel, and Egypt to name just a few – 
which will be discussed in more detail later. As well as the development in 2010 of CCTV Arabic 
International Channel to promote Chinese diplomacy as well as culture and its commitment to a 
peaceful rise (Wai-Yip, 2014:21), as discussed in the previous chapter.  
An assessment of Saudi-Iranian relations for instance, reveals that rivalries and cooperation 
are hindered by the conditions of mistrust and suspicion which have been rhetorically constructed 
and politically fostered (Amiri, et al. 2010:50). This is not to say that the rhetoric is entirely fabricated 
but that it reproduces, as well as being reproduced by, images and memories of negative relations, of 
suspicion, ill intent and interference. Yes, there is conflict in the histories of the two states and 
tensions in the contemporary era but they are reinforced by the language and representations of the 
two powers and their fears and suspicions of one another.  
Saudi-Iranian ties were at their closest in the run up to the 1979 revolution when the Saud 
and Pahlavi dynasties, both monarchical, came together in support of regional security, citing shared 
commonalities of governance and mutual interest (ibid:50). There was, however, an on-going bone of 
contention with regard to ownership of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, three small islands 
of the upper Persian Gulf that were under Iranian control until British intervention in the late 19th 
century after which they were transferred to the UAE (Young, 1970:152). This was a continual source 
of contention between the two powers and the efforts to resolve it centred on equitable solutions, 
cooperation and discourse – on soft power and diplomacy. Though an agreement was eventually 
reached in 1965 it was never ratified by Tehran due to the discovery of important mineral deposits on 
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what was to become the Saudi side and the agreement was finally abandoned in 19682 (ibid: 153). 
This was, arguably, due to a lack of trust and transparency between the two states with regard to 
existing knowledge of these deposits. The upper Gulf Islands, though overshadowed in the 
contemporary era by more pressing foreign policy issues relating to the economy and nuclear plans, 
is a very real issue to Iran, within the framework of historical experience of foreign invasion and control, 
to lose the islands – and more importantly, their potential resource revenue, would be seen as a 
further humiliation at the hands of rival, hegemonic powers and their perceived puppets (Rakel, 2007: 
160).  
In the recent past, leading up to the 1979 revolution, Iran and Saudi Arabia experienced warm 
relations based on shared identification as monarchical, major regional powers with a common 
interest in regional security and geo-political interest as hydrocarbon exporters. In the contemporary 
era, both states are committed to bilateral agreements with China in order to fulfil the latter’s growing 
energy requirements (Jaffe and Lewis, 2002:115). The Islamic revolution and Iran’s resultant anti-
western/anti-hegemonic policy, raised tensions with Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the USA (Mahruqi, 
214). This was further hindered by the Islamic Republic’s insistence on the illegitimacy of monarchical 
rule – aimed at its Arab neighbours but also a justification of its own disavowal and overthrow of the 
Shah and commitment to the exportation of the Islamic revolution (Rakel, 2007:167).  
Tensions have also been exacerbated by the Sunni attempts to destroy the Imam Hussain 
Mosque in Iraq – an important sight for Shia communities and Iranian pilgrims. Another case in point 
was the Hajj clash in Mecca On July 31, 1987, when over 400 people, most of them Iranian pilgrims 
but also many Saudi policemen, were killed and many more injured at a demonstration that led to a 
stampede outside the Great Mosque in Mecca during the Hajj (Wallace, 1987). Iran and Saudi Arabia 
blamed each other for the clashes, leading to a severe worsening of Saudi-Iranian relations. Although 
the incident mainly involved Iranians, some had alleged links to Saudi Shi’a organizations. As a result, 
both countries sought to influence Muslim public opinion abroad and discredit the other party. The 
weak relations of the Movement of Vanguard Missionaries (MVM) and the Islamic revolutionary 
organization (IRO) to the new centres of power in the Iranian regime, their refusal to carry out military 
operations in Saudi Arabia, and the Hajj incident in 1987 were the main reasons for the formation and 
the strengthening of Hezbollah al-Hijaz. Iran wanted to have small, controllable organizations that 
                                                          
2 Though a new, final agreement of a zig-zag equitable division was reached on 24.10.68. 
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could be used as pressure tools on the Saudi regime but would not endanger Iran’s foreign policy 
objectives.  
There are also elements of influence on their relations deriving from the division in their 
worldviews and they have both used their Sunni-Shia division to support their policies and steer public 
opinion and foreign policy decisions. Their political and religious differences seem to play the prime 
role in the political domain and the international community alongside the argument between Sunni 
and Shia, as well as the debate about the domination of the region are often exaggerated (Rakel, 
2007:168). These are elements that influence their relations, but there are also many facets about 
their relationship which are down-played, such as their previous cooperation for security and peace 
in the region after colonial withdrawal and their trade relations (Amiri and Samsu, 2011:247). It 
appears true that they both have aspirations for Islamic rule and leadership, aspirations which drew 
them closer together under King Faisal and Shah Reza Pahlavi (Amiri and Samsu, 2011:249). Since the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been pursuing an anti-hegemonic (and specifically anti-USA) 
foreign policy and condemns Saudi Arabia for being a close ally of the USA. Saudi Arabia in contrast is 
concerned about Iran's dominance and interference in neighbouring countries especially in Iraq after 
Saddam Hussein and in Syria and Yemen currently (Ghorbani, 2012). There is also regional concern 
regarding the continuing development of Iran's nuclear programme. 
While most literature points to competition over regional hegemony, their differences are 
underpinned by religion/sectarian identity differences. Within the remit of dominant foreign policy 
interests relating to the maintenance and consolidation of regional power in soft and hard measure, 
there are several domestic issues which play a significant role in shaping the underlying security 
concerns, such as the presence of a sizeable Shia minority in eastern Saudi Arabia, this region has seen 
far less investment than the rest of the country (Beranek, 2009: 4). Their sectarian differences alone 
do not justify and explain their relationship and the tensions between them. Iran constructs a narrative 
of opposition to Saudi Arabia and its monarchical rule, as against the tenets of Islamic rule (De luca, 
2016:1). Likewise, Saudi Arabia uses rhetorical devices such as ‘suspicion’, ‘lack of transparency’, and 
‘rival’ to describe Iran (Vatanka, 2015:1). The use of such rhetoric to frame these differences in 
opposition to one another, however, are important in shaping public and international perceptions 
and narratives of legitimacy to justify relevant actions. Since the Arab Spring the struggle and rivalry 
between the two parties have intensified, however, for some years both states have placed actors 
across the region in order to realise their interests which is evidenced in their military and financial 
backing of several groups such as Hezbollah (Berti, and Guzansky, 202014:30). Saudi Arabia and Iran 
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also play out their rivalry by-proxy, using developing crises to support opposing factions in the same 
country, by means of finance and/or arms. 
It is also worth noting here the parallel Chinese-Saudi relations that are in play, and how this 
specifically does not affect Iranian-Chinese relations to the degree that would be expected on 
conventional readings of Iranian foreign policy. Prior to 1990 the Saudi regime did not recognised the 
legitimacy of the PCR and so bilateral relations were non-existent – indeed Saudi Arabia was the last 
Arab state to establish diplomatic ties with China. Relations improved after the 1989 Tiananmen Crisis 
however, as Saudi Arabia markedly offered no criticism of the event. Since this time relations have 
steadily improved, accelerating from 2000 onwards. This, of course, is no surprise as Saudi Arabia is 
the world’s energy exporter and China in turn, is the world’s biggest importer of such energy (Nazer, 
2015:1). Such relations extend beyond crude oil trade however, expanding into the wider 
hydrocarbons sector with Chinese investment in Saudi refineries and energy fields, coupled with Saudi 
Investment in Chinese refineries as Sinopec Partnered with Aramco in January 2015 (Nazer, 2015:3). 
Chinese companies are also involved in the development of railway lines, cement plants and port 
(Alterman, 2015). Despite having a sustained, seven-decade relationship with Saudi Arabia, the 
growing instability and turmoil in the MENA region is arguably influencing Saudi Arabia’s identification 
and recognition of the need to keep its options open and strengthen relations with a wider array of 
actors (Nazer, 2015:2) and to hedge against overreliance on the USA ( (Altman, 2015) -  just as China 
is seeking to develop closer MENA ties through increased trade as well as cultural presence (CCTV 
discussed previously). This is also influenced by China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative (see chapter 
six), which seeks to developed a trade and investment structure in line with the traditional Silk Road 
(Jin, 2016: 1) 
China, alongside this developing relationship however, is also increasing relations with Iran – 
Saudi Arabia’s bitter enemy – or so the rhetoric goes (Jin, 2016:1). What is interesting to see is that 
China appears to successfully balance these relationships with neither state offer protest against 
China’s relations with the other. In a formal alliance between the Iran and China there would certainly 
be space to raise such issues, even objections. To give a more contentious example, China and Israel 
also enjoy numerous positive trade, commercial and diplomatic relations, however this is not raised 
as an issue for Iran. The fluidity and ambiguity or Iranian-Chinese relations effectively safeguards 
against having to make such demands or criticisms – or even to defend them. Again this come to a 
point of identity and pragmatism. China is following its own policies within the wider world and simply 
justifies them as such which Iran can raise no issues with because it is not a breach of a treaty or 
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promise, it is within pragmatic policy interests which avert risk within an environment of trust and 
good faith.  
The civil war in Syria, which began in 2011 is a prime example of the proxy competition 
mentioned above. As the rebellion continued Saudi Arabia chose to align with the rebel forces, 
providing financial and military aid. Iran in turn, came out in support of the Assad regime, a long-
standing ally, in opposition to Egyptian, Israeli and US challenges in the region (Goodarzi, 2006:2). 
Concern is, of course, warranted with regard to the potential regional fallout of the crisis. Certainly 
Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan have already experienced the pressure that an influx of refugees can lead 
to (Hale, 1992:679; O’Donnell and Newland, 2008:5). The conflict in Syria has become a sectarian issue, 
Sunni rebels versus the Shia government and its Shia allies. This has intensified with the further 
involvement of the Iranian-backed Hezbollah. Saudi Arabia, along with its western allies, has 
denounced this organization as a terrorist group and condemned the arrival of some 400 Iranian 
revolutionary guards to Syria (Berti, and Guzansky, 2014:26) though it is openly debated whether 
these are in fact military personnel or ‘experts’. 
The condemnation of Iranian involvement, and that of Hezbollah, is also set within the 
continuing rhetoric regarding Iran’s inclination to interfere in the domestic issues of its neighbours 
and its intent to spread the Shia Islamic revolution and regional instability. The perception may be that 
Iran is not transparent, cannot be trusted, always tries to meddle in support of Shia development and 
growth in the interests of regional hegemony which is expansionist in nature and a threat to all (Rakel, 
2007:168). The past activities and opposing ideology of Iran is offered within a framework of mistrust 
which views the support it offers to its Syrian ally, as a regional security issue which must be countered.  
This also has implications for Chinese-Iranian relations with regard to the fact that the former 
also reacted to the developing crisis in Syria in support of Assad, denouncing the rebels (Morin, 2014). 
As such the state did not become an issue of contention for either state but rather support each ones’ 
commitment to anti-hegemonic policies in light of Western ambitions to intervene on October 4th 
2014 (Morin, 2014), as well as a convergence of their “suspicion of western proposals at the 
international level” (Morin, 2014). The Iranian reaction to the Syrian crisis also has specific 
psychological roots, it should be noted, for both Iran and China, who both have significant separatist 
issues – China with Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang; and Iran with the Kurds, Azeris and Arabs in some 
areas – and identity conflict generally between Shia and non-Shia, Iranian and Persian identities; as 
well as pressures from refugees from Afghanistan. Suppression of domestic uprisings are seen as a 
sovereign right and important for the integrity of the state. Therefore, George Abu Ahmad argues that 
the reaction of China, and concurrently Iran, represents the way in which each has internalized the 
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roots of the Syrian conflict and reacted in a way which supports their own separatist concerns and 
reactions to any connected potential uprisings (Morin, 2014). In the contemporary era, with the rise 
of the hard-line fundamentalist entity known as the Islamic State, Iranian-Saudi relations are again 
converging to assess and respond to the potential threat that is, in part, a response to long running 
sectarian tensions and regional conflicts (Dakroub, 2014). 
It is interesting to see, in the case of Iranian-Saudi relations, that regardless of the 
convergence or divergence of interests or similarities/differences in histories, cultures or experiences, 
the rhetoric used to frame relations between the two – particularly in this instance, regarding that 
developed by Iran, does not fit the same framework as that utilised towards China (discussed in 
chapter six). There is less talk of friendship or shared history, just as there are less attempts at 
confidence building measures such as the high level delegate visits between Iran and China, and 
greater transparency of intentions that have resulted in China displaying less suspicion over Iran’s 
nuclear policy, just as there is less tension with regard to China’s large Muslim minority in Xinjiang 
than with Saudi’s Shia minorities (Rogan, 2014). The steps required for Saudi Arabia and Iran to 
develop closer, less suspicious, more confident ties with one another, for instance would be 
considerably steeper and unstable than those required between Iran and China. This is based not only 
on the physical proximity of Saudi Arabia being in direct competition with Iran – and on the opposite 
side of its border, whilst China is geographically farther away, with its own development and regional 
interest closer to home. It is also based upon significant psychological dispositions, underpinned by 
historical experiences and feelings of betrayal.  
This also echoes the reception received by Iranian actions in Iraq post-Saddam, where it seeks 
to support the Shia faction and exercise soft power in the form of diplomacy and guidance (Rezaei, 
2011:40). This is not simply about regional hegemony and a power hungry state, however. Iraq and 
Afghanistan are both direct, border sharing neighbours of Iran and so the potential for crisis to spill 
across this border is a very real concern. Therefore, there is the desire to have stable and friendly 
neighbours (Rezaei, 2011:38). This is, in part a basic security interest, however, it is also framed by the 
pre-existing knowledge frameworks that are able assimilate the potential threat within the existing 
framework of previous relations with Iraq – specifically the debilitating 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war which 
ravaged the country.    
The commitment to the export of the Islamic revolution largely died with Ayatollah Khomeini 
(Rakel, 2007:160). Presidents such as Rafsanjani were, and continue to be, faced with domestic 
concerns relating to a population boom in the post-revolution decade, high unemployment, and 
severed ties with dominant economic players, traders and investors (Rakel, 2007:160). As a result, 
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they saw the importance of a more pragmatic foreign policy, one that would seek to foster positive 
relations in reaction to external perceptions of the state as a pariah seeking regional domination in 
the form of a Pan-Islamic regional revolution that would oust the existing governing structures of 
neighbouring states (Ramazani, 2011:11). 
In the wake of 9/11 the government in Tehran publicly condemned the attacks and allied itself 
with the West in the war against terror (Kozhanov, 2011:2). Tehran also supported strikes against 
terrorist groups in Afghanistan and played a significant role in the Bonn peace conference (Middle 
East/Gulf:171). In the build-up to the 1991 Gulf War, Iran again exercised diplomatic power – 
encouraging cooperation and mediating between factions and external powers (Bowker, 2013:116).  
Another reading or interpretation could be that the ultimate ideal for the current superpower 
(the USA) is regime change in the Islamic Republic and nothing less (Rezaei, 2011:40). In this respect 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq has been viewed as a threat to Iran, in that it may be next, despite containing 
the silver lining of removing the biggest threat to Iranian survival (Rezaei, 2011:40). Therefore, actions 
and policies are forced into existing frameworks of bias which silence alternative interpretations or 
readings that would enable us to view any actions by Iran in a positive light. Such deep suspicion and 
mistrust has a significant impact on Iranian foreign economic and security policy, for it would appear 
imprudent to offer any degree of faith to states incapable of returning the compliment.  
Sanctions against Iran, as stated previously, have largely been ineffective (Early, 2011:400; 
Early, 2014:1). Such threats and indirect attacks are merely counter-productive to a state whose 
foreign policy is generally reactionary, based on its historical perception of subversion. Iran is an 
ancient civilisation and has a history, predominantly, of prudent statecraft, and in light of its 1979 
throwing off of the shackles of domination and subversion, it expects to receive recognition for its 
historical successes (Ramazani, 2009). USA statements that all options are on the table when dealing 
with Iran (Bush 2005) is seen as a threat of military action or further sanctions if compliance is not 
granted. More importantly it is interpreted as disrespectful. In this respect it is clear that when dealing 
with the USA Iran utilises the mirror image/image of the enemy tool of cognitive decision-making in 
which it sees the hegemon and inherently bad with negative ulterior motives, therefore even when a 
positive act is executed it is assumed, or believed, that there is an underlying negative, or sinister 
motive.  
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Competition and Cooperation 
Another key challenge to Iranian dominance in the MENA is Turkey, though as much as it is a challenge 
it is also a key security partner. Relations between Iran and Turkey since the latter’s independence in 
1926 have been predominantly peaceful, if at times strained (Anon, 1998). Iran is considerably rich in 
energy resources, specifically hydrocarbon reserves, but has lacked freedom due to international 
trade and economic sanctions as well as technological under-advancement (Aras, 2008). Indeed, 
recent years have resulted in major European firms such as BP and Krupp-Thyssen, pulling out of Iran. 
This, however, is changing: The Iranian foreign policy direction is shifting ever further towards 
integration through bilateral trade agreements with states such as China, India, and specifically, 
Turkey (Aras, 2008). With the recent lifting of sanctions multi-national corporations are also expected 
to flock to Iran. In April 2010, technical delegates from Ankara and Tehran initiated talks in Igdir to 
explore the development of a free industrial zone between the two states and the trade volume 
between them was reported to have increased by more than 70% in the first two months of 2011 
alone. Turkey is also a significant beneficiary of Iranian tourism (Aras, 2008).  
In relation to economic security, the two states appear to be becoming ever more intimately 
intertwined, both states have significantly independent reasons for the progression of their relations, 
affected by a variety of conditions and concerns. The factors at play are very much determined by 
reconstructing foreign policy concerns and the ever greater securitisation of the economy which 
underpins the order (Cable, 1995:305). Both states are members of the Economic Cooperation 
Organisation (ECO) and enjoy two-way trade which is estimated at $10 billion annually (Kurtaran, 
2011). Iran also expresses plans to privatize national assets which is being capitalized on by Turkish 
businesses. Turkey is also a strong supporter of diplomatic solutions to contention and promoted the 
opening of dialogue over the use of sanctions (Colachal, 2008). By August 2010 Turkey was listed, 
alongside China as one of the main suppliers of petrol to Iran. China currently supplies approximately 
one third of all of Iran’s energy demands (Iran has the raw energy but relies on China for refined petrol) 
(Kozhanov, 2011:1). As sanctions increased and tightened (prior to the recent resolution), China 
utilised more third party or intermediary states to trade on its behalf, these states are known as 
sanctions busters, or ‘Black Knights’ (Kozhanov, 2011:1). The promotion of direct flights to Iran by 
Turkish Airlines have also affected positive relations between the two states as has the shared 
business language of Azeri (Kurtaran, 2011). Domestically Turkey has used an assertive foreign policy 
to enhance its international status so as to enable the consolidation of domestic power at home. This 
domestic power has also been developed through a display of affinity to Muslim causes and 
mercantilism (Migdalovitz, 2011). In this respect the foreign policy benefits of bilateral trade with Iran 
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are very much affected by domestic concerns and interests. In relation to Iran, positive relations with 
Turkey involves increased diplomatic ties as part of a wider movement on Iran’s behalf to engage with 
the international community.  
The nature of Turkish-Iranian relations developed and deepened in light of the reconstruction 
of economic security concerns. This is not to say, however, that the two states became at all friendly 
as they still viewed one another with suspicion and doubt, operating approaches of caution and 
pragmatism. Turkey and Iran, both being significant regional powers, are necessarily in competition 
for regional hegemony. Diplomatic and economic power was garnered through bilateral relations and 
economic agreements. Turkey aligning itself with the EU and the west and Iran increasing its relations 
with states such as Syria. This atmosphere of competition was most overtly displayed with regard to 
the newly independent states (NIS) of the Caucasus and central Asia in the 1990s (Pomfret, 1997). A 
variety of the NIS states were Turkic and as such were nations with whom Turkey could claim kinship. 
Iranian endeavors also mirrored this as, though only Tajikistan speaks a dialect of Persian, there were 
others with strong cultural affinities. Both states were keen to develop these ties, offering diplomatic 
and economic assistance and agreements with the Caucasus states, many of which were rich in mobile, 
hard-working labour forces (Bower, 2007). The psychological effects of greater relations with 
perceived kin countries also strengthened national esteem as well as being, especially for Iran, another 
route into the world economy. Though the two states do not compete explicitly and directly for 
influence in Central Asia, they both followed significant foreign policy goals with regard to the 
establishment of bilateral agreements and the endorsement of their attraction to the states (Bower, 
2007). 
In the contemporary era the reactions towards the significant international implications of the 
three major conflicts regarding 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq varied between Turkey and Iran. Both 
publicly condemned the 9/11 terrorist attacks and joined the rhetoric of the war against terror on the 
western side (Bower, 2007). This support, however, did not carry over into US intervention in Iraq. 
Indeed, Turkey expressed concern over US judgments regarding weapons of mass destruction, even 
attempting to obstruct the invasion (Bower, 2007). It was feared that the invasion would mirror the 
destabilising effects of the previous foray into Afghanistan. Increased US presence in the region and 
de facto control of Iraqi energy fields were of economic concern as were the implications of ever 
greater conflict, driving away investment and hindering existing bilateral agreements (Chomsky and 
Achcar, 2007:83). Turkey and the USA were erstwhile allies – the latter’s distance being a comfort. The 
quagmires, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq brought the USA much closer to Turkey, however, 
resulting in a need to re-evaluate foreign policy focus with regard to US diplomacy.  
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The content and context of Turkish-Iranian relations have changed considerably in general 
terms in the last 20 years due to the changing international order and the growing supremacy of 
economic security concerns. The fall of the USSR and a shift away from the importance of military 
might and ideological confrontation have altered the playing field to an unrecognisable degree. These 
issues are still of importance but are now on the periphery almost as otherwise sensitive issues, such 
as nuclear development or relations with Israel, are overlooked in the interests of fostering and 
maintaining advantageous trade and development relations with neighbours. It would seem that, in 
the contemporary era, a state’s economic capabilities are the most important markers of its success 
and competence, a lesson that Turkey and Iran appear to have learned quickly and which has resulted 
in a transformation of their relationship with one another.  
Iran in turn, following the 1979 revolution and the 1980–88 Gulf War, was left with a crippled 
economy and feelings of resentment for (and also from) the United States and Europe (Coughlin, 
2009:2370). Afrasiabi and Maleki (2003) recognise Iran’s foreign policy as deriving from two sources: 
its turbulent regional environment and its faction-ridden polity, in the run-up to 9/11. The attack on 
the World Trade Centre changed the security landscape globally, redefining the concept of terrorism 
as a threat over and above its traditional role as a tool of the state to a more permeating and evasive 
presence. It also highlighted the increased role that Iran had been playing since 1990 as a mediator 
and crisis manager (Afrasiabi and Maleki, 2003:257). Reflecting its soft power ambitions, Iran has 
worked to develop diplomatic ties with regional powers and to actively engage with the promotion of 
regional security initiatives such as the general agreement on the establishment of peace and national 
accord and protocol on mutual understanding in 1997, the OIC, and the ECO (Afrasiabi and Maleki, 
2003:258). There are also growing pressures and security concerns for Iran regarding the freshwater 
resources which it shares with Afghanistan (Khorami, 2014). This could certainly explain Iran’s interest 
in mediating the peaceful settlement of governance issues between the United States and Afghanistan 
following the US invasion after 9/11. In this respect Iran’s focus is very much east-facing. However, 
there has recently been a significant shift in Iranian foreign policy towards a balancing of East and 
West (Vakil, 2006:52). Iran cultivated relations with China, Russia and India for economic and political 
coverage that could not be found in the West and to counterbalance the threat of Western sanctions 
as a result of fears over its nuclear energy policy (Kozhanov, 2011:3).  
The Nuclear Issue 
Iranian society can be separated into two camps, those that urbanize with development and those 
that urbanize without it. The result is significant economic and developmental inequalities between 
communities in underdeveloped cities such as Hormozgan, and major cities such as Isfahan and Tehran 
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(Aminmansour, 2007:1). Continued and/or improved interactions with other states have the potential 
to mediate the risks that globalisation presents to Iran, inviting firms, information and investment to 
aid trade, knowledge production and development (Axworthy, 2011:109). Iranian advancement and 
development is an area of concern not just regionally with regard to the MENA but also internationally, 
in terms of its diplomatic development with Arab neighbours as well as the newly independent states 
of Central Asia which brings it more closely into China’s sphere of interest, just as China is present in 
the MENA via bilateral relations with numerous states and the development of its Arabic news and 
culture satellite channel, but especially with its development of nuclear technology. 
If Saudi Arabia is concerned about its neighbour’s nuclear ambitions, then Israel is concerned 
even more so. Such fears being a manifestation of angry rhetoric coming out of Iran towards Israel. 
Relations between the two powers have not always been so contentions, however. At its inception in 
1948, Iran was the first state to recognise the legitimacy of Israel, following this they became strong, 
strategic allies up to the 1970s (Rezaei and Cohen 2014:443). They were two non-Arab, non-Sunni 
states in a region dominated by Sunni Arabs. Under the Shah, Iran also sought to align more closely 
with the USA and relations with Israel were seen as a tool to garner greater support from Washington 
(Rezaei and Cohen, 2014:443). The alliance and its political benefits was such that they preceded 
concern or interest in the Palestinian question and resulted in Iran being Israel’s only energy supplier 
during the energy crisis and in the post-Suez Crisis era of the 1950s (Rezaei and Cohen, 2014:445). This 
relationship came to an end following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, though all ties were not in fact 
severed until almost a decade later.  
Israel, during this time was not so keen to end the relationship, nor did it take the rhetoric 
delivered against its legitimacy seriously, being keen to maintain the geo-political alliance and its 
benefits, encircled as it was by a sea of hostile Arab neighbours. Indeed, Israel instigated several secret 
meetings with Iran, or rather many of its more moderate players, supplying weapons during the Gulf 
War and encouraging the USA to take a softer stance against Iran. With the end of this war, however, 
Israel ceased to be useful to Iran and ties were finally and officially severed. As Iran has increased its 
commitment to developing positive relations with its Muslim neighbours its negative stance towards 
Israel has increased exponentially, fuelled by increased training and funding of pro-Palestinian entities 
such as Islamic Jihad and Palestinian attacks on Israel from the West Bank (Rezaei and Cohen, 
2014:447).  
Following the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of the USA as the only remaining 
superpower the rivalry between the two old friends increased in line with Israeli-US relations and 
Iran’s anti-hegemonic constitution. This was also exacerbated by the 2003 fall of Iraq, a key enemy of 
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Israel. The two were propelled to direct and blatant rivalry for regional supremacy. Iran’s recent 
assistance with diplomacy and peace-keeping post-9/11 has caused concern in Tel-Aviv vis-a-vis a 
growing accommodation at least between Iran and the superpower which is seen as a threat to Israel’s 
strategic importance and special relationship with the latter. As a result, it has upped its rhetoric and 
pressure on the USA directly via the powerful Jewish Lobby in Washington, as well as attempting to 
foster closer and more proficient ties with more moderate and pragmatic Muslim neighbours.  
The influence that Iran has exerted on religio-political groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas 
(Mahurqi, 2014) has also had a direct negative impact on Israel via physical attacks and as such Israel 
no longer follows the stance that it did in the 1980s of ignoring Iran’s anti-Israel rhetoric. The threat 
of Iran has been securitised and is now a very real one: exacerbated by the belief in the latter’s 
commitment to the development of nuclear capabilities apparently. A nuclear Iran, not only hostile to 
Israel but intent on challenging its very right to exist is a very real and existential threat to Israel which 
is already the outsider in the region. Though there is of course the growing debate that a nuclear Israel, 
faced with a nuclear Iran would result in deterrence through the understanding of the potential for 
mutual assured destruction (MAD) and so a more stable regional order (Edelman et al. 2011: 67), the 
issue in foreign policy terms is a normative one. MAD as a deterrent only works if both parties can 
trust the others pragmatism and will to survive. Iran’s foreign policy, as previously stated, is 
reactionary. It is also opaque and complex. As an elusive, slippery enemy, Iran cannot be trusted, or 
rather its previous actions show that it can be trusted to dig its heels in and to cut its nose off to spite 
its face, as can be seen in light of economic and trade sanctions and its refusal to halt its nuclear 
programme or even to provide adequate transparency or confidence building measures regarding its 
ultimate intentions (Edelman et al, 2011:67), until the recent resolution negotiated by China.  
The revolution caused Iran to redirect its foreign policy, resulting in an anti-Israel stance as 
the Ayatollah sought to realign with religious kin in line with ambitions to export the Islamic Revolution, 
supporting growing entities such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad whilst refuting Israel’s very 
right to exist (Lindsay and Takeyh, 2010:35). This about-face was not just inspired by religious doctrine 
and unification, however. The new constitution of the Islamic revolution was a specifically anti-
hegemonic one and the state of Israel with its close links to Washington and having been seen as 
created by European powers, was now rebranded as a usurper and the driving force of western neo-
imperialism in the region (Rezaei and Cohen, 2014:444).  
Iran has been, until January 2016, the target of numerous UN sanctions (see appendix a), led 
by the United States, as a result of suspicions regarding its nuclear programme (Global Policy Forum, 
2006). This programme is justified by Iran as being for domestic power capabilities only (Chubin and 
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Litwak, 2003: 111). Despite being a signatory of the non-proliferation treaty, numerous members of 
the international community, such as the United States and EU member states, were dubious of this 
claim, fearing the worst and reacting appropriately (Diamond 2012: 3). Iran and many (but not all) 
Western powers were, it appeared, at a stalemate. The United States had been convinced that Iranian 
intentions are expansionist and power-hungry and Iran is incapable, in the face of such confidence in 
its irrationality, of acting in a way deemed transparent enough. Conservative actors, rooted in realist 
theories of balances of power and regional hegemony, understood this nuclear programme in the only 
way that their reading of actions and intentions allow (Drenou, 2011:74). They viewed it as a negative, 
as a precursor for nuclear weaponization and therefore a security threat to the MENA generally and 
Israel specifically (Bergman 2009: 329). The issue was securitised to represent an existential threat. It 
should be noted, however, that recent developments, spurred by China’s mediating capabilities 
(discussed in chapter six) have resulted in a compromise, following negotiations Iran, the USA and the 
UN over the former’s programme (Scott, 2015:5). Though to what extent this is a result of Iran’s desire 
to placate the West rather than part of its greater desire to be an active member of China’s new ‘One 
Belt, One Road’ initiative is an interesting question, which will be considered further in chapter six.  
Conclusion 
The inherent problem with any analysis of Iran and its foreign policies is not the policies themselves 
but rather the interpretations that they produce, and going hand in hand with this, the interpretations 
which produce them. Foreign policy making and implementation does not occur in a vacuum. In order 
to analyse it is necessary to first recognise and address the inextricable problem of how decision-
makers view and react to their environment. Problems framed by perception, knowledge structures, 
pre-determined bias and existing behaviour patterns. 
FPA has traditionally centered on a structure-oriented study of state-to-state interactions at 
the regional or global level. The popular view here is of a macro-political system in which the actions 
of states are ruled by a system of constraints and/or incentives (Walker et al., 2011:3). There is much 
missing from such an approach though, that must be considered in the interests of a more 
comprehensive, multi-layered approach to understanding, such as the ideologies involved, domestic 
pressures, international standing, and goals and requirements of any given state. For too long the 
study of international relations has been western in focus. This misses important developments in 
other regions which can have profound effects on the international. For a point in turn see the fall of 
the USSR and the end of the Cold War. In the contemporary era FPA is ever more hindered by the 
dichotomy between a world of neighbours, every closer and more interactive due to technological 
advances, and a world of strangers who are unwilling, or unable, to understand one-another (ibid, 
123 
 
2011:2). This gives rise to difficulties in understanding which are retarded by conceptual and historical 
prejudices (Ciuta, 1991:1).  
An abstract model of actor rationality does not consider such psychological dispositions, nor 
does it consider behavioral motivations. Rather the focus tends to be on the policy process and the 
organizational context surrounding decisions to explain behaviour (Garrison, 2003:158); yet it is 
impossible to assess a state without considering its representation of the world. This is especially so 
with regard to Iran, with its unique history and civilisation, it is also a theocracy with specific, socially 
constructed rules and operations, born out of a reaction to US and European control and manipulation.  
It does not see itself as the evil arch villain intent on taking over the world but rather a power looking 
to return to its rightful, historical place as a regional superpower. Iran wants respect, it wants to 
develop and progress, but at the same time it will not allow itself to fall once again prey to the whims 
of a greater power (Rundle, 2011:95).  
In order to assess and analyze the foreign policy-making practices of any state and the 
intentions behind them it is necessary, in the interests of a comprehensive account of agents and 
processes, to adopt a Constructivist approach which addresses issues of norms and values, identity 
and history, language and self-representation (Kaarbo, 2003:158). Interestingly, certain of these 
factors are also present in a post-colonial discourse with addresses the relationship also, between a 
state and its other, though arguably, giving more importance to the power of the narrative of an 
‘Other’. A hermeneutic approach which enables the study of the theory and practice of interpretation 
is of invaluable importance. It allows the consideration of all aspects of interpretation – tangible and 
intangible – tacit and overt, with regard to presupposition, pre-understandings, language and 
semiotics.  
To go further is to suggest that to address and assess Iran’s recent foreign policy is to 
necessarily utilise Gadamer’s hermeneutic circle (Outhwaite, 1987:64) for to understand the whole 
(Iranian foreign policy) is only possible in reference to its individual parts (colonial legacy, historical 
situ, civilisational achievements, regional position) which again need to be understood in turn by 
reference to the whole (i.e. reactionary politics and regional and ideological ambitions and existing 
relations, or lack of, with other states). This is significant in relation to the analysis of Iranian-Chinese 
relations which will be the focus of the following chapter. Both this section of the thesis and the 
previous chapter highlight a commonality between the two states, not so much in their specific 
policies but in the driving forces that underpin the decision-making practices that give them agency. 
Each state places emphasis on, and constructs its national narratives around, past experiences of 
external intervention and present drives to modernise and develop through the execution of 
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pragmatic foreign policies, often reactionary but always underpinned by the need to maintain 
legitimacy in the eyes of a potentially fractious society. These similarities will underpin the analysis in 
the following chapter of the specific Iranian-Chinese relationship itself and the rhetorical articulation 
of its material motivations and concrete interests within a constructed narrative of amenability which 
will be assessed to determine the extent to which it can be classified as constituting a Tacit Alliance. 
  
125 
 
Chapter Six 
An Evaluation of Iranian-Chinese Relations as Representative of a Tacit Alliance 
 
Introduction 
The nature of the relationship between the China and Iran has been the source of much debate within 
the academic and security arena, specifically in relation to potential regional and international impacts 
(Shariatinia, 2010:1). Whilst some of the debates taking place are influenced by the residual concerns 
spawned from the China Threat theory, much is more greatly influenced by the status of Iran as a 
pariah, or rogue state. A considerable amount of this discourse is framed by external perceptions, and 
considerations of the impact, expectations and concerns of third parties, rather than pursuing a 
greater understanding of the Chinese-Iranian relationship itself. Once such example of this 
preoccupation with the impact of the relationship rather than its construction, is the idea of there 
being the pursuit of a strategic relationship. In traditional security terms, a strategic relationship is the 
alliance, or coalition, of powers against a common enemy or threat (Kay, 2015:185). In the 
contemporary era the foreign policies of these two states, whilst underpinned by common driving 
factors, as highlighted in the previous two chapters, are actually quite different. They have specific (if 
not divergent, then, mutually dis-effectual) international and foreign policy interests. Iran has been 
developing its nuclear programme, much to the discomfort and protestation of the dominant powers 
that are the USA and leading European states (Patrikarakos, 2012:). China’s response to this has been 
to call for the creation of dialogue over sanctions, and of peaceful resolution. Despite seeking to veto 
sanctions when possible, China has also voted in favour of them under international pressure 
(UNSC/9948). This again does not fit with a traditional strategic alliance understanding of the Chinese-
Iranian relationship.  
 A more robust and comprehensive analysis and explanation of the specific nuances of the 
Iranian-Chinese relationship is needed, and this is the focus of this chapter. The material base of 
interaction will first be addressed. This relates to interactions between the two based on trade, energy 
and mutual interest in strategy. Whilst, as stated above, in traditional security terms the two powers 
have not formed a strategic coalition, there relationship has been strategically constructed to fulfil 
specific interests and compliment general aims, as will be discussed below. These concrete 
interactions will be referred to as the ‘tangible’ base of their relationship and will be discussed within 
the framework of international processes and developments, or international pressures, which will be 
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shown to define and dictate its presentation and representation.  Moving on from this, the tacit nature 
of this relationship will then be analysed to understand the rhetorical, or hyperbole creation and 
maintenance of Iranian-Chinese relations in the absence of a formal alliance. Critical discourse analysis 
of official Iranian and Chinese government statements and news reports, as outlined fully in the 
methodology chapter, will be used to show the construction of concepts of a narrative of friendship, 
historical shared experiences and co-operation between the two powers which in turn constructs a 
condition of trust in the absence of formal, internationally binding agreements. This will set the ground 
work for chapter six which will summarize the finding of the research endeavour with regard to the 
extent to which the relationship and be classified as a Tacit Alliance, a concept introduced by Cynthia 
Crosbie and Coral Bell (1973 & 1977 respectively). 
The material base 
According to the latest statistics from Iran, China is officially the biggest market for Iranian exports, 
receiving 23.37% of total exports. Imports from China account for 19.57% of total Iranian imports 
(ISNA, 2010). In the first 10 months of the current Iranian year (2015), bilateral trade in non-
hydrocarbon products reached a record $13.2 billion, of which $7.3 billion was imports from China 
and $5.9 billion exports to China (see table one below for a list of these products). This makes Iranian-
Chinese trade a valuable and strategic concern for the former who is still suffering, and needing to 
recover from extensive and crippling UN authorised sanctions due to suspicions regarding its nuclear 
technology programme (discussed below), though negotiations have now resulted in the lifting of 
sanction (Naji, 2016:1). The injection of capital gained from bilateral trade agreements is vital also for 
the continued domestic legitimacy of Iran, which is struggling to maintain its growing urban population 
and skilled workforce (Amuzegar, 2014:20). This is also important for its regional power projection as 
an influential power, which can offset the pressure of challenger states such as Saudi Arabia and Israel 
as well as competitor states such as Turkey. China is also able to corner a market not already 
dominated by western firms: developing a testing ground for low-end manufactured goods and 
medium-technology machinery previously identified as low quality compared to western alternatives. 
Of all the non-hydrocarbon goods the greatest market is that of automobiles with China being Iran’s 
biggest net supplier of cars and car parts. Alongside this, Iran is also reliant on China for infrastructure 
development and maintenance – relying on imports for its rail and subway services as well as 
household goods such as TVs, computers and phones. 
Table one shows the goods traded between the two states. It is clear that there is a trade 
disparity here with China importing low cost goods and exporting high value items, putting Iran at a 
disadvantage and in a somewhat dependant relationship with China as a source of infrastructure 
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development, and vital consumer goods (Shariatinia, 2015). The development of non-hydrocarbon 
trade between the two has been a keen interest of Iran since 2011 when international sanctions began 
to shrink the latter’s economy and trade options. The diversification of trade goods, connected to this, 
is part of a wider societal legitimacy programme of job creation and development in Iran, which suffers 
from a growing urban, educated and/or skilled youth workforce with few employment opportunities. 
China in contrast boasts both existing and developing ties with numerous countries in the Middle East 
(Davidson, 2010:2) and Asia as well as economic blocs such as the European Union (EU Trade, 2015). 
The need for such diversification in this respect then is a far less crucial, or political issue. However, 
China needs hydrocarbons and hydrocarbon-products, for which it is willing to adapt its trade 
preferences (Garver, 2006:279).  
Table 1: Iranian imports to, and exports, from China 
Iranian exports to China Iranian imports from China 
Iron ore railroad and subway locomotive parts 
Methanol oil and gas pipelines 
Propane LCD and LED modules 
Polyethylene car parts 
Styrene Polystyrene 
Butane Bananas 
ethylene-glycol Cars 
Para xylene   
Chrome   
Stone   
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Marble   
oil and mineral seeds   
purified copper   
 
Hydrocarbons: Energy and oil fields 
In the energy sector, the intricacies of Iranian-Chinese trade and the political economy dimensions of 
their relationship are possibly most obvious. China is, as stated above, a developing nation and one 
by-product of this is its insatiable need for energy as the world’s second largest consumer of 
hydrocarbons. With a growing GDP, which has grown an average of 8-10% per year for much of the 
past 25 years, its hydrocarbon demands in the long-term are forecast to continue to increase 
(Chinability, 2015). The lion’s share of its needs come from Iran. That China is in need of such energy 
is well-documented, and as it develops so too do the expectations of its populace with regard to living 
standards, welfare, private transportation, consumer goods and leisure activities. The increased 
demand for cars alone in China has increased as bicycles and motorcycles are replaced – due in part 
to the greater affordability of cars as a result of China’s membership in the WTO and increased 
domestic manufacturing (Luft, 2009). Iran in turn, less developed, has a rapidly growing population 
and poor infrastructure that has yet to recover from the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88. Iran is also seeking 
to reduce its own reliance on its key natural resources, which requires industrial development. Iran is 
also, importantly, the owner of the second biggest hydrocarbon reserves in the MENA; due to UN and 
US sanctions, however, customers have been in short supply (Burman, 2009:120). As such, there exists 
an oil-for-goods exchange between the two with China paying for its energy through, goods, and 
knowledge and technology transfers (Harold and Nader, 2012:22). Whilst there are an array of small, 
private Chinese businesses in Iran, a significant amount of the Chinese companies present are 
connected to joint projects such as building and maintaining hydrocarbon refineries, transport 
systems, paper mills and telecommunications installations. Here we can see that energy commodities 
are tied, in the case of Iran, to societal needs and welfare.  
China and Iran also co-operate on the development of Iran’s numerous hydrocarbon fields 
and so the capacity to access greater resources – for which the latter lacks the important know-how. 
Chinese national companies such as Sinopec, CNCP (Chinese National Petroleum Corporation) and 
CNOOC (Chinese National Off-shore Oil Corp) are some of the top firms with Iranian counterparts. 
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Nigec is involved in the development of Iranian fields at Yadarvar, Masjid-e Suleiman and Kashan oil 
fields, which produce a key income for Iran and key energy needs for China in a mutually beneficial 
trade relationship as China seeks to secure its access to these resources. In 2004, 2009 and 2011 
Chinese state-run enterprises signed billion dollar deals with Iran LNG for the exclusive right to extract 
and import hydrocarbons from the Yadavaran, north Azadegan and south Pars energy fields.  This 
interest in energy accumulation and access is also prevalent in, and key to, wider regional interests of 
the development of pipelines to compete with western and Russian sourced energy transportation 
lines across the region. One key proposal is for a line to connect China and Iran via Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan – cultural kin countries of the latter, which Iran has used, in competition with Turkey, 
to develop ideological affiliations in the interests of boosting trade options in the post-Cold-War 
period (Paul, 2012). It should be noted, however, that such pipeline proposals are all too often 
‘proposals only’ due to wider international pressures from extra-regional powers, such as Russia, who 
currently hold a monopoly on energy transportation, and regional politics relating to co-operative 
agreements required from all parties to the pipeline and their own foreign and diplomatic political 
interests. Such endeavours have the emphasis of non-disrupted transportation of Iranian 
hydrocarbons to Chinese markets rather than a regional initiative for greater interdependence and so 
peace and stability. However, the latter narrative is used to sell the co-operative efforts of the two 
powers. For China, it is also important to consider the fact that all of its hydrocarbon imports, 
regardless of seller, have to pass through potential maritime choke points such as the Straits of 
Hormuz. As such, the issue of energy is not just a trade or development concern for China and its trade 
partners but also one of regional security and, contingent to this, stability.  
Military and technological transfer 
A less publicised facet of Iranian-Chinese trade relations, but one that is highly speculated over at the 
international level, concerns military co-operation and technological transfer. Connected to security 
and stability, the above identified energy agreements between Iran and China for the latter’s exclusive 
rights to the energy fields was, in part, agreed to by the former in exchange for China’s commitment 
to ensure their security. Whilst a formal alliance was not created, under the latter deal in 2011, China 
committed to the security of these fields as part of its national interest (Dorraj & Currier, 2008). This 
can be seen as a strategic move by Iran, which has already been the victim of a cyber-attack on one of 
its nuclear facilities that is believed to have been supported by the USA (Langer, 2013:5) and is 
sensitive to Israeli rhetoric of cold war and calls for international military strikes on Iran.  A significant 
degree of military interaction, therefore, does overlap with the energy sector relations discussed 
above, in relation to the acquisition of nuclear technology and so will not be repeated here.  However, 
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this also comes into the domestic and regional arenas with the development of oil fields as well as 
propositions of energy pipelines involving third party states such as Tukey and Pakistan. Military co-
operation and exchange is also of key concern as well a safe passage through the Straits of Hormuz. 
In the technological transfer arena. China has provided assistance to Iran in the form of training and 
technical support. It has shared technology and maintenance information on missile construction and 
development that includes the building of a missile factory.  
There has also been collaboration on the development of surface to air missiles, fast track 
missiles, radar systems and combat aircraft. In the 1980s and 1990s China used a black knight, in the 
form of North Korea (Hinckley, 1990), to assist in this technology transfer in an attempt to ward of US 
and European scrutiny of its military trade. Iran used such weapons to ensure its control of the Straits 
of Hormuz though cooperation can be traced further back to the First Gulf War (the Iran-Iraq War) in 
which China supplied weapons to both parties to the conflict. Though this military cooperation did 
decline significantly from the late 1990s onwards, it did not disappear altogether and China does still 
assist in the development and maintenance of military hardware. In the contemporary era the biggest 
bone of contention for external powers is whether China, or Chinese companies, are selling nuclear 
weapons technology to Iran. Whist it is no secret that Iran is developing nuclear energy capabilities, 
as part of a long running domestic policy that can be traced back to the pre-theocratic governance of 
the Shah, there is much speculation as to whether this is simply nuclear energy or weapons grade 
technology. Nuclear co-operation between the two powers began, formally, in the 1980’s with China’s 
agreement to provide 4 nuclear reactors and to help build a 4th research reactor at Bushehr. 
Cooperation in weapons grade technology ceased officially in the early 1990s when a covert 
agreement was discovered and so international pressure applied to China to withdraw (Delpech, 
2006). However, suspicions of continued covert assistance abound. Iran, an original signatory of the 
NPT, is adamant that its nuclear development is for peaceful, domestic purposes only, to reduce its 
dependence on its hydrocarbon revenues and for which it has to export crude oil and import refined 
oil. It is also, the government states, a factor in its development programme, if Iran is to become a 
developed country it must curb its reliance on its primary energy source and harness ‘developed’ 
technologies. China is also a developing state, and as a growing and significant power, has normative 
commitments to fulfil the role of a responsible power. This is tied to its regional policies in Asia to 
avoid neighbourhood fears and mistrust vis-a-vis its rise and influence but also internationally in-line 
with its relations with the USA and Europe. China is adamant that it is not assisting in Iranian 
development of nuclear weapons capabilities. It is also vocal in its support of the right of Iran, and any 
other state for that matter, to develop nuclear energy. This support is expressed due to its anti-
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hegemonic constitution, which sets multi-polar regionalism above hegemonic dominance and external 
actor influence on domestic policies and interests.  
Official discourse states confidence in Iranian transparency and statements of peace that has 
seen China veto, when possible, UN recommendations for further and more progressive sanctions on 
Iran. China instead, in-line with its ‘harmonious rise’ policy and growing power has called for the 
‘nuclear’ issue with Iran to be addressed through the development of diplomacy and dialogue, which 
have ended successfully with the 2016 resolution of P5+1 talks (Naji, 2016:1). This appears to have 
been a coup de grace for the rising power as it has been instrumental in bringing the concerned parties 
to the table and mediating between them during international negotiations which at the time of 
writing have resulted in a resolution to Iran’s nuclear question (Scott, 2015). This role has provided 
kudos to China’s diplomatic skills and has helped to increase the potential for significant economic 
benefit as an unsanctioned Iran creates greater trade and exchange opportunities between the two. 
It also provides a greater sense of regional peace and stability with regard to the commitment of 
officially binding international agreements between Iran and the dominant western world. 
Furthermore, it eases pressure on China to explain its bilateral relations with Iran.  
Regional Cooperation 
Additional regional interests centre around physical and ideological security (in particular in relation 
to the threat of terrorism) but also, and arguably predominantly, economic security. The Shanghai 
Cooperation organization (SCO) is a Eurasian regional organisation, created in 1996 by China, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. It is based on a treaty of deepening military trust and thus 
reducing the influence of liberal democracies in the member states (Summers, 2015). The SCO is 
underpinned by the commitment to non-intervention in domestic affairs and thus the safeguarding of 
sovereignty, territory and domestic stability, while promoting good neighbourliness and friendly co-
operation (Summers, 2015). Over time, this organisation has grown in aim and scope, with the 
construction and promotion of regional programmes relating to key infrastructure systems such as 
transportation, telecoms, energy, security and banking. This is an Asian regional organisation, which 
is set up not so much to resolve disputes but rather to promote co-operation between members and 
promote their development. It also was established to promote regional trade relations and, above 
all, to safeguard security. The main security concerns identified are as follows: separatism, extremism 
and terrorism, and drug trafficking. Considering its proximity to the MENA and the predominance of 
Muslim communities this has gained much weight in the post-9/11 era, though the organisation is 
careful not to transform into a military bloc, instead largely concentrating on energy projects.  
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In 2007, Iran was invited as a dialogue partner to the SCO and in 2016 may be set to achieve 
full member status, following the resolution of the recent negotiations (Almeidi, 2015). This has given 
Iran a greater pro-active presence in the central Asian region, which provides opportunities with 
regard to energy projects and wider non-hydrocarbon trade potentials. This fits with Iran’s foreign 
policy commitments of increasing regional alliances and collective security. It is also attractive to Iran 
with regard to its potential ability to sway political power and exert influence internationally, an 
important factor for Iran and its pariah status vis-a-vis western powers and organisations (Saremi, 
2015). In pursuit of greater economic co-operation, the SCO has also launched an initiative for a new 
banking system to offset the dominance of the current international banking system and thus create 
new areas of economic growth and political influence. The Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
currently being established with its base in Beijing, has both China and Iran as two of its 35 founding 
members (Shaoxian, 2015).  
The involvement of Iran is both geo-strategic and political. It is true that Iran’s main security 
concerns lay within its immediate vicinity, however, due to the impacts and pervasiveness of 
globalisation and international trade, economic progress and security are highly interdependent. 
Iran’s role in the AIIB forms part of its wider commitment to improving its international image – 
assisted also by the recently concluded nuclear negotiations. This also has an influence domestically 
with regard to a populace that has been suffering from sanctions. The growth in relative size of the 
younger generations which do not remember first-hand the Iranian revolution or previous external 
interventions (Ortega, 2015). Assisted by greater technological and telecommunications access, this 
upcoming generation are ever more conscious of disparities between themselves and other, more 
modern and developed societies. The AIIB will be a forum for the pooling of funds to invest in 
infrastructure projects for poorer countries. In this way, it is similar to the World Bank and IMF, though 
without the structural adjustment stipulations that are often seen as unfair and progress-stifling 
(Young, 2015). 
Another key enterprise that is of mutual interest to both Iran and China is the New Silk Road 
initiative, launched by Xi Jinping as the ‘one belt, one road’ initiative launched in 2013 to create a tree-
trade corridor (Summers, 2015). This New Silk Road aims to restore China's old maritime and overland 
trade routes. China and Russia have been co-operating on the integration of Asia by way of 
multifarious networks of high-speed railways, pipelines, superhighways and ports, with Chinese 
corporations seeking and closing infrastructure deals across the Eurasia landmass. Investing close to 
a trillion dollars with an intended yield of over $2.5 trillion across 40 plus countries (Shaoxian, 2015). 
SOEs and financial institutions are being urged to invest in external construction and infrastructure 
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projects. Traditional craftsmanship is also being revived in an attempt to develop authentic brands in 
line with China’s ‘going global’ interests (Xiansi, 2014:1). China is the main contributor of investment 
in this plan and there are some concerns about the flow of goods and China’s tendency to have 
stronger exports than its trading partners. However, there is genuine interest in ironing out such 
differences as the road is a key potential source of economic and developmental progress as well as 
greater diplomatic ties amongst members (Wong, 2015: 5). In this respect the initiative also promotes, 
or predicates, interlocking security guarantees in liberal terms as a result of the increased integration 
and interdependence of countries along the belt. There have already been discussions between China 
and India regarding the security of borders that are of particular concern to the latter, and have, on 
occasion, resulted in war (Stanzel, 2015). This initiative is important in particular with regard to 
Iranian-Chinese relations and the convergence of their interests – with China seeking to create a 
Eurasia economic bloc, and Iran seeking to access key markets and diplomatic opportunities, especially 
in light of the history of economic sanctions on Iran.  
Geo-strategically Iran is a key node of the Silk Road project, which runs through the north of 
the country, as it has key access to open seas, bettered only by Russia (Ortega, 2015). This is of 
significant interest to Iran on several levels that have been boosted by its distancing from Hamas and 
its promotion of soft power and diplomacy (while at the same time exploiting Western errors and 
failures in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen and Syria) (Ortega, 2015). China has invested in the belt road plan, 
and the AIIB and SCO security structures as they provide a reprieve from its immediate, suspicious, 
and often hostile, neighbours. The Silk Road can also be seen as the re-articulation of Persian and 
Chinese progress and success. It builds on the previous, ancient, model of internationalisation to 
compete in a globalised world. The belt does not just provide much needed access to markets, trade 
opportunities and investment and development.  
Figure one: The proposed new silk road
en.shisu.edu.cn 
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It provides security through interdependence, and recognition of Iran as a regional super-
power. This has the possibility to be increased as western firms clamber to offer investment with the 
2016 lifting of sanctions which has the potential to transform Iran into meeting point of the West and 
the Eurasian East (Korybko, 2015). Central Asia is also home to the ‘stan’ states which share cultural 
and historical ‘kinship’ commonalties with Iran. This can be used to develop soft power and so help to 
raise Iran’s profile. The Silk Road also seeks to develop pipeline opportunities and routes that 
represent a key market for Iranian energy exports, again providing the opportunity to reap much 
needed economic rewards that can be invested at home to promote governmental legitimacy and 
ease societal tensions caused by insecure and threadbare living standards.   
Pragmatic Drivers of Iranian-Chinese Relations 
For both China and Iran, development is crucial for their respective ambitions to return to the 
international stage on a level playing field with the dominant international actors. China first tried, 
under Mao Zedong (1949-1976), to develop at an accelerated rate within the framework of a 
Communist manifesto, highly influenced by Stalinist Russia (Kemenade 2009: 8). The death of Mao 
and the rise of Deng Xiaoping (1978-89), coupled with the failure of initiatives such as the Cultural 
Revolution and the numerous five- year plans surrounding it, led to the development of a new system. 
The Chinese state was restructured into a ‘“Harmonious” combination of capitalist development and 
sustained Communist-State apparatus’ (Wu and Lansdowne 2009: 1). This merging between East and 
West, between Cold War era first- and second-world ideologies, represents ‘the interaction between 
emulation of the west and resistance to its intrusion in modernising endeavours’ (Xudong and 
Junxiang 2009: 1). The liberalisation of the market did not run parallel to the liberalisation of the 
government. The latter maintained its socialist order and ideals in separation from capitalist and 
economic reforms but regardless of this, the twin-peaked system resulted in China rising to a position 
of recognition, a significant member of the global economy and a member of the World Trade 
Organization in 1999. This drive to develop is not new, but rather one of the few lasting themes 
throughout China’s history (ibid, p. 48).  
The capitalist development and market economy has been the push and pull of China and its 
commitments to trade relations with a staggering array of actors in Asia, North and South America, 
the MENA and Europe. Increased trade has brought with it significantly improved diplomatic relations. 
China thus promoted its ‘five principles of coexistence’ (Garver 2006): a commitment to the fostering 
of trust, respect, cooperation and equality with its Asian neighbours in the interests of a harmonious 
order. Regional initiatives, such as ASEAN, have been established and supported by China, which has 
sought to operate on a basis of consensus between nations to address security and developmental 
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needs and concerns (Beeson 2004: 33). China, as a rising power, committed to an accelerated rate of 
development is naturally a significant consumer of resources, specifically hydrocarbons. It is also a late 
arrival to the international scene where existing powers already have the market monopoly in and 
between many states. China needs hydrocarbons, resources and fresh, un-monopolised markets.  
Iran in turn, following the 1979 revolution and the 1980–88 Gulf War, was left with a crippled 
economy and feelings of resentment for the United States and Europe. Afrasiabi and Maleki (2003) 
recognise Iran’s foreign policy as deriving from two sources, its turbulent regional environment and 
its faction-ridden polity, in the run-up to 9/11. The attack on the World Trade Centre changed the 
global security landscape. It also highlighted the increased role that Iran had been playing since 1990 
as a mediator and crisis manager (ibid, p. 257). Reflecting China’s harmonious world policy, but in no 
apparent way influenced by it, Iran has sought to develop diplomatic ties with regional powers and to 
actively promote regional security initiatives. These have included several ceasefire agreements 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan since 1994; the general agreement on the establishment of peace 
and national accord and protocol on mutual understanding in 1997; the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC), of which Mohammad Khatami was a chairman in the late 1990s (ibid, p. 258); and 
the Economic Co-operation Organization (ECO). There are also growing pressures and security 
concerns for Iran regarding the freshwater resources that it shares with Afghanistan. This could 
certainly explain Iran’s interest in mediating the peaceful settlement of governance issues between 
the United States and Afghanistan following the US invasion after 9/11. In this respect Iran’s focus is 
very much East-facing. However, there has recently been a significant shift in Iranian foreign policy 
towards a balancing of East and West. Iran has cultivated relations with China (as well as Russia and 
India) for economic and political coverage that cannot be found in the West and to counterbalance 
the threat of Western sanctions (ibid, p. 51) as a result of fears over its nuclear energy policy.  
In order to maintain and sustain domestic growth in the 21st century, energy security has 
become a priority for Beijing, due to its unavoidable dependence on the Middle East for hydrocarbons 
(as the region holds over 50 per cent of the world’s proven reserves, with Iran possessing 10 per cent 
of the global share) (2009 figures from the US Energy Information Association - EIA). The Iran and Libya 
Sanctions Act in 1996 also created an economic vacuum as Western companies were prohibited from 
sizeable investments in the Iranian hydrocarbons industry. This provided an opportunity for Chinese 
firms to secure hydrocarbon imports and assist in the development of its hydrocarbons infrastructure 
through investments, as they faced less competition within Iran in comparison with other nations. In 
developing relations with Iran, China achieves influence and presence in what is arguably one of the 
most important geo-strategic and economic regions in the world. It also supports China’s commitment 
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to peaceful and productive (as well as profitable) ties with all major powers and regions. Both Chinese 
and Iranian policies are anti-hegemonic in character. Rather than seeking to align with the dominant 
superpower, both states prefer the maintenance of a non-threatening international system of regions 
and regional powers concerned with their own interest areas. China specifically sees this as the most 
conducive system for its economic growth (Swaine. 2010: 2).  
In line with mutual foreign policy interests and developmental directions, China and Iran have 
engaged in significant hydrocarbon trade deals. Iran has also received investment in the infrastructure, 
energy and technology sectors. It is also a vibrant and thirsty market for imported machinery and 
crafts. The high level of traffic in goods and knowhow between the two states is conducted by public 
and private sector firms alike and though China appears to be giving more than it is receiving, there 
are positive impacts of these corporate activities on the home economy. This includes the 
maintenance and development of Chinese economic prowess and economic security, as it has the 
stable monopoly of Iranian markets as well as a testing ground for the development of new products 
and the improvement of existing ones (Downs & Maloney, 2011). Iran in turn receives much needed 
foreign direct investment, technological knowhow and an injection of life into its stagnating economy. 
Factors within these frameworks form the pragmatic basis of Iranian-Chinese relations and so drive 
the need for a normative understanding and risk reduction in the absence of a formal alliance. As they 
are to a degree economically intertwined and interdependent there is the pragmatic and strategic 
need to construct a condition of trust, benefit, and expectation vis-a vis co-operative projects, 
transfers and exchanges. This forms the material base – the tangible economic reality of Iranian-
Chinese relations, upon which a normatively constructed Tacit Alliance can be developed.  
The development of this Tacit Alliance is reliant on the saleability of these material interests 
on the marketing of compatibilities to legitimize and promote exchanges and co-operation and overall 
relations. This is achieved in a particular way across two levels – the physical and the rhetorical. At the 
physical level all of the above material, or concrete interests produce a cyclical structure of self-
fulfilling prophecy. The two states engage with one another because they are already engaged with 
one another– they have clear common interest’s vis-a-vis security and constitutional imperatives as 
well as each having markets/sectors/resources that the other needs. At the rhetorical level, an alliance 
is created de facto: the material interests are wrapped with a discursive narrative of amenability and 
confidence, which is both constructed by and constructs the positivity of the interactions that they 
defend. In this respect, they are building trust and reducing risk (as discussed in Chapter 2) with the 
creation of normative influences on expectations and responses which in turn impacts the 
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predictability of the actions of the other. This creation is evident in official discourse practices 
supported and enacted by the governing parties of both states, as discussed below.  
Critical Discourse Analysis and the Construction of Narrative 
Whilst it is clear to see that there are material interests which underpin co-operative efforts and 
interest between Iran and China, the nature of this thesis is not an assessment of these interests 
specifically but rather the extent to which they are discursively embedded with a set framework which 
seeks to construct trust and confidence which inversely reduces risk analyses. This has a connotation 
of securitisation theory as the assessment of the extent to which relations themselves (rather than 
their aims and interests such as terrorism and drug trafficking which are still security issues) between 
the two powers are politicised and so not deemed an area of fear, threat or conflict. This necessitates 
an assessment of the discursive practices selected for analysis and the extent to which articulations of 
identity and the ways in which they construct objects within the rhetoric. As such, the focus is on 
‘[how] does the discourse construct a Tacit Alliance?’ The ‘how’ here is bracketed as understanding 
the presence or absence of a Tacit Alliance necessarily involves the ways in which this is done.  
The audience for the sources selected are identified as China, Chinese civil society, Iran, and 
Iranian civil society. Evidence is taken from official government sources such as white papers and news 
reports from official state newspapers. While Fowler (1991) highlights the lack of neutrality and 
presence of ideological manipulation in all newspapers generically, these are classified as more overtly 
biased and specifically ‘official’ as both governing systems heavily monitor and censor their media 
outlets, with reporters and editors having negligible, if any, autonomy. Consequently, these 
newspaper sources, as explained in chapter three (p75) can be seen as mouthpieces of government. 
This is significant as there is no reporter autonomy to detract from the information and the way that 
it is being presented.  
The sources selected relate to Iranian-Chinese relations specifically and so the tone and 
message reflects this. The initial search yielded over 1527sources, with an increase in recent years due 
to the nuclear negotiations taking place in the contemporary era. 134 were found to constitute a direct 
Iranian-Chinese channel of communication. In comparison, of the remaining 1366 items, 27 related to 
sports results and 821 were rejected as irrelevant on the grounds that the articles included the names 
of the two powers but nothing more. 545 sources were directly irrelevant but informative by-proxy in 
that they relate, specifically in the case of China, to external perceptions of their relations and so are 
generated for an alternative audience identified as the international arena. It is noteworthy that whilst 
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these sources do not positively reinforce Iranian-Chinese relations, neither do they repudiate them. 
Rather they are heavy on facts and description but light on, or absent of, hyperbole.  
Articles reporting on developments in the recent nuclear negotiations between Iran, 
European powers and the USA for instance, where the audience could be the wider international 
community and peer states, lack any references to the themes identified in the discursive analysis. In 
a similar vein, items which propose the construction of the AIIB or the role and actions of the SCO are 
also absent of such relationship reinforcing content. This is significant in that emphasis can be placed 
on what is not stated, on what is absent from these particular discourses. In this context then the 
silence can be held parallel to the discursive practices employed at the bilateral level and the disparity 
be seen to intangibly support the theory that there is a tacit alliance between the two powers. Their 
trust and confidence building efforts are conducted for their own pragmatic interests and are not 
formalised even in discourse in wider foreign policy, regional or international narratives or hyperbole. 
The normative construction and espousal of friendship, trust and commonalities are not even 
exercised to defend China’s veto of UN sanctions. The actions can be seen to be there – ambiguous as 
the silence may make them – such as in the case of Iran’s rescue of Chinese Fishermen which reads as 
a situation report only (Xinhuanet.com: 2012) - but the narrative – the discourse and so empowerment 
of the narrative is absent. Visible in this comparison is the CDA belief in the depiction of different 
phenomena based on political and social perspectives (Nasab and Dowlatadabi, p. 94). This confirms 
the utility of the official media texts as tools and social practices, with political implications about 
issues of status and solidarity (Gee, 2004:32).  
Analysis of the texts and transcripts that refer directly to the Iranian-Chinese relationship, in 
contrast, highlight specific strands that can be seen to mark the construction and maintenance, and 
so the empowerment of a narrative of amenability, trust and attachment – of a tacit, informal, alliance 
based on shared norms, values and historical experience. They represent the ideological 
manifestations of the phenomena of tacit alliance construction (Nasab and Dowlatadabi, p. 94). These 
strands are identified as three themes that both build upon and underpin one another.  
Discourse, as detailed in chapter two, can be categorized as systems of truth, which, as a result 
have the potential to ‘fix’ meaning, if only temporarily, allowing us to make sense of the world at any 
given time. Within the context of this thesis it allows for the comprehension of truths articulated in 
the construction of Iranian-Chinese relations specifically. Of the 134 items identified as 
representations of the two states ‘talking to each other’, key words, terms and labels were identified 
as creating a rhetoric within and between them. As these have been discussed in Chapter two they 
will not be repeated in detail here, however, it is necessary to summarise. Such key terms were 
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centred around expressions of friendship, trust, cooperation, relations, respect, shared history, 
regional interests, peace and stability, development, strategy and security. This represents what Doty 
refers to as a ‘first reading’ (1996: 308). The second reading of the discourse assesses the ability to 
identify common themes in the accumulation of the language identified that can be understood to 
contribute to the creation of strands, or themes, that underpin the constitution of the meta-discourse. 
These themes have been identified as the modality, intention and expression – as the what, why and 
how – which have been segregated into frameworks of interaction for this thesis. Whilst it is natural 
that some themes may overlap – such as expressions of friendly co-operation or historical trade 
relations – they have necessarily been segregated into the three frameworks in order to articulate the 
different layers present in the construction and legitimation of the narrative.  
References to cooperation, exchanges and relations (relations/relationship) are identified 
within the strand of ‘interest’ (what). These terms represent what Iran and China are doing within the 
framework of one another and their relationship. As noted above, there are an array of trade, 
technological and cultural exchanges that take place between the two states. This strand can be 
identified as underpinning and reinforcing this material base. This is articulated within domestic 
interests as the tools with which the ‘what’ are justified and pursued. In terms of the discursive 
practice of hyperbole-building within the articles selected this ‘Interest’ is represented by the utility 
of references to cooperation, mutual or bilateral exchanges, visits between, and by, high ranking 
officials, relations, ties, mutual benefit, partnerships and consultations. Of the sources selected for 
analysis, all but ten can be codified as positive for the presence and utilisation of hyperbole parallel to 
the descriptions of cooperation and engagement. These references are articulations of interactions 
within the material sectors of business, economics, culture and politics as well as the recognition of 
interactions between high ranking officials. It is the identification of what the states are doing and the 
way in which they interact which can also be termed the pragmatic/strategic basis for all interactions 
and so the causes of the potential development of an incorporeal association.   
The second Framework is the Modality (why). These terms are identified as the structural 
framework within which the ‘interest’ occurs. The prime foreign and domestic concerns of each state, 
though diverging, as discussed previously, in terms of specific interests, have sufficient similarities to 
aid the construction of this theme of the discourse. The core of these interests and aims, as identified 
in chapters three and four, are centred around security, within which is the connected, though not 
mutually exclusive, issue of peace and stability. Diplomacy is also included here as the ‘soft power’ 
tool with which these are sought. Both states are rising powers, albeit within different environments 
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and under different international expectations. This involves the need to develop in numerous sectors 
and so to have a development agenda.  
Within the context of chapters three and four, Iran and China can be seen to share particular 
commonalities not so much within their specific foreign policies but in relation the overarching 
patterns of their expression and execution, in the cognitive drivers of their foreign policy formulation 
and execution. Both states are anti-hegemonic and heavily rely on the hyperbole of identity and 
historical experience to drive their interests and ambitions. In the dialogue that has been constructed 
between them these interests relate to expressions and representations of peace and stability, 
diplomacy as a utility of soft power promotion and maintenance, and strategic interests and so create 
the ‘modality’ framework. This is significant in that the rhetoric being used is multidimensional which 
in part may account for its resilience. The first strand clearly identifies what the discourse does – the 
truth of the text – but of equal importance is why this is done – the pragmatic drivers of the behaviour 
which reflects the tangible, material base discussed above.  
The third framework is concerned with the ‘illustration’ (how). The discourse develops a 
narrative of what is being pursued between the two powers, and why. Fundamental to this, 
particularity within the remit of this thesis, is this ‘how’. As stated above, Iran and China pursue 
relations external to the framework of a formal, binding alliance. In order to offset the lack of formal 
alliance commitments, they must create and maintain a relationship of security in which they can, 
with a significant degree of accuracy, predict the potential actions of one another. They must construct 
trust, therefore the discourse that is relevant to this strand relates to trust, friendship, respect and 
what have been termed ‘positives’. The latter of these are not specific words but rather a collection 
of words and phrases directed to one another that construct a positive reflection, including 
congratulations and positive connectors such as ‘pleased to’ and ‘we welcome’. This includes support 
for the nuclear programme, references to China as a respectable and responsible power and 
humanitarian endeavours of each (see appendix D).  
This strand is arguably the most significant in the analysis of the existence of a tacit alliance 
as it denotes the creation of trust that h is vital for the development of intra-state relations in the 
absence of a formal alliance. Trust is of limited concern in explicit alliances or treaties because the 
level of risk concerned is also limited by the binding agreements (Abbott, 1993). A better 
understanding of trust and the ways in which it is constructed are considerably more informative when 
applied to relations between states that lack the formal articulations of cooperation. China and Iran 
are not kin countries, in Huntingdon’s use of the term (2002), nor have they committed to a formal 
alliance with one another. But, as previously stated, there is recorded evidence of continual rhetoric 
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of confidence building. China may have voted in favour of the latest round of UN sanctions against 
Iran, but this is not a set pattern and the government is also consistently on record as advocating the 
opening of discursive relations, of diplomacy and so discourse, between the NATO powers and Iran 
(Farrar-Wellman and Frasco 2010). 
While chapter two defended the selection of white papers and national newspapers as 
sources where the actors were in effect addressing one another it is important to revisit this here also. 
The audience in discourse analysis is an important factor due to its central role in revealing the context 
and aims of the narrative – of the truth – that is being constructed and identified. The audience for 
these texts are present at two levels. At the strategic level the audience is the recipient state – it is an 
informal re-iteration to the commitment to sustain relations and interactions between one another. 
There is also a parallel political level. The narrative is also constructed and developed for the domestic 
audiences of each state. As identified in the previous two chapters, government legitimacy and 
societal support is a key policy issue of concern for both the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Chinese 
Communist Party. Here it is possible to identify the power relationship that is present in all CDA. 
Traditional CDA analysis tends to identify power in a hierarchy with the text revealing the power of 
one rhetoric over another and so identifying an asymmetric relationship. This is not found to be the 
case in this exercise however. There is no overt or hidden, systemic, competition for, or expression of, 
power by one over the other. Rather the power relationship identified is more embedded than this. 
The power is found in the narrative – in the recognition and acceptance of the narratives being 
presented to, and so accepted by, the two-level audience. In this case then the power itself is in the 
formation of rhetoric, its delivery and reception rather than in the specific truth that is being offered 
by the completed text.  
This expression of power as narrative and not effect can itself be seen as a reflection of the 
nature of Iranian-Chinese relations themselves and the suspicious, anti-hegemonic nature of the 
foreign and domestic policies of the two governance structures being articulated. An expression of 
power or superiority of one over the other would in fact hinder relations and so constructions of the 
concept of trust and confidence in one another as each state is sensitive to the interference of, and 
subjugation by, external powers based on cognitive understandings of history and victimisation 
(Leverette & Leverette, 2014:3). The location of power within the narrative rather than emitting from 
it, is in itself a tacit appeal to legitimacy and indeed a form of confidence building within itself. Each 
state can expect not to receive harsh criticism from the other or indeed to be shown to be at a 
disadvantage to the other in a negative context within which resentment can be fostered.  
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China is aware of its rising power status and its need to be seen to be acting as a ‘responsible’ 
member of the international community. These run parallel to its energy and market access needs 
that drive its relations with Iran. While it is obvious that China is in a stronger position than Iran which 
has been all but crippled by economic and trade sanctions as a result of its nuclear programme (though 
having roots that can be traced further back to the US Embassy Hostage Crisis of 1981), this is not 
reflected vis-a-vis power within the analysis. The recent nuclear negotiations which have taken place, 
and resulted in a successful compromise, have been driven significantly by Chinese calls for diplomacy 
and detent. The upshot is the opening of discursive relations between the West and the pariah state 
with what initially appear to be some very positive results as a resolution to the Iranian nuclear issue 
has been agreed. Many Western firms have commented on the potential for access to the Iranian 
market (Dehghan, 2015). The lack of rhetorical subversion of Iran by China in the discourse analysed, 
ensures that the positive relations between the two powers has a foundation on which to develop 
further. In four separate sources Iran is referenced as praising China’s role in the negotiation process 
and in two states officially the Iranian people will not forget the support provided by China during 
sanctions and through the negotiation process.  
The three strands, or frameworks, identified identify the relationship and construct domestic 
support and recognition of relations between the two powers based on material interests, through 
the pursuit of co-operation and mutual exchange and underpinned by historical experience and 
friendship over the longue duree. China is not a neo-imperial power intent of intervening in the 
domestic affairs of other states and Iran is not an untrustworthy pariah state intent on nuclear 
domination. Rather they are two states with no history of conflict with one another who share 
common experiences of imperial exploitation and economic associations – they are friends, a 
friendship upon which, importantly, trust can be fostered and risked. An example of this is Iran’s 
nuclear programme, which has been securitised by some states (such as the USA, Britain, Saudi Arabia 
and Israel) and politicised by China (and accepted by the audience) as a domestic social and economic 
endeavour requiring a diplomatic solution and compromise rather than strong-arm tactics born of fear 
and distrust.  
Hyperbole Representations: Existential, Propositional and Value 
The sources selected were segregated and initially read state-centrically. This has, in the first instance 
produced some interesting comparative results. The data recovered from the sources show a 
difference in the tools used. China shows a predisposition for the use of rhetoric relating to friendship, 
diplomacy and exchanges with references to partnership and regional initiatives and security being 
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the least utilised expressions of association. In comparison Iran prefers to highlight expressions of 
cooperation, relations and positives, with dialogue and trust being the least utilised rhetorical tools.  
Graph 1: Comparison of the utility of the rhetoric utilised by Iran and China 
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On first inspection this has the potential to undermine the assumption that there is a tacit 
alliance built on the creation of trust in order to offset the risks involved in the absence of formal, 
binding agreements and treaties. This is particularly the case with regard to Iran, which seems to put 
so little emphasis on this term specifically – only mentioning trust eight times across six sources. As 
highlighted in Chapter two, the construction of trust forms a confidence building exercise, and as such 
though the word trust is only used eight times, being part of the modality framework it is also 
expressed through the implementation of cooperative endeavours and exchanges. These include joint 
ventures, economic agreements and cultural exchanges as well as high-level meetings between 
presidents and foreign policy personnel. These activities build and re-inforce the confidence that is 
needed in order to fulfil the material interest highlighted in section one of this chapter. In this respect 
then they are the construction of trust by alternative but no less influential means. This information 
is also reflective of the general foreign policy representative mode of each state, and so can be seen, 
alternatively, as part of a wider pattern of discursive behaviour of each state, and how they legitimise 
their practices to their domestic audience. 
The closest degree of commonality between the two exists with regard to the utility of 
references to trade (China:5%, Iran:3.47%), region (China:4.3%, Iran:3.05%), strategy (China:5.57%, 
Iran:5.27%) and security (China:2.88%, Iran:3.61%), the difference between the degree of utility 
registering at less than 1%.  This is interesting, though not overly surprising, as they represent specific 
foreign policy interests and ambitions previously identified with regard to the need to develop 
economically and structurally within a stable environment. They form the majority of the ‘interest’ 
framework of ‘why’ the two states are pursuing positive relations. In this context then they underpin 
the material interests introduced above and empower the discursive practice of legitimising the 
actions and accompanying rhetoric of the relevant policy makers and governing body. In contrast the 
least degree of commonality is found to exist within the utility of references to cooperation, friend, 
exchanges and peace and stability which all register a divergence greater than 8%. Peace and stability 
forms part of the ‘interest’ framework, though it is possible to account for this disparity vis-a-vis 
concepts and articulations of peace and stability. China, for instance, tends to talk of peace and 
stability within the rubric of economic cooperation and as such accompanies it with references to the 
SCO, AIIB and trade relations – within bilateral and regional cooperative projects. Iran in comparison 
accompanies peace and stability concerns with a rhetoric of increased positive relations and the 
development of greater diplomacy and soft power.  Friend in turn sits within the expression 
framework, and whilst China uses the term friend to identify Iran and traditional relations, in line with 
its ‘good neighbourhood’ policies and to offset tributary system fears, Iran within a similar context 
refers to shared commonalities and histories, utilising concepts of respect and partnership. Here the 
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articulation of partner, with similar normative connotations to friend vis-a-vis trust and commitment 
are favoured.  Exchanges and co-operation form the bulk of the modality framework and are 
normative articulations of the material base identified. Exchanges and cooperation frame trade and 
joint development projects within a positive discursive framework of shred interest and commitment. 
For Iran, the use of exchange and co-operation also creates assumptions of equality and level-footing 
which support its national narrative of respect and non-exploitation which are significant for the 
legitimacy and empowerment of the narrative being constructed.  
At the level of framework creation disparities in the form of rhetoric utilised, and so 
importance assigned, is also evident. Graphs 4 and 5 below show that there appears to be a similarity 
in the degree to which framework A is expressed – registering at 23.84% (China) and 25.39%. (IranI). 
This shows mutual recognition of the strength and importance of the material base that underpins 
their relationship as need driven rather than altruistic. This reflects the finding so Sylvia Crosbie’s 
(1974) application of Tacit Alliance theory to French-Israeli relations in which the relationship and 
rhetorical expressions of sympathy and support lasted only as long as the economic benefits that it 
yielded. Though the two powers may differ with regard to their commitments to why and how they 
relate to one another they appear to agree on what interests those relations are based upon – on the 
modality.  
Frameworks B and C conversely reflect a greater disparity with Iran focusing on the 
development of C and China of B. This raises the questions of how can these trends be accounted for? 
and what do they represent? Where does the power relation lie for each state? Whilst it would be 
virtuous to find that the results mirror each other across all three frameworks, this is not expected, 
nor indeed a negative result. The importance attributed to a framework, as to a specific word or 
expression as mentioned above, is rooted in state-centric necessity of legitimacy and so the power 
relationship of the overarching narrative. The Chinese sources emphasise the interest framework – 
the why – which reflects its position as a rising international power and a developing nation. In order 
to justify to its civic audience, the trust it expresses in the pariah state, cultural, economic and political 
exchanges and co-operative endeavours it must emphasis the benefits at best and necessity at worst 
of such activity. Much of this is framed within the development drive and China’s insatiable need for 
energy. Modernity is also utilised with regard to access to Iranian markets and so the benefits for the 
business and private sectors. Reports of China’s exchanges and co-operative endeavours with Iran vis-
a-vis the creation of the AIIB are also framed within China’s domestic policy of encouraging peaceful 
development and its responsibility to pursue a peaceful environment in which to continue to develop. 
Chinese foreign policy in this regard is a kind of strategy – from straplines of a harmonious world, to 
146 
 
peaceful rise, regional peace, stability and security is key. This also is influenced by the domestic 
securitisation of Xinjiang Province which, conflated or otherwise, constitutes a significant influence on 
China’s anti-terrorism policy.   
Iran on the other hand is the weaker partner in the respect that it is predominantly seen, 
externally, as a pariah state and as a regional non-Arab, non-Sunni outcast. Like China, it wishes to 
regain its standing as a significant and influential regional power. Unlike China it has yet to make any 
meaningful progress at this level – due to regional tensions with Arab neighbours and general 
international concerns over its Israeli rhetoric and nuclear programme. In keeping with these issues 
as well as the importance of its anti-hegemonic national and foreign policies (discussed in chapter four) 
and its theocratic governance structure, the expression of the relationship can be seen to be of greater 
utility. In order to maintain and legitimise the power of the narrative being enforced to construct an 
environment of trust and confidence – a tacit alliance – the Iranian government must do several things. 
First, as a theocracy it must defend its collusion with a secular, communist state. Second it must 
defend its cooperation with the same state which is rising and which, according to much Asian regional 
and western discourse, has delusions of hegemony through the recreation of a tributary system. It 
must also offset concerns of China’s highly complex interdependence with the USA and, to a lesser 
degree, western European states – the big and little Satan’s of the international system. From this it 
is possible to identify that these factors correlate positively with the emphasis placed on the 
enforcement of the expression framework.  
What Iran, through its media sector, does is construct a narrative which highlights above all 
else, the normative facet of Iranian-Chinese relations. Within the sources there are 240 references 
dedicated to the construction of amenability. Rhetoric highlighting partnership, friendship, various 
different forms of relations and references to history – historical relations and shared historical 
experiences all collude to legitimise a relationship on the grounds of affiliation, commonality and 
tradition. Media attention and government recognition is given to the anniversary of relations – most 
commonly in the sources gathered to the 40th anniversary of relations, alongside their ancient 
partnership as guardians of the silk road – a representation of the continent as the centre of modernity 
and internationalisation prior to the onset of imperialism and globalisation. Iran recognised China’s 
national humiliation day with references to the same history and within its own anti-hegemonic 
rhetoric, thus creating a non-cultural kinship, which highlights the lack of past conflict or significant 
tension between the two powers. Each state has the same driving force of discursively justifying their 
relations to their civic audience and promoting their commitment to the same with regard to their 
political audience (each other). The difference is the ways in which they pursue these aims, where 
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they lay emphasis, which is rooted not in their pragmatic development or maintenance of the 
relationship but in their own constructions of their wider national and foreign policy formations.     
 
Graph 4: Division of Frameworks for the Iran   Graph 5: Division of Frameworks for China 
   
The data of the two states combined provide a more generalised trend in the construction of 
a specific narrative. Here we can see that the formal representation of the relationship which is 
espoused by government White Papers and national newspapers more or less equality weights the 
construction of the relationship predominantly through the utility of the interest and expression 
frameworks. Significantly, less attention is given to what, officially, they are doing, than to why and 
how they are doing it. If the underpinning goal of such an approach is the creation of a tacit alliance, 
then these finding are certainly able to support this in the respect that the modality framework relates 
to the material base of their relations – to the pragmatic interactions. In the absence of a formal, 
binding agreement or alliance the interest and expression frameworks – the why and the how – are 
constructions of trust and confidence. They represent the discursive creation of, and commitment to, 
a positive environment/relationship based on shared norms and values. These norms and values are 
underpinned by the verbal articulations of support, understanding and sympathy. These point to the 
creation of a confidence in the ability to predict and prescribe the behaviour and actions of each 
towards the other, in a way which offsets the risks perceived to exist in relations between actors who 
have no formal alliance or shared norms and values. To invert this point, it could be argued that if 
there is no tacit commitment or alliance between them, then surely there is no need for the presence 
of this rhetoric, just as there is no need for the lack of this hyperbole and discursive practice in the 
separate non-relevant sources gathered.  It is also relevant to raise the question, though it is beyond 
the remit of this thesis, to ask why such positive re-enforcement is not so prevalent in media accounts 
of Chinese-US relations where the states are heavily interdependent economically, or even in Iranian-
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Turkish relations in which cooperation takes place along-side a dominant rhetoric of suspicion, 
mistrust and competition.  
Graph 6: combined use of rhetoric            Graph 7:combined Chinese framework divisions  
                
Conclusions 
Iran and China interact on multiple levels relating to trade, development and security – both 
domestically and regionally. Taken together they form a political economy backdrop for cooperation. 
All of their interactions have a significant economic dimension: be it investment or hydrocarbons for 
trade practices. In the contemporary era of UN sanctions and the predominance of the liberal world 
order both are at the mercy of globalisation and dominant international norms such as human rights 
expectations and freedoms evaluations. Both are outsiders, to varying degrees of the dominant 
international ‘club’.  This, combined with their historical experiences and identifications victimhood 
with regard to treatments received at the hands of external powers, has resulted in the predominance 
of both of reactionary foreign policies. China’s AIIB and Silk Road initiatives for instance are reactions 
to Obama’s ‘pivot east’ initiative, just as the SCO was created in part to offset the potential regional 
influence of liberal democracies in the post-cold-war era. Each state also conversely has similar foreign 
and domestic policy interests, as highlighted in chapters two and three, with regard to the meta-
narratives that they construct to articulate programmes not of development, but of re-development; 
revitalisation of a state that was previously amongst the most developed. Each does not want to 
succeed to the point that they are able to sit at the big boys table but rather to return to their seat 
there. The nuance is subtle but significant as they empower historical narratives of glory and success 
to create the identity that they should have, that they are seeking to reclaim. This commonality 
between the two powers, in articulation rather than process highlights points of convergence and 
similarity that are manipulated in the construction of a specific relationship.  
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As has been identified, Iranian-Chinese relations are significant in all economic sectors relating 
to trade, military co-operations, technological transfers, investment and infrastructure projects and 
issues of peace and stability in which these can take place. China is heavily reliant on Iran for its crude 
oil imports and refined oil exports – but not exclusively so as it does have other, significant suppliers 
– it also sees in Iran an accessible market free of dominant western giants which is a source of trade 
but also a testing ground for their brands. Iran in turn sees in China a back door into the international 
economy and a vital source of trade but also of development and so modernity in terms of 
infrastructure development and technological transfer. These are hard, material interests that form 
the basis of their relations. There is also a parallel benefit for the development and maintenance of 
Iranian-Chinese relations, which is tied to domestic policy interest of stability, security and legitimacy. 
Relations between the two powers supports their respect, constitutionalized, anti-hegemonic 
commitments and articulations of pride and strength that they will not bow down to external 
subjugating powers as pseudo-puppets. Each has an interest in greater regional co-operation and 
engagement, which will reap economic and diplomatic rewards, as well as boosting regional stability 
and offsetting western dominance and so interference, which is also a key foreign policy motivation 
and so co-operation between the two within wider frameworks such as the SCO, AIIB and ASEAN. In 
this respect, they certainly have the basis for a formal alliance, especially as China is heavily involved 
in the development of Iranian hydrocarbon fields and Iran potentially has an interest in the Muslim 
dominant Xinjiang province of China, which forms a specific domestic and regional security concern 
with the rise of radical Islamist organizations post-9/11.  
The central question of this thesis relates to the presence of just such an alliance and, more 
specifically, its configuration. There is no formal, binding and enforceable alliance, which raises issues 
of security – particularly for two states so suspicious of the motives of external powers. As discussed 
in chapter three, the absence of a formal alliance creates a vacuum with regard to the behaviour 
predictability of interacting states. This informs risk and trust assessments that can retard 
dependencies and efforts to cooperate bilaterally. In the absence of alliance safeguards then trust and 
risk must be increased and decreased respectively, via alternative means, a key tool of which is 
confidence building. The second part of this chapter details the extent to which this confidence is 
normatively constructed through dominant government discourse via official, censored, media outlets. 
The sources that have been selected and analysed point to the construction of a narrative of 
amenability – of cooperation, friendship, reliability, shared and exchanged culture and historical 
dependability, respect and support. The articles represent discursive practices through which each 
state supports the other, with official trade and development cooperation being supported 
150 
 
rhetorically through the inclusion of a recognition of shared history, common purpose, respect and 
support of each for the other.  
This rhetoric empowers the narrative through the accepting audience and so enables the 
politicization of the Iranian nuclear programme by China, or the Chinese vote in favour of UN Sanctions 
against Iran for instance, the securitisation of which would have resulted in a negative effect on their 
relations and domestic interpretations of it. The discourse created allows for the pragmatic 
development of their own interest without detracting from wider bilateral relations. Shared norms 
are powerful tools, as can be seen from the briefest of glances at the current liberal international order 
and concepts of freedom, human rights, and democracy. In the case of Iran and China, these norms of 
amenability construct a shared experience of victimhood and return to greatness as well as shared 
interest in a stable and economically interdependent region. Such rhetoric, along with confidence 
building measures of congratulations; commiserations; cultural exchange programmes; and the recent 
Iranian rescue of Chinese fishermen from Somali pirates; or Chinese commitments to defend the 
Iranian South Pars energy field against external attacks, all work to reduce the degree of risk involved 
in collaborating with one another – i.e. the lack of predictability in expected actions and intensions. 
Concomitantly, they also increase the degree of trust that is constructed, which related to the degree 
to which either can be predicted to act in a set way, and the extent to which that behaviour will 
support rather than betray, shared interest and collaborations. The creation and maintenance of 
shared norms relating to similarities in experience and civilisational kin ship as well as anti-hegemonic 
and non-interference policies are also significant and powerful. Shared norms and beliefs created a 
status quo of behaviour, responsibility and expectations (as ever-evolving as any status quo is), to 
construct and institutionalise behaviour in a way that constrains in both positive and negative terms, 
the behaviours of the actors concerned. Iran and China promoted shared ideals, interests and 
ambitions within domestic legitimacy and regional security frameworks, they also rhetorically 
construct support and investment in one another and shared pride and prestige over the longue duree, 
as well as sympathy and empathy in relation to each other’s fall from grace at the hands of imperial 
powers. These frameworks construct a normative reality politically and societally which, as much as it 
is constructed, in turn constructs and constrains behaviour and actions.  
The material base and the discursive practices highlighted then mirror a formal alliance vis-a-
vis shared interests, economic dependence or independency and security interests. However, the 
security concerns expressed are set within the political economy field rather than traditional, hard 
power military interests and as such affect the viability of a traditional alliance. International pressures 
are also a key component of the lack of a formal alliance as each state has its own, pragmatic agenda 
151 
 
and, for China. Especially, a formal alliance with a pariah state would significantly affect its ‘responsible 
power’ commitments and agenda. What is evident, however, is the construction of an informal 
commitment of each towards the other, in the absence of a formal agreement. Support, cooperation 
and promotion of ties are endorsed and accepted within the discursive, rhetorical, and hermeneutic 
domain of norms and value-creation and maintenance. The institutionalised of the narrative into 
national discourse also legitimises and cements such constructions and commitments to confidence 
building through trust creation activities such as tourism, cultural and student exchanges and mutual 
high-level visits between government and private sectors. Such activities are indicative of the 
existence of a commitment towards one another – of a tacit alliance.  
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions 
 
The Iranian-Chinese relationship is an interesting one, not least because of the lack of significant 
research dedicated to it, despite the two parties playing key roles in the current global political 
economy. China is a rising power with an insatiable need for energy, new markets and investment, 
whilst Iran, in turn, is a state as rich in hydrocarbon reserves as it is in ‘bad will’. This is to say that, 
though its foreign policy goals are similar to those of China, as summarized below, it is considered a 
pariah state, mistrusted by regional neighbours such as Saudi Arabia and Israel, and viewed with 
suspicion and as a potential threat by Israel and the USA due to divergent, and arguably incompatible 
ideologies. It will be interesting in the coming months and years to see how such dynamics may evolve 
now that Iran has finally reached a compromise over its nuclear programme and sanctions have been 
lifted.  
The central aims of this research endeavour are threefold, as identified in the introduction, 
the first of which is to explore the nature of Iranian and Chinese foreign policy decision-making and 
the impact of identity and cognitive factors in this process. Chapters three and four looked at Chinese 
and Iranian (respectively) cognitive foreign policy decision-making. Here the emphasis was not on the 
policies themselves, but rather, in support of this aim, was on the cognitive processes that create the 
framework within which such interests and policies are formulated and executed. This analysis of 
foreign policy decision-making highlighted a rhetorical framework within which decision-making is 
formulated and executed which places an emphasis on the roles of identity, history and legitimacy. 
Chinese foreign policy is significantly influenced by China’s identification with its pre-colonial past and 
century of humiliation at the hands of imperial powers. As such its key interests relate to territorial 
integrity as seen by its commitment to the one China policy and previous ‘ownership’ of the islands of 
the South China Sea. As a previous ‘great civilisation’ China seeks to regain this standing and so 
emphasises the need to develop and modernise, which results in a dependence on hydrocarbons that 
it must import to fulfil its insatiable energy demands.  
The CCP also came to power in 1949 on the back of claims to denounce hegemonic affiliation 
which was seen as a crime of the previous government. As such, and combined with the humiliation 
discourse, the government must maintain domestic legitimacy, and a commitment to this 
constitution. Relations with external powers such as the EU and the USA, as well as relations with 
Asian neighbours are predicated on the utility of knowledge schemas which codify the actions of 
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others based on past experiences. As such relations with Japan over the Spratly Islands involve 
previous comparisons to the latter’s role in subverting China during the colonial expansion of the 19th 
century. The various policies of successive presidents such as Mao’s ‘seek truths from facts’, Deng’s 
‘hiding light’, Enlai’s ‘peaceful co-existence’ and so on all can be framed within this cognitive process 
of maintaining a low profile in order to fulfil development and modernity ambitions.  
Iran, in turn, follows a similar path of aligning interest to previous identity perceptions as a 
great regional power prior to external colonial intervention. Iran also identifies itself, as it is identified 
by neighbours, as the non-Arab, non-Sunni interloper in the region. This identity also affects its 
perceptions of aims and interests as it heightens suspicions over the actions of others, again based on 
the assimilation of new information into existing schemas. Saudi Arabia and Iran for instance have 
long running rivalries which directly influences Iran’s perceptions of its actions and so motivates its 
decision-making practices. The nuclear programme, as discussed in chapter four again can be seen as 
being driven by Iran’s identification of itself as a developing state, wishing to return to past 
prominence as an important and advanced regional power. International concerns over this 
programme are assimilated into knowledge frameworks of past experience of external interference 
resulting in subjugation and fit the mirror image, image of the enemy cognitive model as Iran’s own 
interests are seen as being for necessity and so political issues, whilst western reactions are seen as 
part of a wider pattern of control and domination.  
The second aim of this thesis was to assess the political and economic dimensions of Iranian-
Chinese relations and the impact they have upon domestic and international economic security 
interests and concerns and how are they impacted upon by them in turn. This aim was addressed, to 
varying degrees, across all sections of the thesis. Iranian-Chinse relations and indeed their tacit alliance 
are driven by the politico-economic situation. Commitments to trust, cooperation, investment and 
support are not about friendship, they are about economic and political gains. China needs to 
modernise, it also needs to maintain legitimacy and so to provide its urban population with the fruits 
of consumerism which greater integration in the global economy permits. For this it needs energy. It 
needs hydrocarbons. And so it looks to various states in the MENA, Iran being just one partner, but a 
very significant one. Iran in turn, also needs to modernise, in the sanctions era it also needed a back 
door into the global economy in order to offset as much as it could, the socio-economic impacts of 
sanctions on its urban and rural populations which were still recovering from the First Gulf War. These 
political-economy considerations then drive the tacit alliance which is centred on development as well 
as sovereignty and legitimacy which, for both China and Iran, are inherently domestic as well as 
international issues. Iran, in the aftermath of the 1979 revolution, extolled the exportation of the 
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Islamic Revolution and though this was replaced by a more pragmatic policy in the Rafsanjani period 
and after, it still informs support of Hamas and Hezbollah, and relations with Israel. This has no such 
effect with regard to Chinese relations, however, where subjugation and repression of the Uyghur 
Muslims is politicised into a domestic issue and so not one of concern for Iran which also endorses 
non-interference in sovereign issues.  
The relationship between the two also acts to cultivate domestic legitimacy with regard to 
constitutional commitments to anti-hegemony and so the relationship is used to portray the 
continuation of this commitment on which both parties came to power during their respective 
revolutions. Similarly, it has been shown that the Iranian nuclear programme which has raised many 
issues at the international level with regard to Iranian intentions and transparency has been politicised 
by China and so deemed to constitute no existential threat. This is constructed, as discussed in chapter 
six, as being based on a relationship of trust, yet it is equally, if not more so, influenced by China’s 
interest in the Iranian hydrocarbon market as well as an opportunity to showcase China’s growing 
diplomatic, and thus soft power, capabilities.  
The relationship also impacts at the regional level as Iran is a key node of the new, or revived 
Silk Road initiative and a founding member of the AIIB. These initiatives are aimed at strengthening 
FDI and developing the infrastructure and development of member states. They are opportunities for 
greater integration into the global economy as well as, in the case of the AIIB, an attempt to offset the 
influence of dominant liberal institutions which have the ability, due to their emphasis on liberalization 
and democratization, to compromise state stability. These initiatives also seek to develop and 
strengthen regional security with regard to development, of course, and purchasing parity, but also as 
it relates to issues such as terrorism, crime and corruption. As such it can be noted that the political 
economy of Iranian-Chinese relations also has a very real international dimension. These issues 
influence, and are influenced by the political economy of the two states and their overarching foreign 
and domestic policy goals and concerns as discussed in chapters four and five. 
The overriding aim of this thesis is assess whether or not there exists a tacit alliance in Iranian-
Chinese relations. Chapters four and five identified the extent to which each states’ foreign policy 
decision-making was influenced by identity and cognition. In doing so it established specific similarities 
between the two powers with regard to their identity constructions and they ways in which these 
inform policy. As stated previously, the similarities lie predominantly not in their specific policies but 
in the driving forces behind them. Both states construct a national and international narrative of 
legitimacy framed within concepts of their respective heritages of ancient civilisations and major 
powers, tracing their lineage back to their guardianship of the ancient Silk Road and so the centre of 
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internationalisation. Each also has a reactive foreign policy, born of their respective colonial 
experiences which is manifest in the inclusion in their constitutions of their anti-hegemonic 
commitments. Each state also is keenly aware of the domestic-international symbiosis of their policies 
and the need to maintain domestic legitimacy along the lines that each took power – again tied to a 
denouncement of external intervention but also a commitment to development and prosperity for a 
fractious domestic society of multiple, and at times contentious, identities. For China this involves the 
stability of relations between native Han Chinese and minorities such as the Muslim Uyghurs which 
has the capacity to escalate into a security issue due to asymmetric rights and representations. For 
Iran the domestic arena is a potential source of conflict between the wealth urban and the 
undeveloped rural areas which constitute significant disparities in wealth and opportunities and so in 
human security terms.  
Chapter Six then expands this analysis to consider the specific interactions between the two 
parties. Firstly, the concrete interests that underpin pragmatic relations between Iran and China were 
introduced in order to establish the material base for a possible alliance. CDA was conducted to 
analyse the interactions between, and representations of, each party. This data analysis identified 
three specific frameworks for interaction which are represented by the rhetoric constructed by each 
party about the other or relating to their relations. Here it is found that despite the lack of a formal 
binding agreement between Iran and China the rhetoric used reinforces cooperation, increasing 
concepts of trust and reducing perceptions of risk in their dealings with one another. This occurs at all 
levels, through cultural affiliation or exchange, trade and investment, and knowledge and 
technological transfers. This risk reduction/trust increase suggests the presence of a tacit alliance 
which must be maintained with the normative setting of identity, diplomacy and amenability which 
frames the pragmatic material interests at play and so offset the need, to an extent, for a formal 
agreement. It also offers flexibility and space with regards to negative policies. The lack of a formal 
agreement of support between them for instance enabled China to vote in favour of economic 
sanctions at the UN (UNSC/9948), whilst still being able to follow this up with confidence building 
measures which resulted in very little impact on, or deterioration of, their relationship.  
This tacit alliance and the implications of increased Iranian-Chinese shared interests and 
increased cooperation were also analysed in relation to the recent lifting of UN economic sanctions 
against the former. This is significant not only because it increases access to Iranian markets. The lifting 
of sanctions also enables Iran to play a more active role in the south-central Asian and Asia Pacific 
regions. The nuclear issue and economic sanction no longer have the same potential ability to hinder 
Iran’s access to Asian markets first of all but secondly, and possibly more significantly in terms of 
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development and modernisation goals, Iran is able to develop its role with the SCO and as a founding 
member of the AIIB which offers an alternative economic structure to the liberal institutions of the 
World Bank and IMF. This also fits with China’s One Belt, One Road initiative which puts both states 
back in guardianship of centres of internationalisation – revised as they may be. Stable relations with 
Iran also supports China’s security concerns vis-a-vis domestic terrorism and Iran is unlikely to fund or 
offer support for any revolts in the Xinjiang region. There is also the security of hydrocarbon supplies 
which will be increased with the development of pipelines from Iran through central Asia. Two 
powerful, non-democratic powers, which are not in competition with one another has a significant 
impact on south-central Asian and on how China is perceived by neighbours, and whether it is 
securitised or not. Calling for greater interaction, interdependence and cooperation whilst lacking the 
demand for greater political liberalization and democracy has a huge potential for influence on a 
region which is generally undemocratic in the liberal sense of the word and so can offset external 
influence in the region from western powers such as the USA.  
This research finds that a Tacit Alliance does indeed exist between China and Iran, as stated 
above. This alliance is underpinned by concrete interests. More importantly, as a feature of originality 
for this thesis, it exists as a result of the constructions of a normative framework of commonality and 
affiliation. The international environment which is dominated by liberal western powers and in which 
neither Iran nor China are major powers, is not conducive to a formal alliance between the two, 
though even if it were there would be very little benefit from formalizing the relations that they have. 
The informal alliance allows greater lee-way with regard to the pursuit of individual interest, parallel 
to the execution of confidence building measures, as highlighted in chapter six. This is significant in 
two ways. The first relates to alliances theories generally, as introduced in chapter two. Whilst there 
has been much talk of the end of alliance theories following the end of the Cold-War (Oest, 2007:1), 
alliances are still important in the contemporary, globalized world of complex liberal economic trade 
practice. These range from the policies and influence of the IMF and World bank and their practices 
regarding structural adjustment policies, to the interactions of multi-lateral, or regional, trading blocs 
such as the EU. They are also important with regard to the impact of conflicting ideologies and world 
views that did not end with the Cold War but rather evolved into more complex, less territorially based 
tensions, such as the rise of Islamist rejections of perceived forms of neo-imperialist meddling in the 
form of the rise of entities such ISIS. Whilst alliances have not ceased they have altered in appearance 
and motivation to represent more politico-economic entities. This is not to say that traditional 
alliances are defunct, but rather that they exist alongside more fluid forms of state-to-state 
cooperation’s and commitments. A Tacit Alliance is one form of a more fluid collusion, though a 
significant one. It entails, or necessitates, the construction of an identity framework which permeates 
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the domestic-international divide favoured by more traditional IR theories such as Realism. This is 
significant in the contemporary era, where greater account is given to the importance of the role of 
identities in relation to stability and security. A Tact Alliance does exist between Iran and China and it 
has significant implications with regard to international relations as a set of practice and an area of 
study.  
This brings into play the second significant of the existence of a Tacit Alliance, as stated above, 
with regard to Iranian-Chinese relations specifically. The existence of a Tacit Alliance between the two 
powers adds new dimensions of understanding to their relationship and to situations such as China’s 
reluctance to support UN sanctions against Iran and willingness to play a mediating role in the recent 
sanctions negotiations with regard to the P5+1. It also assists the understanding of Iran’s refusal to 
criticise China when it did support such sanctions, as discussed in chapter six. For too long 
international relations, in practice and theory, have been pre-occupied with understanding the foreign 
policies of China and Iran, and the rise of the former and reactions of the latter, in relation to the west, 
in terms of how they relate to US foreign policy for instance, or what impact it may have on Europe. 
This western-centric view offers only a one dimensional understanding of the international arena, 
being myopic at best. China is a rising, developing power, with growing international influence and 
Iran is a developing power which plays an important role in the dynamics of the Middle East and North 
Africa. These roles and their foreign policy interests and activities must be understood from their own 
perspectives, rather than what they mean for the dominant western powers. Iranian-Chinese relations 
need also to be understood within this framework as they offer important implications for the ever 
evolving world order. 
The creation of the AIIB which draws the Asian region closer to the Middle East in economic 
and developmental terms can offer significant challenges to the dominance of the current liberal 
system which puts these two regions at the mercy of globalization rather than as active participants 
within it. The new silk road venture also brings them closer together economically as well as culturally 
and technologically as trade routes historically have transported so much more than mere goods and 
services. With the removal of sanctions and Iran’s key position with this trade route will it become, 
once again, a western outpost as European and American firms rush to its unfettered market, or will 
it retain its anti-hegemonic constitution? These are questions that need to be asked but they need to 
be asked within an understanding of the dynamics of Iranian-Chinese relations rather than within the 
dynamics of western assumptions of it. This much more comprehensive analysis of the growing role 
of both Iran and China in the coming years must necessarily include an awareness and understanding 
of the nature of the Tacit Alliance within which they relate to and interact with one another and the 
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ways in which it influences their joint and individual policies at the national and regional levels, as well 
as their responses to western discourse at the international level. This study posits that a Tact Alliance 
has been found to exist between Iran and China, and it is an alliance of significance to international 
relations both academically and politically.  
Limitations and Further Research 
There were various limitations during the course of this research project which must be acknowledged. 
First and foremost, there was the issue of the lack of accessibility to primary data from each state. 
Sourcing data, statistics and information was very difficult, especially up to date information as it is 
generally released two or three years later, and after censorship. This issue was, overall, offset by the 
decision to use CDA over a statistical analysis which also was more appropriate to the research aims. 
The issue of Iranian-Chinese relations is rather a broad one, with numerous facets and dimensions ripe 
for researching. For instance, the decision was taken in this thesis to analyse the construction of a tacit 
alliance through the utility of rhetorical devices. As such the decision was taken to analyse how the 
sources from each state represent the other, or relations with or between the other. As such the 
sources were segregated. This was a valid approach in that it enables, at the first juncture, an 
understanding of the construction of the relations between the two powers, and how these mirror 
their general foreign policy decision-making practices, habits and behaviours – as discussed in 
chapters three and four. There is arguably a potential limitation here in that the analysis does not 
cover how the sources – and so the discourses – interact with one another, how they converse if you 
like. This, however, is not so much of a criticism in that it is something the thesis should have done. 
Rather it is better suited to being recognised as an area for further research. The first step is in 
identifying the rhetoric and discourse and the ways in which it is used to frame a positive, tacit 
relationship between the two states. Further research then would expand on how this is being done 
and so a follow up discourse analysis would focus on how these discourses interact with one another, 
such as judging statements and responses to assist in the build-up of an in-depth analysis of the utility 
and maintenance of their relations with one another and so the maintenance of the tacit alliance that 
has been identified.  
 Another limitation of this research project was the lack of attention given to the specific 
foreign policies, and policy-makers, of each state. In chapters four and five the emphasis was not on 
who does policy or on specific policies. The focus was, necessarily, on the formation of policy-making, 
on the cognitive process which inform it, as these processes share commonalities between both China 
and Iran with regard to concepts of identity, history, respect and legitimacy. It is important to locate 
these underpinning forces as they are used to assess the actions and potentials of alliance partners 
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and represent the schemas that are used to assimilate information which informs calculations of trust 
and risk assessments. Again though, this also highlights areas for further research as a separate, yet 
connected avenue to pursue would be the ways in which the cognitive process impacts on specific 
polices and their executions would result in a more statistical analysis of specific policies of each party 
and how they impact the other, as well as how they are represented and the degree of effect such 
representations have on the response to policies. This could be used for instance to look at China’s 
growing presence in Africa along with Iran’s burgeoning presence, or to look at the Israel-China-Iran 
relationship and how it is conducted with little securitisation by either party. China is a rising power in 
south-central Asia specifically and in the world generally, Iran in turn is a significant power in the 
energy abundant MENA. Their relations with one another in the sanctions era, and how they develop 
in the post-sanctions climate are of much interest to policy makers, economists, academics and 
diplomats alike, particularly in the western world which is vary of the potential of both states and the 
potential hard and soft power they may be able to accumulate  
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Appendix: 
Appendix One: List of UN sanctions against Iran 
 passed on 31 July 2006: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696: 
o Iran advised to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities. 
 passed on 23 December 2006: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737: 
o  In response to failure of resolution 1696.  
o Iran ordered to suspend enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and 
cooperate with the IAEA 
o Imposed sanctions banning the supply of nuclear-related materials and technology, 
assets of key individuals and companies related to the program are frozen. 
 Passed on 24 March 2007: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747: 
o Arms embargo and expansion of freeze on Iranian assets. 
 passed on 3 March 2008: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1803: 
o Extension of previous freezes and advised states to monitor the activities of Iranian 
banks, inspect Iranian ships and aircraft, and monitor individuals involved with the 
program through their territory. 
 Passed in 2008: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1835  
 Passed on 9 June 2010: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1929: 
o Iran banned from participating in any activities related to the nuclear sector. 
o Arms embargo tightened, travel bans placed on individuals involved with the 
program, freezing of funds and assets of the Iranian Shipping Lines.  
o Recommended state inspections of Iranian cargo. 
o Prohibition of the servicing of Iranian vessels involved in prohibited activities. 
o Pretension of the provision of financial services used for sensitive nuclear activities. 
o Recommended States monitor Iranian individuals and entities they deal with.  
o Prohibition of opening Iranian banks in state territories and Iranian banks from 
entering into relationship with other banks which might contribute to the nuclear 
program, and prevent financial institutions operating in their territory from opening 
offices and accounts in Iran. 
 Passed on 9 June 2011: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1984: 
o Extension of the mandate of the panel of experts that supports the Iran Sanctions 
Committee for a further year. 
 Passed on 7 June 2012: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2049: 
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o Renewal of the mandate of the Iran Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts for a 
further 13 months. 
 Passed on 20 July 2015: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231: 
o Identifies a schedule for the suspension and lifting UN sanctions, with provisions to 
re-impose UN sanctions in case of non-performance by Iran, in accordance with the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. 
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Appendix two: Critical Discourse Analysis Tables 
Words identified as constitutive of the construction of a tacit alliance and number of times they are 
found across the selection of sources for each, and both states. 
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Iranian/Chinese use of Rhetoric (combined data)
IRI PRC
Presence of 
Rhetoric across 
sources Iran China 
Partner 36 8 
Relation 79 65 
Diplomacy 18 79 
Ref to history 48 43 
Co-operation 110 74 
Friend 20 96 
Ref to exchanges 10 78 
Trust 6 39 
Dialogue 6 41 
Positivities 57 49 
Peace and 
Stability 13 77 
Security 15 26 
Strategy 29 38 
Trade 26 25 
Development 26 35 
Region 21 22 
Combined presence of Rhetoric 
across sources 
Partner 44 
Relation 144 
Diplomacy 97 
Ref to history 91 
Co-operation 184 
Friend 116 
Ref to exchanges 88 
Trust 45 
Dialogue 47 
Positivities 106 
Peace and Stability 90 
Security 41 
Strategy 67 
Trade 51 
Development 61 
Region 43 
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Appendix Three: Critical Discourse Analysis Frameworks 
 The allocation of rhetorical notes into identified frameworks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The total figures for the combination of Iranian and Chinese Framework: 
Framework 1 (modality) 317 
Framework 2 (Interest) 499 
Framework 3 (Expression) 458 
 
      
 Iran: Strands/Themes/Frameworks   
F1 
What: 
Modality Trust 6   
F1 Modality Exchange 10   
F1 Modality Co-operation 110  Total: 126 
         
F2 
Why: 
Interest 
P&S, Development and 
region 62   
F2 Interest Diplomacy and dialogue 24   
F2 Interest Security, strategy and trade 70  Total: 156 
         
F3 
How: 
Expression Relate/partner 115   
F3 Expression Friend/history 68   
F3 Expression Positivities 57  Total: 240 
      
 China: Strands/Themes/Frameworks   
F1 
What: 
Modality Trust 39   
F1 Modality Exchange 78   
F1 Modality Co-operation 74  Total: 191 
         
F2 
Why: 
Interest 
P&S, Development and 
region 134   
F2 Interest Diplomacy and dialogue 120   
F2 Interest Security, strategy and trade 89  Total: 343 
         
F3 
How: 
Expression Relate/partner 73   
F3 Expression Friend/history 96   
F3 Expression  Positivities 49  Total: 218 
